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By investigating institutional and cultural practices as well as the consequences of the 
creative industry-led development policy in Yokohama, Japan and Seoul, South Korea, this 
dissertation critically reexamines the key rationales of creative economy-driven urban 
development and considers social costs and tensions between the state, capital and citizens 
that are embedded within creative city policy discourses and practices.  
This dissertation intervenes in the conventional understandings, which consider the 
influx of neoliberalism as the key to explain the rapid global circulation of creative city 
policy, typically based on cities in the West. By considering the policy transfer as endless 
processes of “translation” from the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory, rather than a linear 
replication process, it shows that specific institutional and cultural practices—such as the 
historical legacy of the East Asian developmental state and its relation to capital and civic 
society—are necessary not only for properly locating the meaning of neoliberalism but also 
for evaluating the complexity of neoliberal political projects in East Asia. By conceptualizing 




of Japan and Korea are test sites not only for neoliberal creative economy but also for new 
forms of governing and being governed with significant implications for fostering certain 
types of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and "creative labor". Under this framework, 
ultimately this dissertation contributes to re-orient the current debates on the global creative 
city policy from a question of “How can we develop effective creative city policy?” 
implemented by urban planners, capitals and state officials to that of “How can we invent and 
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GLOBALIZNG CREATIVE CITY POLICY AND EAST ASIAN CITIES 
1.1 Introduction 
The UN-issued Creative Economy Report (2010) emphasizes that creative industries 
have a tremendous potential to contribute to economic prosperity not only for developed 
countries but also for “developing” countries seeking to diversify their economies. The UN’s 
recognition of the creative industries as a “feasible development option” helps to explain why 
studies on this subject hold a vital significance in East Asia where both academic and public 
attention has focused on the success of this industry, more commonly known as “Korean 
Wave” and “Cool Japan” in global markets (Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008). When service 
industries began to displace manufacturing in the 1990s, East Asian governments began to 
look to “creative industries” in order to drive the future growth of urban economies (Yusuf 
and Nabeshima, 2005). Accordingly, the creative city discourse adopted by state officials in 
East Asia emerged as a new method of strategic urban planning that reinvented the city as a 
vibrant hub of creative industries seen to have the potential to improve the “quality of life” 
for citizens, as defined by Landry (2000). Recently, “creative industry” and “creative city” 
discourses have driven public policy interventions and sectoral prioritization of the creative 
economy, so much so that by 2009 over 80 cities across 35 nation-states and all major 
continents focused on explicit policy or strategic plans to develop creative city/creative 




As one of the leaders in earlier experiments in “information society” expansion 
(Castells, 1996; Evans, 1995), it is not surprising that Korea and Japan have emerged as 
leaders in creative city policy in Asia. Seoul, the winner of the World Design Capital 2010 
Award and a member of the UNESCO Creative City Network, and Yokohama, the host of 
Creative City International Conference 2009, are two exemplary cases in which the city 
government is the key initiator of these new development programs. These include 
investment on new cultural infrastructures and agencies to spearhead new initiatives, policies 
designed to the successful attraction of private capital investments and the promotion of city 
and by extension nation branding project. Seoul and Yokohama’s vision and aspiration to 
develop into more competitive cities in the global market begin since 2004, when the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government (below SMG) and the Yokohama Metropolitan Government 
(below YMG) started investing vast amounts of city revenues and human resources into these 
creative city-related projects.  
Despite their similar global recognition and celebration of new policy initiatives for 
economic and urban growth, Seoul and Yokohama have received dramatically different 
social responses and tension levels by the state, capitals and citizens in terms of their creative 
success. In Seoul, we see strong political and social opposition to the creative city policy 
agenda from various citizen groups and environmental activists. Some journalists argue that 
the creative city policy leads to the “McDonaldization of urban design” in Seoul because it is 
heavily planned and practiced by governmental top-down guidelines and regulations (Im, 
2009). This mode of elite-led urban planning has been considered as one of the problems 
caused mainly by the East Asian developmentalist state (Hill and Kim, 2000; Fujita, 2003; 




size and the font of street shops’ signboards under the comprehensive guidelines for the 
designs of buildings and construction; consequentially, these streets lose cultural diversity 
with their newly implemented similar features and homogenization. Still others argue that the 
Creative Seoul policy fosters and exacerbates social and economic inequality, which has been 
perceived as a broad symptom of global neoliberal urban reform (Harvey, 2008; Peck, 2005, 
2007). In particular, many of the urban redevelopment construction projects – such as the 
Yong-San Redevelopment Project, which caused the death of six people in a fire during a 
raid to evict protestors from a building that was going to be redeveloped in 2009 – have 
promoted the gentrification of the area and dislocated their original residents. In the case of 
Seoul, it seems that the creative city policy dubbed “Design Seoul” can be seen as a typical 
example of what might occur when East Asian developmentalism converges with global 
neoliberalism.     
 Different from Seoul’s neoliberal-developmental direction, the case of Yokohama 
demonstrated that the policy objective of utilizing “creativity” not only aims to reform urban 
planning but also to “restructure” a politics related to community development and social 
welfare (Sasaki, 2010). Among the numerous activities that are underway, the experimental 
‘Kogane Cho Bazaar’ and ‘Creative Core Area’ projects supported by the YMG are 
distinctive examples. The Kogane Cho Bazaar venture purposes to regenerate the red light 
area that had developed during the chaotic period of the immediate postwar years as a 
shopping district with over 250 shops (Sasaki, 2010), while the Creative Core Area 
undertaking endeavors to revitalize the old downtown area often called “Kannai” – which 
had been degraded after the urban mega redevelopment of its nearby waterfront district, 




buildings for artistic and cultural purposes that have in turn attracted creative industries to 
this area (Noda, 2008). Yokohama’s creative city policy advocates argue that the recruitment 
of more creative workers and the increase in art-related activities have been responsible not 
only for the enhancement of the social image of the Koganecho area but also for the 
revitalization of the old downtown socio-economically. These policy projects influenced by 
Richard Florida’s work on the “Creative Class” and Charles Landry’s idea of the “Creative 
City” came to be seen as models of how creative city policy can function as a form “social 
inclusion” (Sasaki, 2010).  
 Distinct from the welfare state models of Europe and the United States, in the 
Japanese context it has not been the state but rather business and family kinship networks 
which provide social protection through life-long employment and mutual assistance 
(Kamino, 1992; Kimoto, 1995; Mori, 1995). These “private welfare systems”—what Castells 
called “the internalization of social services” (Castells, 1999:134)—has gradually declined 
under the neoliberal globalization (Aoki, 2003).  A key question arises: within this historical 
context, should the emergence of creative city policy be understood as a “new alternative of 
social inclusion?” Does this affirmative action of creative economy-led urban regeneration 
projects actually counter the problem of neoliberal-developmental forces in Yokohama? 
More importantly, why do creative city policies of Seoul and Yokohama show different 
outcomes in spite of the common socio-economic context in which the current political 
economic movement of neoliberalism has intersected with the historical legacy of the 
developmental state?  
 These diverse gradations of government—ranging from Seoul’s more disciplinary and 




policies of Seoul and Yokohama, thereby demonstrating that an instrumental understanding 
of such policies as “global neoliberal urban reform” cannot provide a sufficient explanation 
(Harvey, 2005; Peck 2007). Conventional wisdom about neoliberalism, as sociologist Peter 
Evans (2008) argues, is often assumed to be in opposition to social welfare and 
deconstruction of social protection and economic regulation through a general retrenchment 
of government (Evans, 2008), and thus cannot successfully capture a distinctive East Asian 
variant of neoliberal movement. As anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2006) argues, in a non-
Western context where neoliberalism itself has not been “the general characteristics of 
technologies of governing,” neoliberalism produces various gradations of governing such as 
disciplinary, pastoral, civilizing/disqualifying policies; these effects tend to create 
fragmentation and uneven hybrid zones of government and citizenships in Asia. For this 
reason, I suggest that it is necessary to capture the current emergence of creative city policy 
by attentively balancing the global macro institutional features of neoliberalism with specific 
institutional, cultural practices such as the developmental state (Chakravartty and Sarikakis, 
2006; Alhassan and Chakravartty, 2011). In other words, neoliberalism should be 
conceptualized “not [as] a ‘structure’ but as mobile calculative techniques of governing that 
can be decontextualized from their original sources and recontextualized in constellations of 
mutually constitutive and contingent relation” (Ong, 2006:13). 
 Thus, this dissertation intervenes in the conventional understandings, which consider 
the influx of neoliberalism as the key to explain the rapid global circulation of creative city 
policy, typically based on the cities in the West. By considering the policy transfer as endless 
processes of “translation” in the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005), rather 




city policy emerged as a new form of urban politics in Korea and Japan where the pressures 
of global neoliberal reform are played out against the distinct histories of the developmental 
state in East Asia, whose principle of legitimacy is based on “its ability to promote and 
sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of 
economic growth and structural change in the productive system”(Castells, 1992: 56). By 
following recent researches about East Asian urban policy transformation (Park etc, 2012), I 
argue that the specific institutional and cultural practices such as the historical legacy of the 
developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society are necessary for “not only 
properly locating the meaning of neoliberalism but also for assessing the breadth and depth 
of the neoliberal political project” in East Asia. This approach offers a clearer picture and 
fills an empirical gap in the understanding of the global “creative city” phenomenon. 
Through this approach, my dissertation reexamines the key rationales of creative economy-
driven development and provides a close analysis of the political and sociological contexts of 
this policy shift. 
 Based on these theoretical and empirical reflection, in this dissertation, my central 
question is: In what ways does the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama generate new 
forms of urban politics in relation to various policy actors, including city government, local 
and global business capitals, and citizen and creative labor? To effectively answer this 
question, I suggest that this policy can be better understood as a “new urban governmental 
techniques” assembled by various discursive and material policy practices under the name of 
“creativity” including:  1) numerous urban material redevelopment construction projects 
entailing direct ecological impacts (i.e., Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park (Korea), 




administrative procedures (i.e., Seoul Design Olympiad (Korea) and Yokohama Triennales 
(Japan), and 3) continuous efforts to foster certain types of subjectivities such as creative 
citizen and creative labor (i.e., the Cultivating and Educating “Creative Citizen” 
Project(Korea) , Creative City School and Yokohama Triennale  School (Japan) ).  
 In order to capture these various discursive and material policy practices, I draw from 
a combined methodology of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and ethnographic studies of 
globalization. My research project attempts to understand the assemblage of Seoul and 
Yokohama's creative city policies by investigating practical activities and consequences of 
the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama. In my ethnographic research, I will trace 
connections of various institutional actors including Seoul and Yokohama city governmental 
officials, policy experts from governmental think tanks, activist organizations, citizen groups, 
artists and creative workers. Specifically, in the main chapters (from chapter 2 to 7), I will 
investigate 1) how and what kinds of material objects are produced by creative city policy 
including cultural artifacts, urban landscapes, and creative clusters by focusing on 
Yokohama’s Creative Core Area and Seoul’s Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park; 2) in 
what ways local and international events are practiced by routinized techniques or 
standardized procedures by focusing on Yokohama’s Yokohama Triennales and Seoul’s 
Seoul Design Olympiads; and 3) whether the new forms and templates of subjectivities are 
generated by the creative city policy by focusing on Yokohama’s Creative City School and 
Seoul’s Seoul Design Supporters Center.  
 In the next section, I will discuss how creative city policy has emerged by examining 
several different academic disciplines such as urban studies as well as media and 




the development of this policy within East Asian contexts where the current political 
economic movement of neoliberalism has intersected with the historical legacy of the 
developmental state. Thirdly, I will discuss ethnographic methods upon which my 
dissertation project is based and provide a brief outline of each chapters of the dissertation.   
1.2 Creative Industry and Creative City Policy 
 The concept of creative city is somewhat vague and a puzzling one. To observe the 
development of the concept of creative city, it is necessary to examine how the concept of 
creative city has been developed with the relationship among other similar concepts such as 
“creative industry” and “creative class”. The first coherent concept of “creative city” has 
been appeared in Landry and Bianchini (1995)’s book “The Creative City”. In this book, 
what they tried to show is that the role of cultural industry and its contribution to 
regeneration of urban development in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Europe and North 
America. By using typical example of interaction between artists and community such as the 
case of Gateshed in U.K, they view that broadly cultural industry can solve urban problems 
such as unemployment and changing city image. Comunian (2010) argues that 1998 onward, 
the word ‘creative’ became popular and began linking to the emergence of the term “creative 
industry” emerged in media and communication studies and secondly to the development of 
the “creative class” theory from urban studies (Comunian, 2010:2). The articulation of 
“creative city” to “creative industry” and “creative class” leads to a new interpretation of the 
“creative city” as a place where “creative industries are concentrated and supported”, and in 
this city “the economic success of a city is determined by the presence of a creative class” 




 The theory of “creative class” developed by Richard Florida (2002) argues that the 
key factor to enhance regional economic growth is a high level of creativity mainly led by 
“creative class” as a category of people who are not necessarily highly educated but who are 
working in “creative” and “innovative” occupations (Florida, 2002). He suggest that several 
categories and indexes to measure and rank how a certain region might attract more workers 
from the “creative class” in terms of  “technology, tolerance and talent”.  
Evans (2009) shows that the dominant objective behind the concept of creative city is 
economic development and employment focusing on “infrastructure (transportation, ICT) 
regeneration, tourism/events and branding, education and training including ‘talent’ 
generation and support” (Evans, 2009:1024). Similarly, Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) also 
show that the concept of the “creative city” has been developed by the somewhat 
“undermining and contradicting” relation to the concept of “cultural quarter” and “the 
cultural cluster” developed in urban geography (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005:6). The major 
difference from those two concepts was in that the “creative city” endeavors to emphasize “a 
more general concern with city planning in the name of “quality of life” (Hesmondhalgh and 
Pratt, 2005:6). In the context of the Western countries including Europe, North America and 
Australia, this concept becomes influential because the creative industries have been 
perceived as an important way of reinvigorating post-industrial national economies. Under 
this policy rationale, many Western countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
U.K start to drive cultural policy toward more “entrepreneur and instrumental” approach to 




On the other hand, Looking from the vantage point of East Asia, particularly from 
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and China, a different set of scholars shows that the primary 
role of cultural policies in East Asian contexts until 1980 was comprised of social and 
political agendas—such as a mechanism to decolonize and reconstruct cultural identity 
formation and nation building—rather than economic development aims (Lee and Lim, 2014; 
Huang, 2014; Lee, 2014; Kong, 2000). However, in the late 1980s and 1990s, East Asian 
countries including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China started not only to 
view culture as an efficient instrument for nation branding and soft power but also to pay 
attention to culture’s potential economic value (Lee and Lim, 2014). This relatively new 
cultural policy emerged with converging sets of discourses, such as "the knowledge economy, 
post-industrial society and globalization" (Lee and Lim, 2014, p9). Along this line, the 1996 
Asian financial crisis ignited national and city governments to look for alternative economic 
strategies; thus the creative economy strategies, "developed since the late 1990s with the 
extension of city marketing techniques and their progressive transformation into city 
branding strategies" (Garcia, 2004: 315), became influential among countries such as 
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and China (Lee and Lim, 2014; Kong, 2009). These 
creative economy strategies developed in the West were seen as the most dramatic solutions 
not only for the physical transformation of the urban landscapes but also for the enhancement 
of economic performance (Kong, 2009). This view motivated the creative city policy’s 
formulaic materialization in East Asian contexts, as Kong (2009) states: 
“To compete in the new creative economy, 1) cities should seek to implement 
particular initiatives such as encouraging creative-industry clusters, 2) incubate 




places and companies, value and reward innovation, and aggressively companies to 
attract the “creative class” as resident (Kong, 2009:2) ” 
 This description captures current strategies of so called “creative city policy”, and the 
global circulation of this type of policy rational has become prevalent and obvious. However, 
it is important to note that the development of this policy discourse of creative city is not 
based on a neutral policy decision processes but is rather driven by a “willed” political logic 
of neo-liberalism. In other words, it is necessary to consider the emergence of this policy in a 
given historical and political economic context. Political economists like Jamie Peck (2005) 
suggests that the rise of creative city policy should be understood within the broad political 
economic turn of “entrepreneurial urban strategies” in Western cities since 1980s, where the 
fall of the Fordist economy was accompanied with diminished urban fiscal capacity and a 
political turn against the welfare state’s social redistribution policies (Peck, 2005:761). 
 Harvey (1989) shows that confronted by very limited feasible options to cure the 
economic and political problem in 1980s, cities were forced them to enter zero-sum 
competitions to attract public and private investments and had to represent themselves as “an 
innovative, exiting, creative and safe place to live or visit, to play and consume” in a various 
cultural events and arts (Harvey, 1989:9). This is what he views as the rise of neoliberal logic 
to create  “new system of governance that integrate state and corporate interests, and through 
the application of money power, it has ensured that the disbursement of the surplus through 
the state apparatus favors corporate capital and upper classes in shaping the urban process” 
(Harvey, 2008:38). Under this neoliberal logic, the role of “government” from welfare state 
replaces “the governance” based on public-private partnership, and in general, this public-




 Along with this historical change, Harvey (2008) tries to answer why this discourse of 
creative city has become so prevalent both at the global and local level. Harvey argues that it 
is based on political and territorial logics of neo-liberalism that captures “local and regional 
dynamics as a source of capitalist power and augments that power by setting up havens for 
capital investment where consumerism, tourism, cultural and knowledge-based industries 
have become major aspects of the urban political economy” (Harvey, 2008:31). Similarly, 
Peck (2007) argues that creative city policy has been “artfully crafted for today’s 
neoliberalized political-economic terrain” He analyzes that the discourse and practice of 
creative city policy actively supports the prevailing neoliberal urbanism, characterized by “1) 
polarizing labor and housing market, 2) property and market-led development, 3) retrenched 
public services and social programming, and 4) accelerating intercity competition for jobs, 
investment and assets (Peck, 2007:2)” 
 Pratt (2008) also points out that the neo-liberal line on manufacturing re-location 
moved into the knowledge industry because capitalist began to notice that “it’s next big 
thing”(Pratt, 2008:114). Pratt (2008) argues that this neoliberal understanding of economic 
approach to culture has been largely based on Daniel Bell’s concept of the “Post-industrial 
Society”. Bell emphasized the emergence of a cadre of scientists or knowledge workers, who 
will be required to service and create the scientific and technological means of a post-
industrial society, and this thesis remains attractive to those who accept the notion of 
economic modernization (Pratt, 2008:115). Furthermore, the development of Bell’s line of 
thought can be found in Manuel Castells’ idea of both “The Information Society” and “The 




potential of what he called “the information economy” based on horizontal networks in terms 
of its inclusive and innovative feature.  Pratt (2008) criticizes that this line of argument 
utilizing technological determinism where certain technologies convey particular modes of 
economic development: “anywhere could be silicon valley/alley/fen’ (Pratt, 2008:120). To 
sum up, creative city policy can be understood as a neoliberal policy rationales based on 
convergences and intersections between cultural policy and urban policy in the name of 
“creativity”.  
 In spite of the global circulation of creative city policy, urban studies and media and 
communication studies scholars find some common problems in this explanation. In the next 
two sections, I will discuss how both urban studies and media and communication scholars 
views some common problems of creative city policy in terms of its theoretical flimsiness, 
limited empirical evidence and the rising social inequality in creative cites.  
1.2.1The Problem of Locating the “Creative Class” and “Creative Industries” 
 One of the critical problems is the question of the definition of “creative class” from 
urban studies and “creative industries” from media and communication studies. In the urban 
studies field, Marlet and Woerkens (2007) argue that Florida’s concept of “creative class” 
and “creativity” is not very different from “human capital theory”. In their case study of the 
Dutch creative class, even though they conclude that both a highly productive labor force and 
the right atmosphere to start up new businesses emerge in places with high levels of skilled 
and creative people, they doubt if this has anything to do with “bohemianism or creative 
ethos” endorsed by creative class theory, other than social interaction as meant in human 




based on unproven assumptions in which “culture” perceives as “intrinsic value to attract and 
engage the creative class” (Pratt, 2008:108).  
 Comunian (2010) argues that because of converging formulaic policy rational such as 
“creative class theory + creative industry policy = creative city policy”, as shown in Kong’s 
definition (2009), it is wrongly perceived that the “creative class” and “creative industry” 
refer to same stakeholders. However, he argues that both concepts are based on different 
stakeholder groups, and both groups do not want the same policy interventions. Moreover, 
this conceptual fuzziness entails a contradiction of how policy interventions promote either 
the “creative class” who desires more globalized forms of culture such as gentrified housing, 
luxurious stores and cafes, or “creative industries” which should be based on strong 
involvement of the pre-existing community, local identity, and local skills and talents such as 
craft industry (Comunian, 2010:4).  
 In the media and communication field, Hesmondalgh and Pratt’s (2005) argument 
about the definitional problem of cultural industry also give us a useful basis to understand 
the uncertain and flexible character of the concept of the “creative industry”. They note that 
the term, “culture” is a very flexible and fuzzy term. Based on this flexibility and uncertainty, 
all industries can be perceived as cultural industries “because all industries are involved in 
the production of goods and services that become part of the web of meanings and symbols 
we know as culture” (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:6). For example, in the case of the music 
industry, it is unclear if the concept includes musicians and performers as well as training, 
management, promotion, and the recording facilities, compact disc pressing plants, inlay 




problem because it is unclear which industry should be measured and surveyed in the 
categories of cultural industry. In this point, they argue that there is a “knowledge gap” 
between “the creation of definitions and new census categories” and “the implementation of 
actual survey” in the cultural industry (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:6).  
 This definitional problem of cultural industry has not been solved, and the definition 
of “creative industries” exactly inherited this fuzziness. Cunningham (2002) argues that the 
concept of creative industry claims to grab “significant ‘new economy enterprise dynamics 
that such terms as ‘the arts’, ‘media’ and ‘cultural industries’ cannot catch’ (Cunningham, 
2002:54). He defines “creative industries” as “activities which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (Cunningham, 2002:54). Under this 
general definition, he argues that creative industries include “advertising, architecture, arts 
and antique markets, crafts, design, fashion, film, software, music, television and radio, 
performing arts, and publishing” (Cunningham, 2002:54).  
 The problem with this comprehensive and inclusive concept becomes clear when 
considering the policy implication. Nicholas Garnham (2005) offers one of the distinctive 
critiques of the implications of the shift in terminology from “cultural industry” to “creative 
industries” in terms of its policy implication in western context. He argues that this change of 
label is not a mere neutral process but holds both theoretical and policy implications 
(Garnham, 2005:5). Tracing the historical policy shift in the U.K, he claims that there had 
been a clear division between “policy toward the arts” based on broadly principle of 




commerce, and “policy toward the mass media” based on the main principle of economic 
analysis of what were large-scale economic activities or industries (Garnham, 2005:16). He 
contends that un-reflexive articulation of arts and media policy creates the rhetoric of 
“creative industry” which reinforces “economic” and “managerial” language and patterns of 
thought within cultural and media policy (Garnham, 2005:6). Under this universal and 
market-driven definition, the old arts and cultural industries are now subsumed into or 
becomes a subset of the creative industries. And the reversal of the relationship occurs in 
which traditionally located the arts at the core, supplying cultural commodities and then non-
cultural spheres, such as a tourism, advertising and design services (Marcus, 2005).  
1.2.2 The Problem of Limited Empirical Evidences and Social Inequality in Creative 
City  
 Although there has been a global expansion in creative city policy adoption, there are 
few empirical studies about its long-term impact. Jayne (2004) argues that “substantial 
funding has supported creative industries development initiatives for the past fifteen years. 
However, the impact of this development on the regeneration of the city has been minimal” 
(Jayne, 2004:208). Comunian (2010) claims that the concept of creative class lacks a precise 
connection of causality with economic development, and the strong links between the 
development of creative city-regions and rising inequality still remains an open question 
(Comunian, 2010:3). Given the fragile employment and markets involved in these small-firm 
clusters, these ubiquitous economic development initiatives rely heavily on “blind faith” in 
the growth prospects of the creative and knowledge economy and in their role as catalysts of 




cities employment and population growth is taking place, but this is relatively small in 
absolute terms, and in many cases are both fragile and transient.  
 Similarly, in their study of thirteen large scales urban development projects in 
European Union Countries, Swyngedouw et al (2002) finds that the policy processes of urban 
development in targeted cities are characterized by less democratic and more elite-driven 
priorities. They argues that the new urban renewal projects so-called creative city policy are 
“the material expression of a developmental logic that view megaprojects and place 
marketing as means for generating future growth and for waging a competitive struggle to 
attract investment capital”(Swyngedouw et al, 2002:546). Chatterson (2000) also argues that 
“the “creative city” perspective remains a comfortable ‘feel-good’ concept for consultant, 
policy makers and politicians rather than a serious agenda for radical change” (Chatterson, 
2000:397). Moreover, this creative class theory has a limitation in terms of its top-down 
perspective on developing assets for attraction and growth. “The creative class” forces certain 
ideas that “the creative city needs specific local assets such as cultural amenities, cafe culture, 
cultural diversity, as well as a provision for high technology to attract creative class” 
(Comunian, 2010:3).  
 Evans (2009) points out that the potential for economic development and employment 
growth in these new area often relies on a small number of local actors and hubs such as 
universities or specialties art/design college or programs, cultural venues and some retail 
activities based on visitor economy (Evans, 2009:1005). Assumed that the potential to create 
employment and economic growth lacks credibility and hard evidence, and as such it 




importing these knowledge economy requires substantial public investments and is not 
guaranteed to succeed (Evans, 2009:1023). Because many successful urban regeneration 
projects are implying “a strong involvement with the pre-existing community and local 
identity,” it is not easily transferable and replicated for other regions (Comunian, 2010:17). 
By examining the successful regeneration in Newcastle Gateshed project, Comunian (2010) 
argues that one of the critical factors to make it possible was the sense of local pride and 
interactive dynamics. In this regard, he claims that the lesson from Newcastle Gateshed 
project cannot be easily to apply to other cities (Comunian, 2010:17).  
 Similarly, Waitt and Gibson (2009) argues that the story of creative regeneration in 
relatively small city, Wollongong, Australia, had little to do with “official planning schemes, 
global trends, desires on the part of creative producers to cluster together or the rise of the 
sorts of entrepreneurial creative cultures documented in larger cities elsewhere”(Waitt and 
Gibson, 2009:1243) Instead, they highlight that the emergence of organically developed 
creative areas in Wollongong is mostly based on residents’ level of affluence, employment 
and education and participation in grass-roots artistic scenes located not in the inner city, but 
in the city’s northern coastal areas, which provides with more affordable and relatively 
inexpensive property prices (Waitt and Gibson, 2009:1243).  
 One of the important problems derived from creative city policy is its connection to 
the problem of social and economic inequality. McCann (2007) argues that creative class 
theory narrowly focuses on life style and livability as assets for economic competition and 
cursorily engages with questions of inequality (McCann, 2007:190). Even though Florida 




policy prescription on how to achieve wage equality in the creative economy (McCann, 
2007:193). By examining the case of Glasgow, one of the most successful and widely known 
cases of European City of Culture, Mooney (2004) reports that Glasgow had become “dual 
city” characterized by “cultural-led regeneration, physical renewal in the city center 
alongside the city’s large peripheral housing estates, all too frequently depicted as residual 
backwaters of dependency poverty and crime” (Mooney 2004:334) Importantly, this social 
and economic inequality is led by “market-led urban regeneration and  significant growth in 
employment in the hospitality, tourism, retail and leisure sectors, notable as source of more 
poorly paid, casualized and irregular forms of work” (Mooney 2004:334). He claims that 
“Glasgow would become a service sector sweatshop, its workers milked by inward investors 
who would move on at the first sign of greater economic hardship and an increasing divide 
between haves and have-nots”(Mooney 2004:334).  
 Media and communication scholars whose research focuses on the development of 
the information society and its relation to inequality have contested the argument that the 
ICT-led development as one of big factions of creative industry is a neutral tool for economic 
development and social inclusion (Mattelart, 2003, Chakravartty and Sarikaskis, 2006, Zhao 
and Chakravartty, 2007). Mattelart (2003) argues that a utopian vision of global information 
society is heavily based on global capital’s old reiterated determination “to defend 
intellectual property ownership, combat pirated software programs, continue deregulating 
telecommunications, and promote common standards and protect consumer”(Mattelart, 2003, 
154). Chakravartty and Sarikaskis (2006) show that ICT-led development strategy in the 




compared to other existing employment opportunities, but they argue that many of these jobs 
actually insecure and “flexible to the detriment of workers’ interests and offer little long-term 
mobility or stability”. Moreover, these jobs are often very limited to a “tiny middle class 
minority with questionable impact on greater urban and rural unemployment” (Chakravartty 
and Sarikaskis, 2006:128).  
 Moreover, jobs created in the arts and cultural sectors also may seem attractive but 
can cause long-term social polarization. Media and communication studies scholars shed 
light on creative industries creates contingent labor situations, and this precarious working 
situations become a dominant way of life form in a given neoliberal society (Miller, 2010). 
Miller (2010) argues that the current creative industry does so under the conditions of 
flexible production and ideologies of “freedom.” Importantly, he finds that this flexible 
production regime and post-industrial labor subjectivity of “freedom” produce certain groups 
of people called “precariat”, whose life is based on extreme insecure economic and social 
conditions. Also, Hesmondalgh and Pratt (2005) claim that the cultural industries are 
traditionally marked by the co-existence of large multinational corporations and many small 
and medium-sized companies. In fact, these many small and medium-sized firms seen as an 
independent sector is high-risk and unstable, so these are not the ideal conditions for creating 
sustainable urban regeneration projects (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005:7). Ross (2010) insists 
that it is necessary to distinguish between “mere job creation” developed by current creative 





 Importantly, Garcia (2004) divides the fundamental dilemmas based on culture-led 
urban regeneration policy into three different concepts:  
“1) spatial dilemmas such as tensions between city center and periphery and the risk 
of gentrification 2) economic development dilemmas such as that of encouraging 
consumption over production, 3) cultural funding dilemmas in the choice to support 
‘ephemeral’ activity such as events and festivals or ‘permanent’ activity such as 
infrastructures”(Garcia, 2004:313).  
 He insists that the current entrepreneurial, elite-led and top-down approach to culture-
led city regeneration had “the limited capacity of cultural endeavors to address issues of 
social inclusion and multicultural representation” (Garcia, 2004:313). Following the existing 
arguments around the concept of cultural planning, he argues that it is necessary to 
conceptualize “a more holistic and flexible understanding of cultural policy that informs both 
the current notion of an arts sphere, and the economic, political, social, educational and 
environmental spheres of cities”(Garcia, 2004:324). In this regard, he claims that “the thing 
that we might concern is not encouraging a top-down ‘expert’ approach, as has been 
commonly explored by many case studies, but the emphasis must focus on providing a 
platform for the local communities, including both the average citizen, authorities and 
specialist agencies, to express their views and expectations and survey the decision making 
process” (Garcia, 2004:324). Ultimately, the goal of urban regeneration led by culture should 
“preserve local control and build a local identity and sense of place” (Garcia, 2004:324).  
 Given the conceptual flimsiness, limited empirical credibility and the problem of 
social and economic inequality, it appears questionable why this discourse of the creative city 




how the emergence of creative city policy can be located in non-western contexts, where 
neoliberalism articulates the historical legacies of the developmental state.  
1.3 Developmental State, Neoliberalism and East Asian Cities 
 Political economists like Jamie Peck (2005) stress that creative city policy is an 
exemplar case of what Harvey calls the rise of ‘entrepreneurial’ urban strategy charged by 
political and territorial logic of neoliberalism, such as exploiting local and regional resources 
as a means of capitalist power and using it to augment power by setting up havens for 
financial investment (Harvey, 2008:31). In this process, generally local governments tend to 
reduce their spending, and inequality among local governments increases, and, finally, local 
governments start privatizing some social consumption services, and this tendency links to 
increasing support for private economic development (Hill and Fujita, 2000:676). Under this 
neoliberal governance regime, what Harvey (2008) calls “the right to the city”, which is 
defined as a right far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources rather “a right 
to change ourselves by changing the city, becomes too narrowly defined and restricted in 
most cases to a small political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities as they 
desire” (Harvey, 2008:38, italic added by myself).  
 Scholars working on the legacies of the developmentalist state in East Asia question 
the trajectories of global neo-liberal movement as a major factor that account for the current 
urban policy in East Asian cities. Hill and Kim (2000) argue that it is not neo-liberalism but 
developmentalism, which can explain current urban policy in East Asian context. They 
boldly criticize that Western cities such as New York and London tend to be over-




2000:2174). They try to show how East Asian cities, especially Tokyo and Seoul, have a 
different set of policy principles comparing to western liberalist traditions. First of all, they 
argue that developmentalism addressed industrialisation not only on behalf of capital but also 
at the level of the nation-state. In this point, because enhancing national production was the 
top priority of industrial policy, “state regulations and non-market governance mechanisms 
were designed to restrain competition in order to concentrate resources in strategic industries 
and maintain orderly economic growth” (Hill and Kim, 2000:2174).  
 Similarly, Fujita (2003) argues that Japan’s state centered developmental, capital 
system enabled Japan to resist the neo-liberal urban development. She shows that “Tokyo as 
a developmental state policy-led manufacturing city makes a striking contrast with New York 
as a liberal urban policy-led service city” (Fujita, 2003). She focuses on how the role of the 
local government, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), actively directs and guides 
Tokyo’s neo-industrialization by regulating small business sectors. She argues that “TMG’s 
policy framework prevents these small business firms profiting at the expense of their fellow 
firms, employees, suppliers, customers and communities, while at the same time encouraging 
these firms through incentives to lead the Tokyo’s economy” (Fujita, 2003:266). Moreover, 
Saito (2003) show that TMG’s ‘state-led’ or ‘state centered’ urban policy initiative is not “the 
imposition of crude form of government order or command” but “the exercise of strategic 
national policy through carefully crafted institutional arrangements in which the public and 
private sectors maintained a delicately balanced relationships with consensus and conformity 
within the framework of the capitalist development state” (Saito, 2003:304, italic added by 




bureaucratic manufacturing city” based on “egalitarianism and social and economic stability”, 
while contrasting New York as a “market centered, liberal service city” based on “bourgeois 
social and economic dynamics and inequality” (Fujita, 2003; Hill and Kim, 2000). 
 Even though these scholars show how western centered arguments about global city 
overlooked local contexts in emphasizing the role of the state, some argue that emphasizing 
local context obscures “the fundamental role of global capital” (Waley, 2007:1466). 
Following Harvey, Waley (2007) claims that global urban regime shifted from “a managerial” 
to “an entrepreneurial urban regime” and from “urban government” to “urban governance”. 
One of the distinctive features is an increase of “public-private partnership” as a prime 
principle of urban restructuring and urban regeneration (Waley, 2007:1467). However, under 
the public-private partnership regime, the role of city government became that of a “market 
facilitator”, so “no longer are cities as able to establish regulatory barrier to capital; on the 
contrary, they are expected to lower such barriers” (Hackworth, 2007:61). Interestingly, 
Waley (2007) point out that the main characteristics of Tokyo as a world city become similar 
to what western “entrepreneurial city”. Firstly, he argues that the state, whether national or 
metropolitan local, increasingly withdraws their role and now act principally as “cheerleader” 
for capital “with exhortatory statements about the need for international competitiveness” 
(Waley, 2007:1486). Moreover, he shows that even Japan’s current urban development 
project is no longer based on public-private partnership but undertaken by solely private 
capital. With this change, urban entrepreneurs could capitalize even large parts of lands in 
central and inner Tokyo, and it squeezes the everyday life-spaces of the inhabitants of 




 In the same way, Shibata (2008) argues, “actually-existing developmental states in 
East Asia have vigorously applied neoliberal logic to their planning policy, even though 
neoliberalism seems diametrically opposed to the developmental state ideology at first 
glance”(Shibata, 2008:92). Shibata (2008) suggests understanding current neoliberal urban 
planning in Japan as a “another management technology to fulfill the unfettered desire and 
anxiety of developmental state elites not to lose out to global economic competition” in 
response to foreign pressure to remove unnecessary regulation and administrative guidance to 
increase “efficiency” of the market mechanism in the developmental state since the 1980s 
(Shibata, 2007:98). She claims that historically Japanese elites well understood the 
importance of “technology” such as public management technology including economics and 
public finance to exercise their power derived from their social status and to maintain their 
influence on policy-making (Shibata, 2008:110).  
 In this dissertation, I assume that even though East Asian cities have different urban 
policy traditions such as developmentalism, it is difficult to consider the current urban 
restructuring regime solely based on developmentalism or neo-liberalism. Also, it is not 
useful to ask whether state or capital have more power to influence the current urban 
restructuring. Rather, as Stubbs (2009) argues, it is necessary to acknowledge that “the strong 
state now had to deal with a strong industry but to also note that the two need not necessarily 
be seen as antagonistic; rather, that the capacities of both were generally enhanced”(Stubbs, 
2009:13). It thus becomes to examine East Asian urban restructuring policy by looking at 




Lee (2009) shows how the Korean developmental state’s neoliberal shift creates the 
symbiotic relationships between governmental and business entities through examining 
Korea’s current ICT industry policy. He points out that Korea’s democratic turmoil in 1987 
began to undermine the absolute state power held since the military regime established in 
1963. It was the 1997 financial crisis that Korean big capital, known by Chaebol, remarkably 
enhanced their power through their alliance with foreign capital, so it is the Chaebol that now 
dominate the state (Lee, 2009:569). Through these phases of what he called “the limited 
developmental state”, the state-capital relationships gradually transformed from a direct-
strong state to the “market-driven” state. Also one of the most distinctive characteristics of 
this current relation is in that state-capital relationship is retained by the principal of 
“bilateral negotiation” between the state and business entities (Lee, 2009: 572). The national 
IT infrastructure project is an exemplary case, in which the domestic telecom companies 
were fully supported by the state-capital alliance, and it is important to note that this 
powerful linkage between state-capital results in neglecting the participation of the citizenry 
(Lee, 2009: 575).  
In terms of urban policy, Kim (2006) shows that the Korean urbanism came under the 
direct impact of globalization following the 1997 financial crisis. The demographic and 
economic gaps between the capital region and other provinces widened, and the population 
share of the capital region continued to increase (Kim, 2006: 189). For example, Kim (2006) 
introduced the fourth comprehensive national territorial plan for the post-financial crisis 
period 2000-2020 as an explicit example of this tendency. The fourth plan greatly 




and the government’s role is defined as a “distributor of resources” which “minimizes along 
with the relaxation of various regulations, especially in the area of housing, land and 
construction market” (Kim, 2006: 193). On this point, the “economically egalitarian” aspect 
of developmentalism is obviously degraded in the current urban policy, and the tendency to 
promote mega-project around Seoul area exacerbates the gap between the capital region and 
the provincial cities (Kim, 2006: 201).  On the other hand, throughout the post-
developmental state period from the administration of Dae-jung Kim to that of the current 
president, policy plans for the cultural or creative industry have been driven by economic 
reductionism of culture that voices advocating cultural diversity have been drowned out by a 
vague rhetoric of “international competition”(Lee, 2007:338). Lee (2007) analyses the 
Korean government’s project of “the cities of culture” launched by the direct supervision of 
the national government and its Ministry of Culture and Tourism. These cities are designated 
in order to promote global tourism and construction for the logic of economic development 
(Lee, 2007).   
<Figure 1> summarizes the evolution of the relationship between state and capital in 
Korea from “the developmental state” to “the post-developmental state” throughout “the 
limited developmental state”, and it locates two current urban policies as an example policy 
influenced by the post-developmental state regime. In sum, the developmental state 
transforms and retains its influences based on newly created state-capital relations in East 
Asian countries, and the current urban policy should be examined by this new capital-state 




diminished its power, as the previous literature shows, it has in practice takes a more market-
driven direction.  
Figure 1: The evolving phase of the developmental state and the urban policy1         
  
 In recent research about East Asian urban policy transformation, Park and his 
colleagues (2012) argue that the evolving relationship between neoliberalism and state-led 
developmentalism in the East Asian context produces “sizeable gaps” between “what 
neoliberal theory postulates” and “what has actually materialized” (Park etc, 2012:2). 
Influenced by the concept of “actually existing neoliberalism” from Brenner and Theodore 
(2002), which highlights the contextual embeddedness of neoliberalism, Park and his 
colleagues (2012) argue that it is necessary to properly “locate” neoliberalism by exploring 
path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited institutional framework 
of the developmental state and emergent neoliberal and a market-oriented restructuring 
																																								 																					




project. In order to explain the current East Asian situation, Hill (2007) suggests applying the 
distinction of the East Asian “neo-developmental state” versus the “post-developmental 
state”. Comparing the levels of market openness and state planning along these two 
dimensions, he notes three types of East Asian countries: 1) the Neo-Developmental State 
(Thailand: High Market Openness/Low State Planning), 2) the In-Between State (Korea and 
Taiwan), and 3) the Post-Developmental State (Japan: High Market Openness/High State 
Planning) (Hill, 2007). Because Japan’s focus is now on “innovation” and “quality of life” 
rather than on catching up with the West’s rapid growth, he argues that Japan is currently in a 
post-developmental stage which marks “both the continuity with past developmentalist 
traditions and institutions” and “the emergence of new ideologies and structures in Japan that 
conform neither to neoliberal nor to developmentalist models” (Hill, 2007). The ambiguities 
and uncertainties containing the concept of “post-developmentalism" require a historically 
specific understanding of the regulative and distributive dimensions of the creative city 
policy in East Asia.  
 Current studies of policy transfer also provides useful insights regarding how certain 
policy regimes can emerge and stabilize through continuous transferring practices of various 
policy actors. Peck and Theodore (2010) argue that policy transfer entails the establishment 
of connections between policy actors and policymaking sites, and these actors cannot be 
perceived as lone learners, but as embodied members of epistemic, expert and practice 
communities. Moreover, mobile policies rarely travel as complete “packages;” instead they 
move in “bits and pieces” as “selective discourses, inchoate ideas and synthesized models” so 




more complex process of nonlinear reproduction. Importantly, even though the promotion of 
creative city policy now has become a global phenomenon as “quasi scientific policy 
rationales” – heavily reliant upon proxies but light on “theory” or hard “evidence” – the rapid 
transfer and emulation of the creative city policy is based on what Evans calls a ‘movement’ 
of global policy and advocacy (Evans, 2009). This tendency is a ‘movement’ because the 
creative city policy is widely promoted through specialist intermediaries, experts and centers 
as well as through government and agency-sponsored exchanges via “inter-local policy 
networks” of conferences, symposia and roadshows (Evans, 2009:1006). The creative city 
policy as a mobile policy blurs boundaries of global and local, and temporal dimensions, thus 
necessitating more contextualized and historically-specific analyses. The different and 
distinctive role of developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society in the 
creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama empirically shows how differences and 
ambiguities are at play when policy moves among historically distinct regions. Thus, as Ong 
(2006) argues, the interactions between neoliberalism and state action require a conceptual 
openness to contingent, ambivalence and uncertain outcomes for unconventional spaces of 
neoliberal movement (Ong, 2006:75). 
 In order to delineate a historically specific understanding of the regulative and 
distributive dimension of the creative city policy in Korea and Japan, I contend that the 
creative city policy in Korea and Japan should not be considered as a simple neoliberal 
economic doctrine in terms of “a negative relation to state power, a market ideology that 
seeks to limit the scope and activity of governing” (Ong, 2006). Rather, I argue that this 




governmental techniques” that are assembled by various discursive and material policy 
practices under the name of “creativity.”  Following Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991), Ong (2006) argues that neoliberalism can be perceived as an “economic 
doctrine” as well as a “technology of government” in “a profoundly active way of 
rationalizing governing and self-governing in order to “optimize”” (Ong, 2006:3). Thus, the 
creative cities of Japan and Korea are test sites not only for neoliberal creative economy but 
also for new forms of governing and being governed with significant implications for 
fostering certain types of subjectivities such as “creative citizens” and “creative labor”. 
Creative city policy in both Korea and Japan actually include “the array of knowledge and 
techniques that are concerned with the systematic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of 
everyday conduct” (Ong, 2006:4). Both cities’ policies contain 1) numerous urban material 
redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological impacts (i.e., the Seoul 
Design Street Project and the Dongdaremun Design Plaza and Park construction plan (Korea), 
Creative Core Area project, and the National Art Park Project(Japan) ), 2) various knowledge 
production projects supported by governmental think-tanks and academic works (i.e., the 
Seoul Foundation for Arts and Culture and the Seoul Design Foundation(Korea), Yokohama 
Creative City Center and the Arts Commission Yokohama(Japan)), 3) many local and 
international events practiced by routinized administrative procedures (i.e., the Seoul Design 
Olympiads and Hi-Seoul Festival (Korea) and Yokohama Triennales and the Creative 
Neighourhood Project in Yokohama(Japan)), and 4) continuous efforts to foster certain types 
of subjectivities (i.e., the cultivating and educating “Creative Citizen” Project(Korea) and the 




My research is thus an attempt to empirically map this making and remaking of 
relations or connections among city government, capital, various citizen groups and creative 
industries workers through the creative city policy as a new mode of urban governmental 
techniques. Even though these identifiable actors play a key role in developing creative city 
policy in both cities in particular ways by sharing a certain set of meanings and practices 
surrounding such policies in order to explain their own developmental path, I do not assume 
that any of these are privileged or pre-established potential actors for creative city policy in 
Seoul and Yokohama. Importantly, in a given post-development context in Korea and Japan, 
each actor’s character and formation dynamically and actively transform in unconventional 
ways. For example, as a neo-institutional approach to developmental state researches 
demonstrates, the relationship between state and capital has been transformed from 
“repressive” to “symbiotic.” Similarly, as media and communication scholars note, the 
relationship between capital and labor in creative economy becomes “flexible, insecure and 
precarious.” Under this changing relationship among state, capital and labor, the non-
governmental nonprofit organizations in particular—such as the Seoul Design Foundation 
and the Yokohama Creative City Center whose major roles are to promote “inter-local policy 
networks” and to facilitate “cooperative activity” between the private and the public—
become tremendously important.  
Based on previous literature, <Figure 2> summarizes various possible relationships 
among state, capital, labor and non-governmental nonprofit organizations related to creative 





Figure 2. The various relationships among policy actors of creative city policy in Seoul 
and Yokohama
1.4 Research Design and Methods 
 In elaborating my previous discussion (in introduction) of my three central questions 
and methodological approach, I explain further why these approaches best address my 
questions. And I will lay out more concretely my object of study in both sites.  
 I draw on the growing body of literature on Actor-Network Theory (below ANT) 
from the Science, Technology and Society (STS) tradition to trace the dynamic linkage 
surrounding the creative city policy to better capture the contingent, ambivalence and 
uncertain movement of creative city policy. ANT suggests that certain urban realities emerge 
from the enactment of both material and discursive heterogeneous relations that can construct 
and deconstruct all kinds of actors including human and non-human (Law, 2007). These 




privileging any strong claim as to the concrete character of associations of human and 
nonhuman actors, ANT challenges social aggregates such as class, group, state, and capital 
not as “the objects of ostensive definition” but only of a “performative definition”(Latour, 
2005). Because of its performative characteristic, social aggregates can be perceived as 
endless processes of making and remaking through some other non-social means, and social 
aggregates cannot sustain their existence without explicit and implicit efforts to keep up 
(Latour, 2005). Under this notion, actor starts being considered as a dynamic entity having 
contradictory voices within its own boundary and actively designating other groups as being 
empty and dangerous to build their own boundaries (Latour, 2005:31-32). Just like the 
concept of actor, for ANT actors engage in providing controversial accounts for their actions 
as well as for those of others, so action cannot be understood as doing something “under the 
full control of consciousness”. Rather, it can be perceived in the sense of the “dislocated, 
borrowed, distributed, influenced, dominated, betrayed and translated” (Latour, 2005:46, 
italic added by myself). Following this performative and relational concept of actor and 
action, my research, which focuses on the actual practices and consequences of the creative 
city policy, illustrates how the temporality and performativity of state, capital, citizens, and 
urban objects shape and translate the context and usage of the creative city policy.  
 By applying ANT approach to urban studies, urban assemblage scholars suggest 
considering policy transfer as endless processes of “translation,” rather than a linear 
replication or emulation process (e.g., Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2010; Bender, 
2010; McFarlane, 2011a, 2011b; Smith 2010). Farias (2010) points out that three principles 




theoretical and methodological impasses of urban studies. In detail, ANT’s radical 
relationality extend its scope beyond language, culture and communication to all entities, and 
this extension of relational character makes us understand objects, technologies, texts, 
humans and institutions not as staying to separated and incommensurable realm of their own 
but as “mutually constructing each other” (Farias, 2010:3, italic added myself). More 
importantly, Farias (2010) argues that ANT scholars’ aim of applying this principle to the 
social is not based on “deconstructing the social, but on understating the associations that 
make up the social”(Farias, 2010: 3, italic added myself). In a similar vein, McCann and 
Ward (2011) propose to conceptualize cities as "assemblages" in terms of three interrelated 
aspects: 1) assemblages "shape, reorient, reconstitute wider flows, thus continually 
reconfiguring geographies of territoriality and relationality"(McCann and Ward, 2011:13), 2) 
assemblages enables to overcome "the sorts of easy analytical dichotomies such as 
fixity/mobility and global/local"(McCann and Ward, 2011:14), and 3) any achievement 
process of assemblages of urban policies shows "uneven consequences" by involving actual 
policy practices and politics (McCann and Ward, 2011:14). In doing so, it is possible to 
understand contemporary urban policymaking process as "neither the absolute 
territorialization of societies, economies, or cultures onto a global scale, nor complete 
deterritorialization into a supra-territorial, distanceless, placeless or borderless spaces of 
flows" (McCann and Ward, 2011:14).  
 By evaluating the current urban assemblage researches, Brenner and his colleagues 
(2011) found that there are three different types of research trends. Firstly, what they called 




so much to "reframe concrete urban analysis" rather than draw on assemblage approach as 
"an ontological foundation"(Brenner et al, 2011:231). The second trend, dubbed 
"methodological orientation", tends to use selected methodological tools from ANT to hinge 
on and to re-conceptualize the handling of socio-natures within critical urban theories 
(Brenner et al, 2011: 231). Finally, the third trend, so-called "radically ontological approach", 
altered urban political economy in order to reformulate the "fundamental character" of the 
urban social world (Brenner et al, 2011: 232). Brenner and his colleagues (2011) claim that 
the third development path might lose its theoretical and critical benefits because it tends to 
rather concentrate on "descriptive focus associated with ontological variants of assemblages" 
by forgetting important structural contexts within which actants are located such as 
formations of capital accumulation (Brenner et al, 2011: 232). In this regard, they suggest 
that urban assemblage research can best contribute to critical urban research tradition when it 
is linked to "political economy or to another theoretical framework attuned to the 
structuration of urban processes" including capital, states, territorial alliances or social 
movements (Brenner et al, 2011:232).  
 This criticism toward assemblage approach is not new. As Law (2007) reported, ANT 
has been criticized in that ANT researches somewhat overlooked the issue of politics and 
power (Star, 1991; Haraway, 1997; Couldry, 2004). Star (1991) points out that the 
intermingling of human and nonhuman should begin with the question, “cui bono?” rather 
than begin with analytical interests. For example, she indicates that certain large network has 
an irreversible character, no matter what their ontological status. She argues that the reason 




from externalities of its own structure, density of communications populations, and already-
established maintenance (Star, 1991). In this point, she claims that these network externalities 
are important not for its heuristic reason but for its power and political reason (Star, 1991:40). 
That is, ANT scholars should consider that the network is not a realm of “neutral” space but a 
realm of where “unequal” distribution and access already exist. It is necessary for ANT 
scholars to start thinking with the facts that “No networks are stabilized or standardized for 
everyone” (Star, 1991: 44). 
 Couldry (2003) also points out that applying ANT approach should be thoroughly 
considered in terms of its “insufficient attention to questions of time, power, and 
interpretation”(Couldry, 2003:11). He argues that ANT studies tend to have very little 
interest to say about processed that come after the establishment of certain networks. Because 
of this trend, ANT closes its eyes to view “the long-term consequences of network for social 
space and its implication for the distribution of power”(Couldry, 2003:7). This lack of 
attention to time and power is connected to another problem of what he called “the problem 
of interpretation” in ANT. Couldry (2003) claims that ANT is less interested in possibility 
that networks and their product can be “re-interpreted” overtime after they have been 
established. To overcome this limitation, similar to Brenner and his colleagues (2011), 
Couldry suggests combining ANT to other sociological concepts such as Durkheim’s notion 
of the social ‘categories’ and Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ (Couldry, 2003:10).  
 To sum up, the critiques of assemblage researches suggest that ANT research should 
not stop their analyses at uncovering whether heterogeneous actors intermingled together but 




possible. As Brenner and his colleagues rightly argue (2011), to better explore these 
questions of "how and why", it is necessary to locate certain urban assemblages under 
specific historical-geopolitical economic conditions. In doing so, my study attempts to map 
creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama by attentively balancing the global macro 
institutional features of neoliberalism with specific institutional and cultural practices such as 
the developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society (Chakravartty and 
Sarikakis, 2006; Alhassan and Chakravartty, 2011). 
 This dissertation also explores the issue of subjectivities, politics and power that have 
been overlooked in ANT literature (Star, 1991; Haraway, 1997; Couldry, 2004). In 
examining the reconfiguration of subjectivities in creative city polices, I draw on Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality for its emphasis on the effect on the enactment of strategic logics 
based on stable arrays or networks of relations (Foucault, 1991; Law, 2002). I am also 
following the insights of critical ethnographers of globalization in practice influenced by 
Foucauldian perspective who argue that global integration has had splintering effects based 
on local historical and cultural contexts (Ong, 2006; Tsing, 2004; Ferguson, 2006; Murray-Li, 
2007; Mitchell, 2002). These scholars argue that the development project implemented by 
post-colonial developmental state function as a political technology of control. Under this 
logic, Murray-Li (2007) shows that governmentality can only be formed “within a 
heterogeneous assemblage or “dispositif” that combines "forms of practical knowledge, with 
modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of 
judgment, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscriptions, 




 In order to bridge ANT to post-structuralist politics, Law argues that “actor-network 
theory can also be understood as an empirical version of post-structuralism” (Law, 2007:6) 
Law (2002) views that post-structuralism is based on the notion that “there are different and 
incomplete deep structures underpinning and being enacted in different social locations” 
(Law, 2002:91). He claims that ANT actually shares similar vision of post-structuralism in 
that “speech, bodies their gestures, subjectivities and materials are an effect of enactment of 
strategic logics based on stable arrays or networks of relations” (Law, 2002:91-92). 
Borrowing from Foucault’s concept of “order of things” in modernity, ANT believes that 
there are many possible “modes of ordering,” and forming and deconstructing a certain order 
are the effects of what they call certain associations or networks. Under this connection to 
Foucaultian notion of governmentality, Law suggests how ANT study can contribute to 
explore the society in terms of three different ways in terms of “material durability” 
“strategic durability” and “discursive durability” (Law, 2007). Firstly, Law claims that it is 
possible for ANT to discover why some materials or material relations last longer than others 
(Law, 2007). As Foucault shows in his example of Bentham’s panopticon, ANT is 
particularly useful to explain how certain configuration of the network produces its durability, 
and how its durability can be modified because it weights material and object as much 
important as social elements. Secondly, Law (2007) points out that ANT can be useful to 
analyze how certain kinds of strategies can create a durable network and how these networks 
can retain their power (Law, 2007:9). 
 Following this conception of governmentality and order of things, I am particularly 




or reordering the material and symbolic work of the creative city policy (Law, 2007).  One of 
the best examples is the current city government-led urban mega events such as Yokohama 
Triennales and Seoul Design Olympiads that include many training and educational programs 
for citizen. Moreover, anthropologist Robert Oppenheim (2008) argues that ANT is tracing 
the multifarious connections among actors, things, and forces at their various sites of 
interactions. He claims that “thick description” is not the right metaphor to explain ANT. 
Rather, it is closer to “string figures” “after narrow but complex linkages” (Oppenheim, 
2008). To capture these string figures, as Ong (2006) argues, my goal for ethnographic 
research is not to discovery “an “appropriate” scale of action-national, global, or local-but to 
identify an analytical angle that allow us to examine the shifting lines of mutation” of 
creative city policy (Ong, 2006:12). 
 Following the urban assemblage work of ANT (i.e.,Farias, 2011; Smith, 2011) and 
critical ethnographers of globalization in practice (Ong, 2006; Tsing, 2004 ; Ferguson, 2006; 
Murray-Li, 2007; Mitchell, 2002), my research goals thus are to understand and analyze: 1) 
how material objects produced by creative city policy such as cultural artifacts (i.e., 
uniformed and standardized signposts and public facilities), urban landscapes (i.e., 
Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction(Seoul) and Creative Core Area 
construction(Yokohama)), and creative clusters (i.e., the Kangnam design cluster in Seoul 
and the Kannai area in Yokohama) are arranged; 2) how knowledge objects and conceptual 
forms are created by the creative city policy (i.e., policy reports produced by the Seoul 
Design Foundation and the Yokohama Creative City Center);  3) in what ways local and 




administrative procedures of the Seoul Design Olympiads and the Yokohama Triennales); 
and 4) whether the new forms and templates of subjectivities such as "creative citizen" and 
"creative labor" are generated by the creative city policy (i.e., cultivating and educating 
programs for  creative citizen and creative labor in Seoul and Yokohama Creative School and 
Yokohama Triennale School in Yokohama). 
1.5 Sampling Frames 
1.5.1. In-Depth Interviews 
 This research was funded by the Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation and the Social 
Science Research Council Korean Studies Dissertation Development Workshop. Under this 
financial assistance, During the 8 months fieldwork in Korea (from June to September 2012 
and from September to December 2013) and 11 months fieldwork in Japan (from October 
2012 to August 2013), I conducted in-depth interviews with various policy actors including 
state officials, corporate professionals and NGOs as well as creative workers in the wider 
area of the creative city policy. The purpose of in-depth interviews was to find out the 
relations or connections among various policy actors through the creative city policy. Seoul 
and Yokohama offered access to various state officials related to the creative city policy such 
as the Department of Culture, Tourism and Design at SMG and the Seoul Design Foundation 
(Korea) and the Arts Commission Yokohama and Creative City Division in Culture and 
Tourism Bureau and Yokohama Creative City Center (Japan) along with access to private 
firms mostly located in the Kangnam, Mapo and Guro districts (Korea) and in the 




15,000 workers constitute creative clusters in Seoul. In Yokohama, nearly 2000 artists and 
around 15,000 workers consists of its creative industrial cluster. 
 In detail, in case of Seoul, my primary target group of state officials was SMG’s the 
Seoul Design Foundation, which is an organization in charge of implementation and 
management of Seoul’s creative city policies. Under its slogan of “Caring for Citizens”, 
Seoul Design Foundation’ projects mainly consist of two different streams: 1) making “world 
class design city” including urban redevelopment construction projects (i.e. the construction 
project of Dongeadmun Design Plaza and Park) and 2) establishing “comprehensive and 
universal guideline” for public design (i.e. the establishment of comprehensive regulation for 
street signboard design). In case of Japan, the counterpart of state officials was YMG’s 
Creative City Division in Culture and Tourism Bureau. Yokohama Creative City Division’s 
policy objects include two different parts: 1) urban redevelopment construction projects such 
as “National Art Park Plan” and “Creative Core Areas” to promote and stimulate local 
economy through creative industry, and 2) citizen participant culture and arts projects such as 
“Kogane Cho Bazaar” in order to enable citizens to take the lead and participate in the 
creation of the Creative City of Arts and Culture. The in-depth interview with state officials 
focused on the role of city governments in the creation and shaping of creative city policy. 
The Seoul Design Foundation has been established in 2009 to provide with concrete and 
practical support to design industry. It is primarily engaged with the urban redevelopment 
construction projects such as Dongdaemoon Design Plaza and Park (below DDP) and 
manages Seoul Design Support Centers to provide facilities, information, education and 




case of Japan, the Yokohama Creative City Center is the counterpart of Seoul’s. The 
Yokohama Creative City Center is established to provide intermediary between the municipal 
authorities and local communities, so its major role is to make Yokohama more friendly 
location for artists, local residents, companies and schools. Under this aim, it is 
comprehensively engaged with creative city polices initiated by YMG. 
 The second group for in-depth interview is non-governmental and non-profit 
organizations related to creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama. In case of Yokohama, 
Bank ART 1929, one of Yokohama’s first and most well-know creative city projects, was the 
major target organization. In addition to Bank Art1929, various other organizations, who 
directly or indirectly involved in Yokohama’s creative city policy were also contacted and 
interviewed. Such organizations included Sakura works, Kannai Future center, SP Spot, 
Koganecho Management office, Kotobuki Creative Action, etc. In case of Seoul, I 
interviewed with different types of NPOs, both who are voluntarily collaborated with SMG's 
creative city policy and who actually countered with and opposed to SMG's creative city 
policy such as Listen to The City and Listening. These different types of NPOs/NGOs 
represent various different social responses and opinions to Seoul's creative city policy. The 
in-depth interview with these organizations focused on how and in what extent these 
organizations promote and “inter-local policy networks” and to facilitate “cooperative 
activity” between the private and the public sector.  
 I also conducted in-depth interviews with creative workers and artists groups in Seoul 
and Yokohama. In Seoul, the companies and artists in Seoul Design Support Center were the 




by Seoul Design Foundation is an integrated business incubator facility dedicated to 
revitalizing the design industry by discovering competent design companies and providing 
them with office space and financial support. This studio is located in Dongdaemun district, 
one of the Seoul’s major creative industry clusters, and currently 45 private companies 
operate their business in the field of industrial design, product design, environmental design, 
packaging design and visual multimedia content production. In addition to these groups of 
companies and workers, I also contacted and conducted interviews with numerous academics 
and creative workers via the Facebook club titled “What can design do for Seoul?” opened by 
the Seoul Design Foundation. This online club was filled not only with designers but also 
with various types of “creators” including architects, painters, and musicians who shared 
their ideas and opinions about SMG’s creative city policy.  
 In Yokohama, the companies and artists in the Creative Core Areas were major 
interviewees. The Creative Core Areas established by YMG is formed “to use the local 
resources between areas, develop core facilities, expand hubs for creative activity, and 
encourage the clustering of creative businesses in Yokohama”(Yokohama Municipal 
Government, 2015). The Creative Core Areas consists of interlinked districts including 
“Bashamichi Avenue Area” “Nihon-Odori Avenue Area” and “Sakuragicho-Noge Area”, and 
the YMG provides certain amounts of subsidies to partially cover the initial cost of locating 
an establishment for companies and artists in the field of design production, film, new media 
content production and artistic activities. Through interviews with these corporate 
professionals, artists and creative workers, I want to locate my dissertation in broader debates 




 Interviews produced data that allowed me to understand actors’ beliefs and opinions 
about the creative city policy as well as informant’s daily practices in certain creative city 
projects. I have conducted preliminary interviews with workers and business people in the 
creative industry as well as government officials in Seoul during my master’s thesis research 
in 2007. Also, the preliminary fieldtrip to Yokohama in February 2012 allowed me to visit 
the creative city project sites in Yokohama and meet some of key policy actors such as non-
governmental organization officials and artists. I had continued to maintain contact with 
these respondents in both Seoul and Yokohama and could gain access to the area. I initially 
estimated that each city would run 35 interviews with various stakeholders in creative city 
policies, and I conducted 20 interviews in Seoul and 35 interviews in Yokohama. They 
include: officials of the state regulatory organization such as SMG (n=3) and YMG (n=7), 
representatives of non-governmental organizations in Seoul (n=4) and Yokohama (n=16), 
corporate professionals, artists and creative workers in Seoul (n=20) and Yokohama (n=12). 
The brief interview time of each participant was 1-session for a total time of 60 minutes or so. 
In some cases follow-up session was also conducted as required by the study under the 
agreement from the interviewee. More detailed demographic information about each city's 
interviewees is included in the tables in the Appendixes.  
1.5.2. Archival and Documentary Research 
 With in-depth interviews with various policy actors, I also collected extensive amount 
of archival and documentary data. These “texts” include state regulations offered by 
government officials; cultural representations reported by journalists; and knowledge and 




Seoul Headquarters established numerous state regulations related to creative city policy such 
as “comprehensive public design guidelines” and regularly publishes numerous policy books, 
periodicals, and PR booklets such as electronic version of policy PR book “Design Seoul”. 
Seoul Design Foundation also publishes various policy reports, educational books and policy 
PR books such as monthly updated web-magazine to inform their projects on their websites. 
In Yokohama, Creative City Division in YMG inaugurates various state regulations to initiate 
creative city policy such as Creative City Division Policy guidelines for the management and 
annual evaluation and assessment reports of Creative City policy. Yokohama Creative City 
Center distributes various policy reports, educational books and policy PR books such as 
“Yokohama Sozokaiwai”, monthly uploaded web-magazine showcasing most updated events, 
news, projects of the Yokohama art scene. The main purpose of collecting archival and 
documentary evidence from firms, foundations, think-tanks, and the state is to understand the 
role of the creative city policy sector in urban development. The growing body of multimedia 
and films from corporations, the state and NGOs that represent the importance of creative 
industry is also a valuable means by which to study constructions and contests of the creative 
city policy. 
1.5.3 Events and Meetings Participant Observation 
 I also attended events, festivals, conferences and meetings held by the different policy 
actors involved in the initiative of the creative city policy. These “events” include 
participation in cultural festivals and education programs held by the city government and 
visits to exhibitions and international and domestic conferences such as the Creative City 




events, festivals and conferences, such as 2011 Seoul UNESCO Creative Cities Network 
Conference. This research aims to follow linkages and interactions among various policy 
groups. It is important to attend these numerous formal and informal events, festivals, 
conferences and meetings not only they are crucial and important “contact points” of various 
actors to form inter-local policy networks but also they function as continuous efforts to 
foster certain types of subjectivities and citizens. I draw on the technique of participant 
observation to grasp how various actors arrange and rearrange new forms of relationships and 
subjectivities. 
 Within these various events related to creative city policy, in Seoul, I participated in 
education programs and events held by Seoul Design Foundation. In Seoul Design Support 
Center managed by Seoul Design Foundation, numerous education programs and events from 
basic design education program for citizens to professional entrepreneurship and marketing 
program for future creative workers. I registered some of these programs and tried to capture 
how Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG), Seoul Design Foundation (SDF) and capitals 
jointly have promoted and fostered a certain type of subjectivity who is ideal for its creative 
city project. One of the mentoring programs, in which I participated during July 2012 called 
the “Design Job Searching Clinic”, was held in Mapo-gu City Hall and was jointly sponsored 
by the SMG, SDF and two online job-searching companies (Designer Jobs and Media Jobs). 
Also I had a chance to participate in one of the relatively 'biggest' events, which was named 
the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7". This event included public discussions, volunteer 
citizens' public talks about their opinions on Seoul's creative city policy, and such cultural 




 In case of Yokohama, I participated in two distinctive social inclusion type projects, 
Creative City School held by Bank Art 1929 and Yokohama Triennale School jointly held by 
the YMG and the Koganecho Area Management. Both projects are important in the sense 
that the objective of projects not only aims to reform urban planning but also targets to 
implement creative city policy as social inclusion and community development. The Creative 
City School, in which state officials, art NPOs, academics, and creative workers gathered 
together weekly to discuss and share their opinions and ideas about Yokohama’s creative city 
policy. Because the Creative City School held bi-weekly gatherings over about two month 
periods, it was a sufficient amount of time for them to develop a somewhat "deeper" 
relationship among the participants. The Yokohama Triennale School was managed by the 
official Triennale Supporters' office, consisting of the staff from the Yokohama Museum of 
Art as well as from the Koganecho Area Management, an art NPO in charge of the 
management of the Koganecho area. The participant observation for this event was important 
in that it clearly gave me a sense of how the state and NPOs guided and practiced 
Yokohama’s one of the biggest urban mega events. Through involvement in these events, 
state officials on the one hand actually could monitor and obtain opinions about the city's 
current creative city policy from creative workers and art NPOs. On the other hand, creative 
workers could have the opportunity to build networks, find their next jobs from one another, 
and acquire the most recent information about the city's creative city policy. By attending 
these events, I attempted to find certain “practices” of institutional actors’ routinized 
techniques or standardized procedures to produce new forms of subjectivities as well as 




1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation consist of five different parts including: 1) Introduction, 2) Analysis 
of Urban Construction projects in Yokohama and Seoul, 3) Analysis of Urban Mega event 
projects in Yokohama and Seoul, 4) Analysis of Labor subjectivities in Yokohama and Seoul 
and 5) Conclusion. Parts 2, 3 and 4 will be divided into two individual chapters, which will 
include a variety of dimensional dynamics of each city’s creative policy in terms of places, 
events and subjectivities.   
 Chapter 1 outlines the global circulation of creative city policy and related literature 
within the East Asian context. This section contains theoretical orientations based on a 
literature review of various disciplines about creative city policy, creative economy policy 
and urban planning as well as a methodological approach. Drawing from the developmental 
state analysis, this chapter includes both historical and institutional contexts of East Asian 
urban politics and their relation to neoliberalism. Also, drawing from Actor-Network Theory 
and the ethnography of globalization, I explain further why these approaches best address my 
question and lay out more concretely my object of study in both Seoul and Yokohama. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the question of how creative city policy are located in 
procedures and objects within the urban construction projects. These chapters focus on urban 
material redevelopment construction projects entailing direct ecological and social impacts. 
In Seoul, the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park project initiated by Design Seoul 
Headquarters and managed by Seoul Design Foundation comprise the primary research 
sources of this chapter. The area of Dongdaemun has established itself as the heart of the 




million or one half of Seoul’s foreign tourists annually. To rehabilitate the area, in 2006 
SMG decided to turn it into a park and create Dongdaemun Design Park as a cultural and 
recreational complex. It also sets out to promote the project for the construction of 
Dongdaemun Design Plaza along with Dongdaemun Design Park as a comprehensive design 
infrastructure in order to revitalize the Dongdaemun commercial area and boost the design 
industry.  
 Similarly, in the case of Yokohama, Creative Core Area Project will be the counter-
parts in Seoul. The formation of Creative Core Area is pursued in collaboration with NPOs 
and local capital in three key districts such as Bashamichi Avenue, Nihon-Odori Avenue, and 
Sakuragicho-Noge area in order to revitalize areas through the attraction of creative industry. 
Under this policy object, various historical buildings, warehouses, vacant offices and similar 
properties in the Kannai area are converted for creative use, and the community development 
was pursued through artistic and cultural activities. Also, these chapters examine how various 
knowledge and production projects supported by governmental think-tank and academic 
works have been produced, distributed and gained some degree of leverage within given 
local settings. More specifically, the primary research data was collected from the Seoul 
Foundation for Arts and Culture and the Arts Commission Yokohama’s regular periodicals, 
irregular publications, and policy reports. Drawing from Latour’s (2005) concept of 
“performative assemblage”, I focus on how these urban places become carefully rearranged 
settings through certain procedural, institutional and technical mechanisms implemented by 
various discursive and material practices of policy actors. The technique for spatial sorting of 




both Seoul and Yokohama. My central focus sheds light on each city’s slogan of “urban 
regeneration” and “site of development” through creative city policy— not in the sense of 
natural or illusory—but rather in terms of a highly contingent and uncertain localized 
achievement. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 independently analyze how Seoul and Yokohama's various urban 
mega events are practiced by routinized techniques and standardized procedures. Also, I 
paint a picture of how various actors of Seoul and Yokohama’s creative city policy world are 
interlinked and engaged with one another through these urban mega events. In more detail, in 
Chapter 4, I first examine four different Yokohama Triennales from 2001 to 2011, and then I 
analyze three Design Seoul Olympiads and the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 in Chapter 5. 
These chapters include interviews from state initiators of urban mega events and other policy 
actors, including local and global business capitals, artists, and creative workers, each of 
whom are involved in various practices of urban mega events in Yokohama and Seoul. 
Rather than conceptualizing the development of new urban mega events as the solely the 
reflex of the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, by applying the concept of “translation” 
developed by Actor-Network Theory, these chapters suggests to reconsider the urban mega 
events not as a mere reflection of “false consciousness” but as an active process of 
“translation” among various policy actors. To shed light on such revision, the focus is on 
how each city’s different policy networks of “neoliberal-developmental” and “post-
developmental” networks differently or similarly organized urban mega events.  
 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are an attempt to “reassemble” the creative city policy actors 




Yokohama. The participant observation research in Seoul Design Support Centers in Seoul 
and the Creative City School and the Triennale School in Yokohama will be my main case 
studies in both sites. Drawing from the current researches on creative labor and global 
precariat movements, I examine how each city’s creative workers actually experience, 
evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resist the given creative city policy. In particular, 
based on in-depth interviews and participant observations, Chapter 6 focuses on how the 
ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are prominently important to explain 
workers’ everyday living and working experiences as creative labor in Yokohama. 
Furthermore, it addresses how these ethical and moral values in creative work are actually 
preferred within the given creative city policy and have certain limitations to overcome a 
“moral but apolitical volunteer subjectivity”.  
Similar to the living and working experiences of creative workers in Yokohama, 
chapter 7 attempts to show how creative workers in Seoul actually experience, evaluate, 
participate, negotiate and even resist the given creative city policy in their everyday lives and 
works. Furthermore, in contrast with its portrait of Yokohama’s “moral and ethical volunteer 
subjectivity”, Chapter 7 addresses how creative workers in Seoul demonstrate the potential to 
resist and oppose not only their given creative city policy but also their precarious working 
and living conditions. In order to rightly capture these creative workers’ resistance and 
opposition, this chapter suggests Jacque Ranciere’s concept of “political subjectivation” to 
better examine how creative workers through solidarity resist and oppose their precarious 






CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA: THE CREATIVE CORE AREA CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECT AND COEXISTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY YOKOHAMA  
2.1. Introduction   
Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the question of how the policy of Creative City Yokohama and 
Design Seoul are located in procedures and objects within the urban construction projects. 
These chapter focus on several urban redevelopment construction projects entailing direct 
ecological and social impacts. In the case of Yokohama, I will focus on Creative Core Area 
Project in a relation to Minato Mira 21 project, one of the largest urban redevelopment 
projects in Yokohama’s urban history. The formation of Creative Core Areas are mainly 
pursued in the Kannai area, which consists of several old districts including Bashamichi 
Avenue, Nihon-Odori Avenue, and Sakuragicho-Noge area, and it purposes to revitalize the 
Kannai area through the attraction of creative class and creative industry. Under this policy, 
various historical buildings and warehouses, vacant offices, and similar properties in central 
Yokohama are converted for creative use, and town development pursued through artistic and 
cultural activities in the community.  
 Similarly, in Seoul, the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction 
project initiated by Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG) and managed by Seoul 
Design Foundation comprise the primary research site of this chapter. The area of 
Dongdaemun is in the heart of the fashion industry and a major tourist attraction in Seoul 




rehabilitate the area, in 2006 SMG decided to turn it into a park and create Dongdaemun 
Design Plaza and Park as a cultural and recreational complex. It also sets out to promote the 
project for the construction of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park as a comprehensive 
design infrastructure in order to revitalize the Dongdaemun commercial area and boost the 
design industry.  
I will focus on how these urban sites are carefully rearranged through by discursive 
and material practices of policy actors including the city governments, capitals, NGO/NPOs 
and citizens. The technique for spatial sorting of zones for “urban regeneration” and 
development in the name of “creativity” will be reexamined in both Seoul and Yokohama. 
My central focus will shed light on each city’s slogan of “urban regeneration” and “site of 
development” through creative city policy— not in the sense of natural or illusory—but 
rather in terms of a highly contingent and uncertain localized achievement. Through this 
analysis, I intend to demonstrate how the cultural logic of development of place is shaped not 
only by the internal and discursive structure of development practices but also by external 
and material contexts.  
To better understand the emergence of the creative city policy in Yokohama, firstly I 
will briefly summarize Yokohama’s urban history in terms of how this “small fishing village” 
became one of the major international gateway ports in Japan and how it became a bedroom 
community for Tokyo” beginning in 1859 until the 1970s. Secondly, I will examine the 
relationship between the Minato Mira 21 (below MM21), one of the largest urban 




how the creative city policy emerged in the Kannai areas as a new form of urban planning 
that arose in response to the MM 21 project.  
2.2. Yokohama’s Urban History: From “Gateway Port” to “Bedroom Community for 
Tokyo” (1859-1970s) 
Yokohama is the second largest city in Japan with nearly 3.7 million residents 
(Yokohama Municipal Government, 2014). It is located 25 kilometers south of Tokyo; 
together these two most populated cities constitute the central part of Kanto region. 
Yokohama has a distinctive urban history compared to other large Japanese cities. Unlike 
most other large Japanese cities such as Osaka, Kyoto and Sendai – that ‘naturally’ grew 
around the ruler’s castle before the modernization period – Yokohama had been developed 
‘intentionally’ under pressure by the West circa the Meiji period (Noda, 2008:12). To better 
understand Yokohama’s urban history, it is necessary to recognize its relationship to Tokyo. 
During the Edo period (1603-1867), Yokohama was a small fishing village consisting of only 
100 households, but it became one of Japan’s major gateways when Edo Bakufu, the feudal 
government during the Edo period, decided to build the port in Yokohama (Noda, 2008:13). 
Because Edo Bakufu did not allow foreigners to reside in the city of Edo (now Tokyo) to 
protect themselves from outside forces, Yokohama became a residential area for foreigners 
(Noda, 2008:13).  
Since 1859 and the opening of the port Yokohama grew into one of the leading 
international cities in Japan becoming a gateway for Western culture. In 1877, there were 
around 3200 foreign people residing there, including foreign traders, educators and 




Tokyo, thus demonstrating how Yokohama was already more internationalized than Tokyo at 
that time (Harata, 1993:85). After the construction of the first railway between Tokyo’s 
Shinbashi and Yokohama, Yokohama was able to develop its economy by using Tokyo as its 
consumption market. Beginning with western furniture production factories and vegetable 
farms, Yokohama gradually developed modern textile and fashion industries during the war 
period (Harata, 1993:86). Throughout the pre and post-war periods, Yokohama not only 
developed light industry including electric goods, modern music instruments, food, textile 
and fashion, but also established heavy and chemical industries in the early 1900s (Harata, 
1993:86). These manufacturing industries extended from the Yokohama-Kawasaki harbor 
area to reclaimed land around Tokyo Bay that formed one of the largest industrial belts in 
Japan called the “Keihin industrial zone”. In particular, during the postwar period the Keihin 
industrial zone took on the major role of Japan’s economic and industrial recovery; moreover, 
the heavy and chemical industries including the steel mills, oil refineries and shipyards were 
developed in the cluster and formed its central core (Kato, 1990:155).  
When the Japanese national economy entered a period of rapid economic growth in 
the 1960s, the city of Yokohama faced dramatic changes in terms of its socio-economic 
structure. Firstly, the growing urban population caused significant social problems because of 
shortages of roads, sewers, water supplies and garbage disposal sites, along with cultural and 
education facilities (Kato, 1990:187). Yokohama’s population increased from one million in 
1951 to two million in 1968.  This continuous population explosion reached 2.7 million in 
1978 and finally stood at 3.19 million in 1989 (Kato, 1990:187). This rapid increase was 




relatively inexpensive land and housing costs compared to those of Tokyo – even though 
these prices were similar to levels of other peripheral areas such as Saitama and Kawasaki – 
Yokohama gradually turned into a “bedroom community” for people who commuted daily to 
Tokyo for work and study (Edgington, 1999:65). At the same time, Tokyo gradually 
absorbed many Yokohama-based trading firms, thus causing the decline of Yokohama’s 
business and cultural activities (Kato, 1990:202). On the other side, growing industrialization 
and urbanization brought about the problem of pollution in Yokohama; this combination of 
environment problems and urban infrastructure shortages urgently called for a public solution 
(Kato, 1990:188-189).  
Under these circumstances, the city of Yokohama initiated new urban planning 
project that was headed by the former mayor, Asukata Ichio, a member of the Socialist 
Democratic Party; he held a reformative vision of “direct democracy by the citizens”(Noda, 
2010:18). As one of the famous “progressive local government’s leaders” of that period, 
Asukata strived to transform the local municipal government – “historically a subsidiary 
branch of the national government” – into “a base for providing public services to the local 
community” (Watanabe, 2006:131). To cope with the general decline in Yokohama’s 
business and cultural activities as well as its conversion into a bedroom community for 
Tokyo, he proposed to collaborate with citizens and incorporate their opinions into the urban 
planning process (Noda, 2010:18). 
By enhancing Yokohama’s partnership with citizen groups and its business 
community, in 1965 the mayor Asukata announced a new urban plan called “City Planning 




renewal of the city’s central section, 2) the reclamation of the coast along the Kanazawa 
District, 3) the development of the new town of Kohoku, 4) the building of a subway system, 
5) the construction of a highway system, and 6) the erection of a bridge across Tokyo Bay 
(Kato, 1990:202). This plan was an historically meaningful policy in that it was the very first 
urban plan which was originated not by the “Japanese national government” but rather by the 
“local municipal government”. Later often called the “Sixfold Major Urban Development 
Plan,” it was the first full scale and well-developed urban project established by the 
Yokohama Municipal Government (below YMG); the major purpose of the plan was to turn 
“Yokohama as Tokyo’s bedroom community” into an independent “International Culture 
City” (Tamura, 1989:274).  
To pursue this aim, the government encouraged “municipal officials to act from 
citizens’ point of view rather than from that of the traditional bureaucrat” (Watanabe, 
2006:132). In doing so, the mayor launched a new division called the “City Management 
Office” under his direct control, and he elected Tamura Akira, later a nationally famous 
YMG official and a renowned urban planner, as the chief officer. In detail, the plan could be 
divided into two different categories.  The first was the “internal redevelopment plan” that 
consisted of a "city center renewal", a "reclamation of Kanazawa district" and "Kokoku town 
development", and the second was the “urban infrastructure construction” including subway, 
expressway and bay bridge construction (Tamura, 1989:269). <Figure 3> shows each 
project’s location: three circles indicate “internal redevelopment plan” sites, with highway, 





Figure 3. The Map of Yokohama and its Sixfold Urban Development Plan2  
 
2.3. “Re-Internationalization or Globalization?" of Yokohama by Minato Mirai 21 
Project (1980s-2000s) 
Along with this urban redevelopment plan, after experiencing the oil shock of the 
1970s and following Endanka (the rapid rise of Japanese Yen value), the industrial structure 
of Yokohama gradually changed from manufacturing to service industries from the 1960s to 
1980s (Edgington, 1991:64). Manufacturing industries centering on chemical industries 
peaked in 1965 when 50 percent of the workforce was employed in the manufacturing 
																																								 																					




industry. In 1985, however, only 33 percent of those employed worked in a secondary 
industry, and 66 percent worked in service industries (Kato, 1990:188). 
As seen in Yokohama’s previous urban history, Yokohama has long been recognized 
as an “international city” since the 19th century. With the growth of its socio-economic 
infrastructure from the absorption of western culture, it has become one of the most 
responsive cities to western urban policy trends. For this reason, the discourse around the 
“internationalization of Yokohama” – that was prevalent from the 1980s as a key concept for 
urban policy and in particular materialized in the MM 21 project – needs to be examined with 
consideration of both the external pressure of globalization as well as the internal socio-
economic restructuring in this city.  
In the middle of the 1980s, when the United States and Japan agreed on the Plaza 
Accord, the value of the Japanese yen rapidly increased – referred to as Endanka – and it 
triggered a rapid globalization and financialization of the Japanese economy. In particular, 
during the era of the Japanese bubble economy (1986 to 1991), the remarkable expansion of 
the financial market induced a massive influx of multinational financial companies and of 
professional service corporations such as international law and accounting firms into Tokyo’s 
central area. The rapid growth of office space demand derived by this inflow of capital and 
human resources finally aroused an economic bubble in real estate and the stock market, and 
consequentially numerous skyscrapers were constructed in the central Tokyo’s Marunouchi 




In terms of urban policy, the Japanese national government announced its Fourth 
Comprehensive Plan for National Development in 1987. This plan covered the period 1989 
to 2000 an emphasized the active role of the National Capital Region (NCR) that was divided 
into two different zones: the “Tokyo metropolitan area” and “the surrounding five outer areas” 
including Chiba, Tsuchiura-Tsukuba, Yokohama-Kawasaki, Urawa-Omiya and Tachikawa-
Hachioji. These five surrounding outer areas would be developed into a network of “Business 
Core Cities” in order to redistribute the concentrated functions of Tokyo (Edgington, 
1991:68). The plan can be characterized as an emphasis on economic growth within 
globalization and information-driven economy along with a massive investment in social 
infrastructure within the surrounding outer areas. As the second largest city in the plan after 
Tokyo, Yokohama was envisioned as taking a key role in the plan. In fact, Japanese national 
government decided that the 18 national government institutions would be relocated to 
Yokohama in the 1990s (Edgington, 1991:68).  
Given these external factors in the development boom in this urban area, Yokohama’s 
industrial structure has gradually changed with the decline of its manufacturing industries. 
The impact of the 1973 oil crisis was more severe in Yokohama than in the nation as a whole 
(Kato, 1990:196). From 1975 to 1985, in terms of the city’s gross production – while the 
share of the manufacturing industry decreased from 29 to 25 percent – that of the service 
industry increased by contrast from 11 to 16 percent (Kato, 1990:197).  
Edgington (1991) points out that because of the higher expenses of production after 
Endanka, numerous electronic companies changed their product offerings and moved their 




with the increment of area cost and contamination control in urban sites, more enterprises 
moved their assembling manufacturing plants to areas that were distant from the city 
(Edgington, 1991:64). With this out-flux of manufacturing industries, a significant number of 
small and medium sized companies went bankrupt through the sharp rise of the yen and its 
negative impact on Japanese product’s price competitiveness (Edgington, 1991:65). Since 
over 99 percent of the factories and nearly 60 percent of the workers in Yokohama were 
based in these small and medium-sized companies at the time, urban planners have placed 
much attention on modernizing these companies through the introduction of new information 
technology (Edgington, 1991:65). As one of the last projects in the Sixfold Urban 
Development Plan, how MM21 was actually conceptualized and materialized as an 
“International Information City” was influenced by these external and internal factors. Until 
the 1980s, Yokohama’s city center was divided into two separate regions: the Kannai area 
and the Yokohama station area.  As shown in <Figure 4>, the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ 
Yokohama shipyard and the Japanese National Railways classification yard occupied the 
areas in between these regions. MM21 was originally proposed to connect these areas by 
relocating them to other parts of the city (Noda, 2008:28). In 1968 when Mayor Ichio 
Asukata and city official Tamura Akira suggested the Sixfold Urban Development Plan as 
the blueprint for Yokohama’s urban development, MM 21 was one of the plan’s major 
development projects to include a revitalization plan of the downtown area3. 
																																								 																					
3 See <Figure 3>'s first circle named "1. The Renewal of City's Central Section". The first 
circle includes the Kannai, Minato Mirai and Yokohama Station area, which together form 






Figure 4. Old Mitsubishi Shipyard located in the area of MM 214 
      
MM21 is widely known as one of the largest waterfront redevelopment plans in Japan. 
It is notable how YMG’s negotiation with various policy actors for MM 21 suggests that the 
developmental state is not “the object of an ostensive black box” but rather a “performative 
assemblage” which can be perceived as involved in an endless process of making and 
remaking (Latour, 2005). In this regards, it is important as it captures how two major policy 
actors, the developmental state and private capitals can assemble the state-capital relationship 
via the principal of “bilateral negotiation” between the two parties through the specific 
translation of their own version of the Public-Private Partnership. Tamura Akira, one of the 
key YMG officials who created the Sixfold Development Plan, shows how the MM21 project 
was executed as a result of the formation of this public-private partnership. In his book, Toshi 
																																								 																					




Yokohama Monogatari (the story of the city of Yokohama) published in 1989, he explains 
why he proposed to execute the Sixfold Development Plan through the symbiotic relationship 
between public and private sectors from the viewpoint of the municipal government: 
The Sixfold Development Plan is absolutely needed for the city. But it was 
impossible to run this project entirely based on the city of Yokohama itself.  Certainly 
the Sixfold Development Plan would take huge capital and time. Based on 
Yokohama's general city revenue alone, it is impossible to run the plan…..Therefore, 
it is necessary to use other funds, other than a subsidy from the national government 
and tax revenues ..... At the time, there were no words like “minkatsu (private 
participation:民活).  Because I was involved in the private real estate business for a 
long time, I thought that using the power of the private sector for the development of 
the city was a natural choice. In spite of its lack of own financial resources, the 
municipality can be a principal agent or a master planner for the policy. So far, what 
the municipal government generally did was only to follow the plan of the national 
government. However, it is the only municipal government who can set a policy 
comprehensively with a “real” consideration for the entire city and citizens because 
it is closer to ordinary citizens than to any other administrative entities. (Tamura, 
1989:276-277; translated and italic added by myself)  
As Watanabe (2006) argues, Yokohama’s development strategy, especially developed 
by Tamura, was seen as “progressive” at the time. In his book, Tamura recalls that the city 
officials in the City Management Office constructed this plan to enhance Yokohama’s 
independence from Tokyo.  Moreover, it was a plan solely developed from the viewpoint of 
the city of Yokohama rather than by the “order” of the national government (Tamura, 1989). 
The municipal government, however, found it difficult to execute the plan by itself because 
of a shortage of financial funding. For this reason, as a former businessman, Tamura 
legitimized its reason to use “private power” in terms of not for the benefit of the private 
sector, but for the citizens and the city (Tamura, 1989). In this model of Private Public 
Partnership (PPP), what he focuses on is the reform of the role of the municipal government 




one that is “synthetic, independent, citizen-friendly, active, and practical”; thus the Sixfold 
Development Plan was important in that this new type of “municipal government” actively 
performed its own “policy plan” for its citizens (Tamura, 1989:278). In this case, what we 
see is how the public-private partnership in Yokohama was translated by using the discourse 
of “for the citizens and city’s future itself”, which was different from its Western 
counterparts. As many scholars point out, in the context of the Western countries such as the 
U.S and U.K, the general rationale for the PPP has been supported by market-oriented 
discourses such as introducing efficiency of market, increasing flexibility and enhancing 
market competition (e.g, Hackworth, 2007). However, in case of Yokohama, the YMG 
developed a strategic approach to legitimize the role of the municipal government in the 
development plan by utilizing the translation of the PPP for "the citizen and the city". Here, 
the role of the developmental state was conceptualized as a paternalistic entity, which could 
strategically guide and use private capitals’ power not for private capitals but for its citizens 
and the city.  
In particular, my interview with a former city official who worked more than twenty 
years at the YMG and participated in most of the urban development projects reveals that the 
plan was guided by “three principles of the development strategy”: 1) developing a public-
private partnership, 2) controlling land use by the local government, and 3) applying urban 
design guidelines to the development area: 
In the case of MM21, just the same as with other big development projects, it was 
difficult to promote the project by only the YMG itself as a solely one of the 
municipal government’s [projects]. Firstly we tried to share the vision of MM 21 with 
several other policy actors such as the central government, Kanazawa Prefectural 




them by a variety of logic. To the Kanazawa Prefectural Government, we argued that 
MM 21 is beneficial for us to enhance the independence of Yokohama from Tokyo’s 
economic and political dependency. To the central government, we argued that MM 
21 could be a good strategy for redistributing the central functions in Tokyo to the 
local areas. Finally, for private capitals such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry’s 
Yokohama shipyard, we persuaded them that MM 21 could increase land values and 
usage. (Former YMG official) 
By using this “vision sharing” strategy, in 1967 the YMG started negotiations with 
other policy actors such as landowners, centering on the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (private 
owner); in 1979 finally they agreed with the relocation of the shipyard (Kato, 1990:203). 
Also the YMG established a special committee for MM 21’s master plan called the “Planning 
and Investigatory Committee for the Overall Improvement of Yokohama City Center and 
Waterfront Area”, and the committee presented its basic plan in 1979. In 1981, an interim 
report of “The Master Plan for the Overall Improvement of Yokohama City Center and 
Waterfront Area” was officially released, and the project’s official name was decided upon as 
“Minato Mirai 21” (literally meaning “Future Port 21”).  
The principal concept of the MM21 was: “1) a cultural cosmopolitan area operating 
around the clock, 2) an information city of the 21st century and 3) a city with a superior 
environment, surrounded by water, greenery and historic monuments, in an effort to create a 
viable international cultural city” (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:186). With this concept of an 
“International Cultural City”, the interim report indicated that the approximate number of 
workers would be projected as 190,000 and that about 10,000 residents would live in MM21 
(Kato, 1990:235). Moreover, the detailed conceptual activities and plans included: 1) the 
construction of an “International Convention Center” focusing on the construction of Pacific 




hotel and conference center, 2) open space and bay frontage, 3) a high tech infrastructure 
including advanced systems for environmental control, waste disposal and local community 
networks, 4) cultural amenities such as the Minato Mirai Hall and Yokohama Museum of Art, 
and 5) Teleport, meaning the construction of a comprehensive communication network based 
on a fiber optic and satellite system (Edgington, 1991:74-75). By launching this official 
project in 1983, the YMG created the PPP with YMG and landowners including Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industry and the Japanese National Railways; the Yokohama Minato Mirai 
21Corporation (YMM 21) was established in the aftermath of this assemblage between 
public and private actors.  
In terms of its organization structure, the board members consisted of both YMG 
officials and corporation representatives, and its main activities included: 1) consultation and 
coordination among landowners and the YMG, 2) the implementation of an integrated area 
management plan, and 3) advertising and PR activities (Kishida and Uzuki, 2009:142). 
Kishida and Uzuki (2009) divided the main activities of YMM 21 into three different phases: 
1st phrase: 1984-1990, 2nd phrase: 1991-1997, and 3rd phrase: 1998-2008. In the first phase, 
the major works of the YMM21 were concentrated in the development of the land 
management plan and the construction of cultural amenities such as the Yokohama Museum 
of Art. During the second period, with the completion of the major business buildings 
construction including the Landmark Tower and Rinko Park, YMM 21 developed a basic 
agreement on urban community development. In the third period, YMM 21 focused on PR 
and advertising activities by using information technology such as high-speed internet 




Through the activities of YMM 21, the YMG implemented the guidelines for “land 
use control” and “urban design” for the MM 21 area as a tool for legitimating their roles of 
not only “cheering” private capital, but also “enhancing” the quality of life for citizens. 
YMM 21 created the Basic Agreement on Urban Community Development with the joint 
participation of YMG and landowners. According to its Land Use Plan, the MM21 area was 
divided into zones in terms of block characteristics such as business, promenade, 
international, commercial, and waterfront. Also, each developer had to follow urban design 
guidelines in terms of “water and greenery”, “skyline, streetscapes and vistas”, “shared 
space”, “activity floors”, “color schemes and outdoor advertising” and “car and bicycle 
parks”. For example, regarding the skyline, high-rises were planned along the town skeleton 
as landmarks, while the overall skyline had to be designed to ascend gradually from inland 
toward the sea. Moreover, even the hues and materials of the buildings themselves were 
standardized to avoid excessive originality that could muddy the setting.  
The YMG, however, not only implemented the guidelines but also provided several 
incentives for private capital including: 1) project research, 2) relaxation of regulations and 3) 
support to private enterprises (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:187). Medda and Nijkamp show 
that tax reduction/exemption, subsidy and long-term low interest rate loans or no-interest 
loans were provided by several different laws such as “The Special Measures Law for 
Promoting Urban Development by Private Sector” (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:187-188). 
More importantly, contrary to these various supports for private enterprises, Medda and 
Nijkamp (1999) argue that what is missing in the development process was “public 




meetings had to be announced, while in the case of MM21, not surprisingly, there had been 
no public audience (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999:189). Indeed, as Medda and Nijkamp contend, 
public participation has not taken any significant role in one of the largest development 
projects in Yokohama’s urban history (Medda and Nijkamp, 1999).  
Even though the YMG officials argued, the Sixfold Development Plan was necessary 
for the citizens and the city’s future and a PPP was seen as the best to execute the project, 
what was clearly neglected in the development process was actual “citizen participation”. 
Tamura Akira argues that “minkastu” was essential to pursue the project. Minkatsu (民活) 
literally means “civic (min:民) participation (katsu:活)”. Actually, the category of “min 
(civic)” is very broad and can encompass private capital, NPOs, citizen groups and even 
ordinary citizens. In the process of the Sixfold Development Plan, however, in particular 
MM21, “minkatsu (civic participation)” turned into “private participation”, only narrowly 
focusing on “private capital’s participation”.  
In sum, one may consider MM 21 as a distinctive example of the developmental 
state’s master plan-based project. Via its three principles, the developmental state guides and 
controls urban development’s master plan while the bilateral assemblage between the 
developmental state and private capital creates the MM 21 area as what Park et al refer to as 
“neoliberal space in a developmental state” (Park, Hill and Saito, 2012). The voice of the 
citizens is however, absent in this development process, and, as shown in <Figure 5>, now 
the MM21 areas are filled with a multitude of skyscrapers for global corporations and of 
highly commercialized entertainment places, shopping malls and luxury hotels. Kato (1990) 




The face of the MM 21 area will change greatly if only upper-class housing is 
available and the area does not have a middle-class atmosphere. To handle this issue, 
policy makers must use careful judgment. (Kato, 1990:235)  
In spite of this concern, today the MM21 area has become the hub for global and local 
capital. Since the MM21 project began in 1983, it has become a principal business center as 
well as a major tourist attraction. As of 2013, about 93,000 people work here and about 1720 
international and domestic corporations including Nissan Motors and Fuji XEROX have their 
headquarters and branches in MM21. Also in 2013, it attracted approximately 72 million 
visitors. With the city center moving to MM 21 with its tremendous success of attracting 
capital, how to revitalize Kannai’s untapped potential remains a stumbling block for city 
planners (BankART, 2009:10).  







2.4. From “International Culture City” to “Creative City Yokohama”: Creative Core 
Area Project 
Short-listed for the 2008 World Mayor award and nominated for the 2003 Global 
Leader of Tomorrow, Mayor Hiroshi Nakada officially launched the Creative City Yokohama 
policy in 2004 (Steven, 2008). Elected as the youngest mayor of a major Japanese city at his 
age of 37, advocating an era of “New Public Management,” Nakada attempted to apply a 
market-oriented city management plan to enhance the YMG’s “efficiency” and 
“transparency”. This city management reform contained the introduction of performance-
related pay and open recruitment, enhancement of financial transparency, and the 
establishment of several project-based divisions within the YMG (Steven, 2008). Influenced 
by an entrepreneurial approach to public management, this idea of a project-based division 
aimed to create a more flexible, temporal and functional organization structure to deal with 
“urgent and important” social tasks (Noda, 2008: 64). Yokohama Art and Culture City 
Creative Headquarters (YACCCH), the initial organization for Yokohama’s creative city 
policy, was a distinctive example of this new project-based division established in 2004.  
The main purpose of YACCCH was to revitalize old downtown areas, often called 
“Kannai(関内)”, through investment in the cultural infrastructure (BankART 1929, 2009:18). 
The Kannai area, originally part of the oceanfront until the Edo period, was reclaimed in 
1667, becoming the home of international trading companies and diplomatic missions since 
the opening of the port of Yokohama in 1895(Kannai, 2014). The Kannai region consists of 
several old districts including Bashamichi, Chinatown and Yamashita Park and includes 




sites where foreigners first settled in Japan by the permission from the Edo Bakufu. For this 
reason, the Kannai has been the doorway to western cultural influences, and numerous novel 
items from abroad such as the gaslight, ice cream and the western style tree-lined street were 
introduced into Japan through the Kannai area (Naruse et al, 2010:55).  
 As <Figure 6> shows the street features of the Kannai area in 1890, this area is 
comprised of much western modern architecture constructed from the initial formation period 
of the town to the war period. Because it contained major government buildings such as the 
city hall of the YMG, the Kanagawa Prefectural Government Offices, and the Kanagawa 
Prefectural Police Headquarters, it functioned as the city’s main downtown area in terms of 
administration, business and tourism.  
Figure 6. The street of the Kannai Area in 18906  
 
       
 
																																								 																					




With office space becoming more available in MM 21 and Tokyo in the 2000s, 
Kannai’s vacancies have risen dramatically. From 1996 to 2003 the number of workers in 
Kannai decreased from 220,000 to 200,000 (BankART, 2009:10). During that same period, 
Kannai’s historic buildings were destroyed and replaced by new apartment blocks, thereby 
demolishing the original streetscape and numerous historic buildings. A former state official, 
who participated in the creative city policy from the beginning, recalls the situation of the 
Kannai area when they first came up with the policy:  
When first MM21 was planned, the city officials wanted to connect Yokohama 
station area to the Kannai area via the development of MM 21. We thought that 
through this project, the two downtown areas could stimulate development of each 
other. However, after the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy, the downfall of 
the national economy harshly impacted the Kannai area. In the Yokohama station area, 
generally 200 million people visit per day, so it was not so much impacted by the 
collapse of the bubble economy. Also, when the IT boom arose in the middle of 1990, 
MM21 provided a much stronger infrastructure than did the Kannai area. Because the 
Kannai area’s buildings were old, it was more difficult to implement an IT 
infrastructure there. For that reason, many companies based in the Kannai area moved 
to the MM 21 area. Given these factors, it was clear that the empty office spaces in 
Kannai would increase, and therefore many people started to worry about the 
degradation of the Kannai area….we (YMG) expected that the MM21 project could 
have a synergy effect for both the Kannai area and itself, but it only exacerbated the 
gap between them.(Personal interview with the Former YMG Official) 
Under these circumstances, this former YMG official mentions that within his 
government there were several groups of people who were concerned about how to handle 
the problem of the Kannai area. At that time, Kitazawa Takeru, who was the former chief 
officer of the YMG’s Urban Design Office and a professor at the University of Tokyo, 
suggested implementation of the creative city policy to revitalize the Kannai area. Kitazawa 





One day, during the period that these policies (concerning the degradation of the 
Kannai area) were being debated, I was walking through the Kannai district when I 
happened to come across Nakano-san just in front of the former Fuji Bank on the 
Bashamichi Dori. The Urban Design Office had just then obtained a preservation 
order on the Fuji Bank, and they were in the throes of putting together an operation 
plan for the premises. On being shown around the building, I was inspired by the 
space and the possibilities it offered both outside and inside. When I enquired if any 
decision on how to use the building had been made, Nakano-san replied that none had 
yet been taken. After taking some photos, I went to see the mayor and said to him: 
“let’s do something with this space”….The Committee for the Regeneration of 
Downtown was subsequently established, and became an effective advocate for city 
culture, creative activities, the arts, as well as the community’s creative potential 
(Bank ART 1929, 2009:61, emphasis added by author) 
As Kitazawa mentioned, following his initial suggestion, the YMG organized a 
special committee for the Revitalization of the Urban Center through the Promotion of Art, 
Culture and Tourism in 2002. After several meetings and studies, the committee developed a 
proposal titled “Creative City Yokohama” (BankART, 2009:12). The Creative City 
Yokohama’s main concept included to turn the Kannai area into a “Creative Core Area” by 
utilizing historic buildings for artistic and cultural purposes. The committee suggested not 
only to preserve numerous historic buildings but also to utilize them for attracting creative 
workers from outside. The committee believed that recruiting more artists and increasing art-
related activities were naturally connected to revitalization of the old downtown socio-
economically. This idea was influenced by Richard Florida’s work on the “Creative Class,” 
which argues that attracting a more creative class enhances a city’s competitive power (Noda, 
2008:103). 
What is important in the initiation of the creative city policy in Yokohama is that 
there have been certain elite groups and policy networks within the YMG and the city itself 




the Japanese context referred to as “machizukuri (町づくり, community building)”. More 
importantly, how these policy groups translated “creative city policy” within the Japanese 
context is essential to an understanding of the emergence of the creative city policy in 
Yokohama. As we have seen in Yokohama’s urban development history from the 1960s, 
Yokohama’s urban development policy was nationally acclaimed as a result of its Sixfold 
Development Plan; therefore many YMG officials, who were involved in urban planning and 
urban policy, moved to academia with their practical experience from Yokohama. For 
example, Tamura Akira, who took the major role in the preparation and execution of the 
Sixfold Development Plan, became a professor at Hosei University, and Kitazawa Takeru, 
who participated in MM 21 and the creative city policy, moved to the University of Tokyo, 
one of the most prestigious schools in Japan. These former YMG officials were deeply 
involved in creating the academic field entitled “machizukuri” within the Japanese urban 
planning discipline; moreover the creative city policy in Japan was developed in relation to 
the concept of "machizukuri". "Machi" literally means “community” and "zukuri" refers to 
“making”, “building” or “developing”. The term of "machizukuri" has been developed and 
used in a variety of activities such as “government-sponsored road construction, citizen-led 
monitoring of municipal government, the erection of apartment buildings by private 
developers and even karaoke parties held by communities” (Watanabe, 2006:128). Because 
of the ambiguous character of "machitsukuri", it might be useful to consider the term to 
represent a “historical phenomenon” containing certain aspects of Japanese urban affairs. 
Watanabe (2006) divided the development of "machizukuri" into three different stages: 1) the 




(1960s to 1970s) and 3) the emergence of participatory "machizukuri" (1980s to 1990s) 
(Watanabe, 2006).  
During the first period (1950s to 1960s), Watanabe explains that "machizukuri" was 
derived from several different fields – from the activities of the Japanese government-driven 
“private voluntary organization” in the 1950s to more local resident-driven urban planning 
and design in the 1960s (Watanabe, 2006:129). From the 1960s to 1970s, the term was 
developed further by “progressive local governments” beginning with Yokohama’s Asukata 
mayor, who proposed the Sixfold Development Plan; what is distinctive during this period is 
that the activities of "machizukuri" became perceived as a “public-private partnership with 
intensive participation by residents” (Watanabe, 2006:131). In the 1980s, when the city of 
Kobe firstly passed a "machizukuri" ordinance, it gradually developed three different tools – 
“machizukuri councils”, a “machizukuri proposal” and a “machizukuri agreement” – to 
facilitate resident participation (Watanabe, 2006:133). The Kobe’s policy was especially 
effective when the Kobe Earthquake occurred in 1995; their tremendous contributions in 
reconstruction planning after the earthquake ignited the boom of the "machizukuri" center 
and other organizations around the nation (Watanabe, 2006:133). Moreover, after the 
enactment of the Nonprofit Organization Law in 1998, "machizukuri" organizations became 
one of the major bodies of citizen and NPO movements in Japan (Watanabe, 2006:133). In 
sum, "machizukuri" can be perceived as one of the ways or tools in which citizens and 
residents participate in urban planning and design to enhance community development, and 
the state officials in Yokohama has been deeply involved in the development process of 




In this regard, the committee members who developed the creative city policy in 
Japan share the value of Japanese machizukuri in terms of its citizen-driven and participatory 
development dimensions; it is thus clear that they try to "translate" creative city policy within 
the context of Japanese machizukuri.  Following the committee’s suggestions, the Urban 
Design Office in the urban planning department incorporated this idea into a broader 
development plan. The mayor then established a project-based division, YACCCH, to 
implement the committee’s suggestions. An important component for this creative city policy 
– that shows the impact of machizukuri – was that it stressed first and foremost the 
collaboration among the city government, the private sector as well as various civic and 
business groups. In particular, the committee included non-profit organizations (NPOs) and 
local communities as policy actors. One of the committee members, Kumakura Sumiko, 
Tokyo University of the Arts professor, stated at the Creative City Conference: 
There was much discussion as to how art society interlinks [to promote creative city 
policy]. In the midst of the post-bubble recession, we decided that the onerous 
burdens undertaken by the municipal authorities to provide cultural facilities should 
be provided by a more flexible and self-governing administrative structure. Given the 
necessity for change, much hope was placed on the role that the NPOs would 
play….At that juncture, we wanted to ensure that the NPOs could provide proof of 
the viability of a new strategy. The NPOs has a business-minded approach; we were 
thus definitely willing to give them a chance. It wasn’t a case of art for arts sake, but 
rather a desire to see a new group of creative people galvanizing their energy to get 
Yokohama on its feet once again. (BankART1929, 2009:19)  
From the viewpoint of the YMG, the collaboration with the NPOs – following the 
committee’s suggestion – became recognized as one of the major strategies for enhancing 
civil participation in the implementation process of the creative city policy in Yokohama. 
One YMG official from the creative city department mentions that YMG viewed NPOs as 




When the city of Yokohama first started the creative city policy, it was hard to find 
such activities like supporting art-related NPOs in Japanese society.  There were some 
special departments to support art or cultural activities within some large enterprises, 
but even in those companies it was hard to find support for art-related NPOs directly. 
So I think that the greatest thing in the creative city policy is that the YMG thought to 
encourage and support art activities related to NPOs at the beginning of the policy 
initiation. By doing so, the number of art NPOs in Yokohama increased, and now the 
NPOs activities are getting vitalized. (Personal Interview with the Current YMG 
Official) 
Through such collaboration with NPOs, the first experimental project in forming the 
Creative Core Area involved the renovation and reuse of the former premises of Fuji and 
Daiichi Banks. Simultaneously, applications to manage these buildings were released in 2003 
with ‘Creative City Center Project’ as the initiative’s title. Financially, YMG hoped that the 
city would subsidize the project and then gradually reduce its contribution once the project 
was financially independent (BankART1929, 2009:13). Under this scheme, two art NPOs – 
the ST Spot Yokohama and YCCC projects – were chosen in 2003 to open BankART 1929. 
After the successful launching of BankART 1929, the partnership between YMG and NPOs 
reutilized many historic buildings for art-related activities (e.g., Bankoku Soko, ZAIM, 
Kitanaka Brick and White and Koganecho Bazaar).  
There are several different types of development cases within the Creative Core Area 
project in terms of its main initiative. It is necessary, however, to note that even though the 
major initiative is different for each type, all three are based on collaboration among the 
YMG, local capital, NPOs and artist groups. Firstly, there are several projects which were 
initiated by the municipal government.  They include the Bank ART 1929, ZAIM and 
Koganecho Bazaar Projects. This type of project generally took place in the historic buildings, 




NPOs and artists who could manage the site and participate in the project. Bank ART 1929, 
as shown in <Figure 7>, was the first and one of the most famous of this type of project. As 
<Table 1> shows, Bank Art 1929 is distinct from traditional public art facilities in terms of 
its usage, management authority and management style (Noda, 2008). 
Figure 7. The Bank ART NYK Studio 
 
Table 1. The Differences between Traditional Public Art Facilities and Bank ART 19297  
 Traditional Public Art Facility Bank ART 1929 
Facility 
Construction 
Newly Constructed Renovation and Reuse  
Facility Usage Specialized for certain usage by arts 





Municipal Government or Art 
Foundation established by Municipal 
Government 
NPOs 
Business Plan Rigorous and Administrative Flexible and Impromptu 
 
																																								 																					




My interview with a YMG official reveals that local capital in Yokohama were 
influenced by the success of Bank ART 1929; consequentially they watched for an 
opportunity to use their own old buildings for corporate public relations and advertising by 
providing them to NPOs and artist groups. The interviewee explains this arrangement:  
After the beginning of Bank ART 1929, there had been great attention not only from 
the domestic media but also from international media and journalism. They led some 
of the local capital who owned historical old buildings to see an opportunity for 
corporate public relations and advertising by supporting this art-related project. Under 
these circumstances, I think, they thought that they themselves could do this kind of 
project that would create a good public image, and some of them actually contacted 
us (YMG) to ask for collaboration among the YMG, NPOs and themselves. Kitanaka 
Brick & Kitanaka White was one of the famous examples of this type. Beside this 
example, some local building owners also started to lend their empty office space to 
artists and other creators at relatively cheaper prices because they saw that the image 
of their buildings had become more lively and fashionable by the presence of these 
artists. So many owners of these old buildings in especially the Kannai area began to 
think of renovating some parts of their property or whole buildings for artists and 
other creators. Also the YMG now had a certain amount of seed money to renovate 
buildings if the building owners decided to lend their properties for artists and other 
creators.(Personal Interview with the Current YMG Official) 
In the case of the Kitanaka Brick & White project (See Figure 8), the Mori Building 
Corporation originally had a plan to demolish the old warehouses so it could construct a new 
apartment complex (Noda, 2008). Influenced by the success of Bank Art 1929, however, this 
corporation postponed its original redevelopment plan and decided to reuse the old 
warehouse buildings by lending them to NPOs and artist groups for two-year periods. More 
than 50 NPOs and artist groups participated in this project, opening such art-related pursuits 
as exhibitions, conferences and education projects for citizens in Yokohama. After finishing 
the project, the Mori Building Corporation finally agreed with the YMG to restore one of the 




Figure 8. Kitanaka Brick and Kitanaka White8 
 
Finally, there were several projects initiated by the NPOs and artists themselves such 
as the Sakura Works and Utoku building Yonkai. These projects were started by the artists 
and creative workers themselves who had participated in previous projects initiated by the 
YMG and local capital. That is, after finishing the two-year project period such as those of 
Kitanaka White & Brick, many artists decided to continue to work in Yokohama and found 
certain places by themselves. In this process, the YMG supported the matching funds of the 
local building owners or in some cases it donated some other government-owned sites to 
them. What is important in this case is that these groups usually found their own way to be 
financially independent from the YMG’s subsidiary. My interviews with several young 






after participating in several different projects. The interviewees’ office was an atelier coop 
used by three different artists:  
We hadn’t known one another before we had participated in Kitanaka Brick & 
Kitanaka White together. We met there and shared our workplace together. After 
finishing the Kitanaka projects, we had to decide whether to leave Yokohama or find 
other places to work in Yokohama. At that time, naturally, there was a certain climate 
within the participants’ circle that led us to continue to work together to locate other 
places to work. In our case, we thought if we shared a certain space, we could save on 
rent and do certain projects together. Also I could access many networks for my own 
projects, so it seems natural to find other places together to share with these people. 
Fifteen groups first moved to Honcho Building’s 4th and 5th floors in 2006, and then 
we finally resided here on Utoku building’s 4th floor. Here, 17 different artists groups 
reside in their own ateliers.  (Personal Interview with Artist in Creative Core Area) 
 
<Figure 9> shows three different old historic buildings where interviewee groups 
moved to in 2006.  
Figure 9. Three places where the interviewee moved to continuously.  From left to right: 
Kitanaka Bricks, Honcho Building, and Utoku Building9 
   
																																								 																					





According to the YMG’s 2012 Yokohama Creative Cluster and Artists Creators List, 
there have been 14 separate ‘creative’ sites in the Kannai area.10 In Yokohama’s case, the 
creative city policy emerged as an alternative to solve the degradation of the old downtown 
areas caused by MM21’s development. In this project, YMG’s role was to find local historic 
building owners (in some cases local and central governments themselves or local small 
firms/businesses); match them with art NPOs, artists groups or citizen groups; and then 
support them financially. In this regard, even though Creative City Yokohama’s policy was 
also initiated by the developmental state, the major policy actors were assembled differently 
from those of MM 21. Here, the major policy actors were the YMG, NPOs, and relatively 
smaller capital. If one were to conceptualize MM21’s policy network as “neoliberal-
developmental” – assembled by multinational capitals such as Japanese chaebol companies, 
Mitsubishi and Nissan and the state – the Creative City Yokohama’s policy network that 
consisted of NPOs, local, and relatively smaller business such as local building owners and 
the YMG could be perceived as what Hill (2007) calls “post-developmental” following 
neither a neoliberal nor a developmentalist model.  
Yokohama City’s Policy Regarding Culture, Art and Creative City Measures, one of 
the major policy public relations pamphlets for the creative city policy, stresses that the 
cooperative and inclusive relationships among different policy actors are at the heart of what 
made ‘Creative City Yokohama’. It simply states: 
																																								 																					
10 It includes Hammer-Head Studio Shin-Minatoku, Bankokubashi Soko, the Mass x Mass 
Kannai Future center, Kitanaka Brick, BLROOM, Utokubiru Yonkai, SakuraWORKS, ba 
ling ling zhong xin, MOTOMACHI x PORT, AGORA, CHAP, the Hatsukou.Hinode area, 





We will continue to carry out sustainable development of Yokohama as a city that its 
citizens can take pride in and one that will stand out both domestically and 
internationally. In order to further vitalize the city, we will undertake cooperative 
activities together with citizens, NPOs, artists and creators, organizations, and 
companies while making full use of creativity inherent in culture and art to build a 
cultural and artistic creative city. (YMG, 2012:4, italic added by myself) 
As shown in the policy pamphlet, in Yokohama’s case two different policy networks – 
the Kannai’s Post-Developemental and MM21’s Neoliberal-Developmental networks – 
coexist in different spaces, one in the Creative Core Areas and the other in MM21, though 
having different time spans (MM 21 from 1980 and Creative Core Area from 2004).   





<Figure 10> summarizes how both Yokohama’s post-developmental and neoliberal-
developmental policy networks occurred in the two different locales of Kannai and MM 21. 
It is important to note that this Yokohama’s "coexistence" and "harmonious" model has both 
similarities and differences from its counterpart, the Seoul’s Dongdaemun Design Plaza and 
Park (DDP) construction project. In the next section, I will focus on how Seoul’s DDP 
construction project was implemented and in what ways its policy actors were assembled by 
comparing this case to that of Yokohama. After describing Seoul’s case, I will discuss what 
kinds of factors comprise the similarities and differences between Yokohama and Seoul and 









DESIGN SEOUL: THE DONGDAEMUN DESIGN PLAZA AND PARK 
CONSTRUCTION AND CONFLICTING MODEL OF CREATIVE CITY SEOUL 
3.1 Introduction 
What is distinctive in Seoul’s creative city policy is its focus on the area of design 
that promotes a city’s brand, revitalizes the economy and enhances the quality of life. Seoul’s 
creative city policy—widely known by Design Seoul—was initiated by its former mayor Se-
hoon Oh in 2006. In the candidate application of the UNESCO’s creative city network, the 
Seoul Metropolitan Government (below SMG) argues: 
Seoul has had the image of a Hard City with priority given to a development 
paradigm focused on construction and industrialization as well as functionality and 
efficiency…the city should be shifted to a focus on culture and design to transform 
Seoul into a Soft City. (SMG, 2010).  
With this strong emphasis on the importance of design, the SMG—under the mayor’s 
direct control—created special administrative divisions such as the Seoul Design 
Headquarters (below SDH). The SDH includes the vice mayor-level Chief Design Officer 
and the Director of the Design Seoul Planning Department. In spite of its intention of shifting 
from a “hard” to a “soft” city, however, Design Seoul policy ironically placed its vast amount 
of capital and human resources into another “hardware” construction project that centered on 
the construction of the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park (DDP). The DDP’s construction 
caused complex social conflicts among various policy actors, not only at the local but also at 




it into two phases: the first phase extends from the “Citizen Park Plan” to the “World Design 
Complex Plan” (2000 to 2008) while the second goes from “The DDP for the Fashion and 
Design Industry” to “The DDP for the Citizen” (2008 to 2014).  
3.2 From the “Citizen Park Plan” to the “World Design Complex Plan” 
To better understand the DDP construction project, it is necessary to start with 
Seoul’s brief urban history. Geographically, the Han River directly passes through the middle 
of this city, dividing it into two different parts: the Gangbuk area (northern part of Han river) 
and the Gangnam area (southern part of Han river). The Gangbuk area, a relatively older area 
where the Dongdaemun area is located, has been the capital of the Joseon dynasty from 1394; 
it is surrounded by four inner mountains and four outer mountains with the Cheonggye 
stream passing through the center (Kim and Han, 2012:142). The Gangnam area, by contrast, 
was more recently developed in 1970s as new housing and business areas with a well-
established infrastructure including wide roads, subways, bus terminals and highways (Kim 
and Han, 2012:147). Unlike the development boom in the Gangnam area from the 1970s, the 
SMG has retained a strict restriction policy in terms of urban redevelopment in the Gangbuk 
area because of its many historic sites such as the five Joseon dynasty palaces (SMG, 
2013:17). When Gangnam became the city’s most vibrant center in terms of its solid 
educational infrastructure, luxury residential areas, dynamic businesses, and active 
entertainment facilities, however, the gap between the areas of Gangnam and Gangbuk 
became a chronic social problem within Seoul.  
The “Dongdaemun” or the “Great East Gate”—designated as one of national treasures 




It was the major eastern gate that surrounded the Gangbuk area and connected the city wall 
during the previous Kingdom of Joseon Dynasty. The area of Dongdaemun is famous for 
being one of the Korea’s largest fashion marketplaces for the trade of clothing and textile 
products. The development of the Dongdaemun area as a major fashion marketplace can be 
divided into five different stages (SMG, 2013:71). During the first stage (1905-1960)—the 
quickening period—the old Dongdaemun market (later called the “Kwangjang market”) was 
established in the Dongdaemun area in 1905 as one of the nation’s first modern daily markets. 
Through the Japanese colonial period, the Dongdaemun market has grown as a focal point for 
the trade of Japanese clothing and textile products (SMG, 2013:72).  
After the Korean war, the Dongdaemun area became a clothing wholesale market 
based on the influx of aid clothing from the United States (SMG, 2013:72). At the second 
stage from the 1960s to 1980s, the garment factory neighborhood called “the Pyounghwa 
Fashion town” was established in the Cheonggyecheon area near Dongdaemun, making a 
division of labor between the Pyounghwa fashion town as a production site and the 
Dongdaemun area as a sales site (SMG, 2013:72). Korea’s rapid economic development 
period appears to have been due to its export-oriented economic policy along with the 
garment and textile industries which were one of the major industries to support the nation’s 
rapid economic growth during that period. 
From 1980 to 1990, the Dongdaemun market has undergone economic depression 
because large conglomerates entered the fashion industry with production of brand goods 
(SMG, 2013:72). These sizeable companies and their brand-named clothes rapidly held the 




quickly. A new business boom began in 1990 with the opening of a series of shopping mall 
complexes such as the “Art Plaza”, “Designer’s Club” and ‘Unocore” in the Dongdaemun 
area along with new marketing strategies initiated in 1998 that included 24-hour service and 
the provision of a bus for shoppers who lived outside Seoul (SMG, 2013:72). During this 
fourth period, as one of the largest fashion wholesale markets in Korea, the Dongdaemun 
market predominated over its rivals such as the Namdaemun market. In 1998 the Migliore, a 
famous chain of fashion department stores, first opened in the Dongdaemun area (SMG, 
2013:73). The success of the Migliore ignited the chain department store boom not only in 
the Dongdaemun area but also nationwide (SMG, 2013:73). Other chain department stores 
such as Doosan Tower owned by the Korean Chaebol, Doosan and Hello apM Mall were 
built in the western part of the Dongdaemun area around 2000. Even though these chain 
shopping malls constructed a new retail distribution systemt, the Dongdaemun went through 
a period of stagnation around 2007 because of excessive competition between high-end 
global fashion brands and lower-priced Chinese fashion products (SMG, 2013:73). <Figure 
11> shows each development period’s major buildings’ locations and photographs. The 
number of each picture is based on the chronological order of each building’s construction. 
Under these circumstances, the redevelopment of the Dongdaemun Stadium (DS)—on which 
now DDP is constructed—has paid great attention to revitalizing the area. The DS, which 
was located near the Dongdaemun gate and surrounded by the Dongdaemun fashion 
marketplaces, originally was built as the Kyungsung Stadium under Japanese colonial rule to 
celebrate the Japanese empire’s birthday in 1925. As Korea’s first modern athletic stadium, it 
was used for numerous historical events such as the celebration of the end of the Japanese 




Figure 11: The Dongdaemun area and the major buildings’ location and photo11 
 
After Korea’s independence from Japan, with the renovation of the site, it changed its 
name to “Seoul Stadium” and functioned as the nation’s major athletic stadium before the 
construction of the Jamsil Olympic stadium. After the Jamsil Olympic stadium opened in 
1984, it turned into the Dongdaemun Stadium and has been used primarily for amateur 
athletic games. Until 2003, the DS consisted of two different facilities: the soccer playground 
and the baseball stadium. In 2003, however, the soccer field became a temporary flea market 
																																								 																					
11 Sources: Pictures adopted from following sources and modified by myself. 1) 
http://www.korea111.com/dongdaemun.htm2) Seoul Museum of History (2012) The survey 
of Seoul living Culture : Dongdaemun market, Seoul : Seoul Metropolitan 
Government,3) http://kr.aving.net/news/view.php?articleId=779049&Branch_ID=kr&rssid=n
aver&mn_name=news,4)  http://nardoldol.egloos.com/m/2208838,  






for street venders who were displaced in the process of the restoration of the Cheonggye 
stream.   
Table 2. The Brief History of the Dongdaemun Stadium before the DDP construction12 






Modern sports stadium  











Amateur sports events especially for high school and college 
soccer and baseball games 




Temporary flea market for street venders 
 
<Table 2> shows a brief history of the DS from 1926 to 2007 before the DDP 
construction. The stadium’s deterioration led to two competing visions of redevelopment 
proposed in 2000: (1) the dome stadium construction plan proposed by the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, one of the nation’s largest private economic organizations and (2) 
the Dongdaemun Park construction plan developed mainly by the Dongdaemun Forum 
consisting of the Dongdaemun tourism and fashion industries, urban planners, academics, 
journalists and civic organizations (Hwang, 2010). The first plan was a “typical” urban mega 
construction project consisting of a baseball dome stadium and various commercial facilities 
																																								 																					





and accommodations while the second was based on the idea of turning the DS into an 
ecological citizens’ park (Hwang, 2010:67). 
When Se-hoon Oh was elected as Seoul’s mayor in 2006, he initially supported the 
second plan as part of Seoul’s larger Urban Recreation Project which divided Gangbuk’s 
center into four themed sectors: “History-Culture”, “Tourism-Culture”, “Green-Culture” and 
“Complex-Culture” (SMG, 2013). As shown in <Figure 12>, the Dongdaemun area was 
included in the “Complex-Culture sector” that passed throughout the Daehakro, Dongdaemun 
and Namsan districts. This initial policy proposal by Sehoon Oh's city government argued 
that the SMG redevelop the DS as a cultural, recreational and greenery-filled citizen’s park 
(SMG, 2006). Yet soon after, the SMG turned this citizens’ park plan into a “World Design 
Complex” after the mayor toured foreign cities such as Tokyo to observe their urban policies 
in September 2006.  
The SMG’s report entitled  “World Design Complex”, argued that the design industry 
has great potential for regenerating the city’s economy and providing abundant employment 
(SMG, 2007:8). In order to revitalize the Dongdaemun’s tourism and fashion industry, the 
SMG went on to claim that the complex should be constructed as “a grand landmark typed-
architecture” designed by a globally renowned architect (SMG, 2007:6). Without mentioning 
any calculation formulas and rigorous explanations about its economic efficacy, SMG 
(2007:8) also argued that the World Design Complex construction would bring a substantial 
amount of both the production inducement value (about 655.3 million US dollars) and the 
employment inducement value (about 639.2 million US dollars). Under the scheme, the 




convention hall for design related-products, and commercial areas such as shops and 
restaurants (SMG, 2007:6).  
Figure 12. The Urban Regeneration Plan Implemented by the SMG in 2007  
 
One critical difference between the “DS Park Construction” and the “World Design 
Complex” plans lies in how much of the original DS would be left standing. Citizen groups 
such as Cultural Action and several academics argued that the stadium should not be 
redeveloped entirely but rather its structure renovated or restored to maintain its original 
features and historic value (SMG, 2013:25). Nonetheless, the World Design Complex Plan—
later changed to the DDP—called for the stadium’s complete demolition replaced by a grand 
landmark designed by the globally-renowned architect Zaha Hadid13. Importantly, before the 
announcement of this plan, the SMG ran a citizens’ contest along with extensive public 
																																								 																					
13 Zaha Hadid is an Iraqi-British architect, who is famous for her winning the Pritzker-prize 
in 2004 and Stirling Prize in 2010. Her buildings are renowned by their neofuturistic features 
such as Guangzhou Opera House in Guangzhou, China and MAXXI of National Meseum of 




opinion polls regarding the redevelopment of the DS. The results showed that a majority of 
citizens in Seoul wanted to keep the original structure and turn it into a greenery-filled 
ecological citizens’ park (SMG, 2013:50). When SMG announced the winner of the 
international competition for the redevelopment of the DS, however, it was Zaha Hadid’s 
design titled Metonymic Landscape, dramatically different from what citizens had favored 
(See Figure 13).  As one journalist argues below, Zaha Hadid’s original design of 
“Metonymic Landscape” did not contain any historical consideration of the Dongdaemun 
area. Rather, it was more suitable for creating an urban spectacle composed of grand 
landmarks: 
Today, Zaha Hadid Architects create landmark projects for all types of functional 
programs. Their buildings are never bland or mundane, but assertive statements of a 
particular view, that the world may indeed look different. Their efforts have resulted 
in a staggering almost one thousand projects around the globe, on every scale, from 
urban design schemes to objects and furniture design (Søberg, 2014, italic added by 
myself). 
Figure 13. The Old Dongdaemun Stadium before the Demolition and Zaha Hadid’s 
Metonymic Landscape for the Redevelopment of the DS14 
 
																																								 																					




Hwang (2010) explains why the citizen park plan suddenly turned into the “World 
Design Complex” in terms of several inter-related factors: 1) the mayor himself had political 
interests in the design industry; 2) SMG had focused on the design industry and landmark 
construction as one of the strategies to enhance the city’s competitiveness; 3) SMG held 
opinions about redeveloping the Dongdaemun area as a fashion and design industry- 
specialized zone because its local economy had been based on these industries; and 4) local 
tourism and fashion industries hoped for redevelopment of the area (Hwang, 2010:78). To 
sum up, the “World Design Complex” plan was constructed based on 1) the political interests 
of Mayor Se-hoon Oh, 2) the administrative concerns of the SMG, and lastly 3) the economic 
needs of local industries. Spurred by these mutual interests, the SMG used the discourse of 
city branding and the enhancement of global competitiveness to promote the design industry. 
Se-hoon Oh stated this view in his acceptance speech for Seoul’s “World Design Capital 
2010” designation: 
Design will be a driving force in developing Seoul's economy. Seoul has surprised the 
world with the `Miracle of the Han River' and its great information technology, but 
now it will attract the world's attention with design. (Kim 2007, emphasis added by 
myself) 
 
 Stressing the design industry as the nation’s decisive force for new development, Se-
hoon Oh argues in his book, Nothing is impossible in Seoul, that design will be one of the 
major tools to enhance Seoul’s city branding (Oh, 2010). By introducing famous global city 
marketing successes such as Britain’s Gateshead and branding consultant’s ideas such as 
Simon Anholt’s city branding strategy, he legitimizes why most major urban redevelopment 




are necessary to improve the image of the city and attract more tourists and private capital 
investment (Oh, 2010:107). Yet, even though he uses the discourse of design for making a 
“soft and creative city”, most of these projects contain “hardware construction” which not 
only caused a direct ecological and geographical impact but also ignited socio-political 
controversies. For example, although Han River Renaissance project uses the discourse of 
environment-friendly “restoration” of the riverside to create “an ecological home to citizens”, 
this plan includes a series of mega construction projects such as the Jamsil Floating Island.  
Figure 14. Artists Impression of Han River Renaissance Project15 
 
<Figure 14> and <Figure 15> show the artist’s impression of the Han River 
Renaissance Project and Jamsil Floating Island. In spite of the consistently strong public 
oppositions and criticisms during the execution of these urban redevelopment projects, the 
																																								 																					






way that the SMG cautiously countered with various policy actors using negotiation 
strategies illustrates the developmental state’s actions to justify these urban mega 
construction projects. I will examine how this negotiation process was performed in the next 
section. 
Figure 15. Artist’s Impression of the Jamsil Floating Island16 
 
3.3. From “World Design Complex” to “Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park” 
After the new construction plan’s announcement, different types of actors reacted to 
the plan. One major policy actor who strongly supported the mayor’s plan is what Hwang 
(2010) calls Dongdaemun area’s “local growth coalition” consisting of the local tourist and 







This locally-oriented coalition formed through promoting a series of local economic 
development plans (e.g., inviting Seoul’s new city hall into the area in 1996, promoting the 
Dongdaemun area for the Tourist Special Zone from 2000-2, and supporting former Mayor 
Lee’s Dongdaemun Park construction pledge from 2002-3) (Hwang, 2010:49). Interestingly, 
this local growth coalition in the Dongdaemun area used to have one of the major roles in 
promoting the redevelopment plan of the DS as “the citizens’ park”. When the SMG 
announced the World Design Complex Plan, however, this local-growth coalition strongly 
supported the SMG, proposing that the World Design Complex construction would be more 
socio-economically beneficial in the Dongdaemun area. Moreover, by using the discourse of 
“their territories” when referring to Dongdaemun, the assemblage between this local growth 
coalition and the SMG strongly countered other policy actors such as street venders, who 
originally resided in the Dongdaemun stadium and later dislocated to other places and citizen 
groups who strongly disagreed with World Design Complex plan (Hwang, 2010:94).   
In fact, the SMG specified possible policy actors regarding the DDP construction 
projects and reported how they “negotiated” with these various policy actors in the 
whitepaper of the DDP construction. It is important to notice how SMG’s negotiation with 
various policy actors shows that the developmental state is not “the object of an ostensive 
black box” but rather a “performative assemblage” which can be perceived as involved in an 
endless process of making and remaking (Latour, 2005). In the later parts, I will analyze this 
complex negotiation process by focusing on the whitepaper of the DDP construction, other 




 In the whitepaper, SMG (2013) firstly points out various policy actors opposing the 
development plan of the local growth coalition included: 1) NGOs and citizen groups who 
initially claimed the “citizen park plan” for the DS (e.g., Cultural Action), 2) soccer/baseball 
athletic groups who actually used the DS for their athletic activities, 3) street vendors with 
shops in the stadium, and 4) the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea who were in 
charge of the excavation and restoration beneath the DS of the Seoul Fortress Wall and the 
Military training facility built during the Joseon Dynasty (SMG, 2013).  
Firstly, in order to oppose SMG’s World Design Complex plan when it was 
announced, the Citizen Movement on Sports, one of the first NGO for Sports in Korea, 
banded together with eight other NGOs including Cultural Action, People’s Solidarity for 
Cultural Heritage, Korea’s People’s Solidarity against Poverty, the Democratic Labor Party, 
the National Association for Poverty, the National Association for Street Vendors, Korea 
Professional Baseball Players Association and Korea Soccer Coach Associations (SMG, 
2013:385)17. In particular, the Citizen Movement on Sports argued for a renovation of the DS 
that retained its usage as a baseball stadium during the baseball season and as a citizen park 
																																								 																					
17	These heterogeneous NGOs assembled together because each of them could share their 
opposition to the DDP construction plan. These opponents of the DDP can be divided into 
three different groups such as 1) cultural groups including Cultural Action, People’s 
Solidarity for Cultural Heritage, 2) athletics groups including the Citizen Movement on 
Sports, Korea Professional Baseball Players Association, Korea Soccer Coach Associations 
and 3) labor groups including Korea’s People’s Solidarity against Poverty, Democratic Labor 
Party, National Association for Poverty, and National Association for Street Vendors. In 
general, while cultural groups and athletic groups opposed the DDP construction in the 
viewpoint of cultural and historical value for restoration, labor groups argue that the DDP 
construction can cause displacement of the street vendors who were temporally doing their 
business in the DS. These street vendors group started their businesses in the DS because 
they have been relocated from their original business place due to the SMG’s another urban 
redevelopment project, Chunggey stream restoration project during the former mayor’s 




for the off-season.  Next the Citizen Movement on Sports and other eight civic organizations 
created the Mutual Task Force and gave a statement opposing the demolition of the DS and 
supporting its restoration in the name of 100 people. The list of these 100 people who signed 
the statement includes not only famous politicians such as Jungwoon Chan (former prime 
minister in Korea) but also athletic celebrities such as Jongbum Lee and Chulsoon Park. Even 
though these advocates comprise heterogeneous groups from different backgrounds and 
interests, they share the same vision for DS’s historic and cultural value. Nonetheless, in 
order to “successfully” pursue the World Design Complex plan, the SMG distinguished these 
heterogeneous groups based on their backgrounds such as cultural/ athletic /labor groups and 
handled each group through different negotiation strategies. <Table 3>, adopted from the 
SMG’s policy report, summarizes how the SMG approached each group. 
To cope with these divergent voices against the World Design Complex construction, 
the SMG first divided the opposing groups into “negotiable” and “un-negotiable”. SMG’s 
negotiation strategy can be explained by the concept of what Callon (1986) called 
“problematisation”, defining “the nature and the problems of other actors and then suggests 
that these can be resolved if the actors negotiated the ‘obligatory passage point’” between 
them. From the viewpoint of the SMG, the cultural groups including Cultural Action and 
People’s Solidarity for Cultural Heritage, which consists of civic activists, were defined as 
“un-negotiable”, because these groups have rigid attitudes toward DS's preservation in terms 
of its cultural and historic value (SMG, 2013:391). In other words, SMG’s ‘obligatory 
passage point’ (i.e., the construction of the World Design Complex) and its cultural group’s 




consequentially, the SMG decided not to contact this group directly for persuasion, which 
means that they were not included in the negotiation process. Rather, the SMG determined to 
counteract the position of this group solely through official comments on them via the media 
(SMG, 2013:391).  
In contrast with the strategy used with the cultural group, the SMG re-classified the 
athletic group into several different categories so that it could be negotiated with mainly by 
the strategy of “personal contacting and persuasion”. Because the SMG itself contains many 
sports administrative sections such as the Sports Promotion Office and the Seoul Sports 
Council, it decided to create a task force from its officials who has significant personal and 
academic networks tied to the athletic groups (SMG, 2013:392). Thus members of the task 
force consisting of SMG officials, who has personal relationships with members of athletic 
groups, personally contacted the people in the athletic organizations and persuaded them 
personally. For example, while some SMG officials contacted several members of athletic 
groups who graduated same colleges and high schools, others persuaded their acquaintances 
in athletic groups who knew one another before. At the same time, through personal 
contacting process, the SMG noticed that the sports celebrities who signed the statement to 
oppose the demolition and restoration of the DS could be placed in the “half-hearted group” 
category because some in this group showed a relatively weak stance toward participation in 
the opposition protest (SMG, 2013:391). Also, some members of the Citizen Movement on 
Sports were able to be persuaded by the SMG’s officials who had close personal and 




the Korea Football Association—successfully swayed the soccer athletic groups to change 
their stance. 
In addition to this strategy of using personal and academic connections, the SMG 
decided to set up an athletic memorial space within the World Design Complex and collect 
opinions from the athletic groups in regard to the restoration of the site’s historic and cultural 
value (SMG, 2013:392). With this strategy, these athletic groups’ opposition to the World 
Design Complex became translated into an “athletic memorial space” within the World 
Design Complex. In other words, SMG transformed and translated “the non-material idea of 
the restoration of historic and cultural value” claimed by the athletic groups into “the 
material actors of the athletic memorial space” consisting of hand-prints of athletic 
celebrities, photographs showing the modern history of the DS, and a miniature model of the 
DS.  Moreover, for the baseball groups who wanted to renovate and reuse the stadium for 
historic and cultural value, the SMG offered substitute stadiums. Here, similar to the athletic 
memorial space, the DS’s historic and cultural value desired by the baseball groups was 
translated into the utility of a substitute stadium as a material entity. Even though the Korea 
Professional Baseball Player Association retained its original opinion to support DS’s 
restoration, the SMG negotiated with the Emergency Planning Committee for the DS that 
consisted of 19 baseball associations, focusing particularly on the Korea Baseball 
Association that is one of the largest national associations for baseball. The SMG offered the 
construction of one domed stadium for the professional baseball league and six small 




historic and cultural value of the DS was translated into material sites consisting of seven 
brand new stadiums mobilized by the SMG.  
Table 3. SMG’s Negotiation Strategy for Each Group18 
Groups Members of Groups Negotiation Strategy 
Cultural 
(23 People) 
Cultural Action/ People’s 
Solidarity for Cultural 
Heritage 
Handling these groups by contacting with other governmental 
branch the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea, who is in 
charge of the excavation and restoration procedure of the DS.  
Athletic 
(88 People) 




Korea Soccer Coach 
Associations 
Creating task Forces and negotiating with these groups by 
dividing them into three different actors:  
1) Half-Hearted Groups (athletic celebrity) - Invitation to 
various meetings/sending P.R. materials 
2) The Citizen Movement on Sports - unofficial personal 
contacting and persuasion 
3) Soccer Athletic Groups - official P.R. activity such as 






Labor Party/ National 
Association for Poverty/ 
National Association for 
Street Vendors 
 
Handling these groups by focusing on the negotiation with 
street venders 
 
For street vendors, the SMG also utilized a different strategy based on their 
characteristics such as dubbed “illegal nature” of street vendors. The street vendors group 
was originally moved out of the Cheonggey stream area because of the restoration 
construction of the stream. Former mayor of Seoul, Myungbak Lee, suggested that they move 
into the DS soccer field temporally since it had not been used because of its deterioration. In 
																																								 																					





this reason, if the street vendors had to move to another site due to the DDP construction, it 
would be a double displacement for them. The SMG, however, argued that it was impossible 
to accept their demands to stay in the stadium because the vendors’ business was “illegal” 
(SMG, 2013:435). In doing so, the street venders group became defined as the group who 
had the “least” bargaining power because they were deemed “illegal nature”; therefore the 
SMG identified negotiation strategies that included even physical methods such as force 
eviction by using police enforcement to solve the “problem” of this actor.  
Moreover, the SMG—to prevent continuous collaboration among the local street 
vendors, their national-level organization (National Association for Street Vendors) along 
with other NGOs (Korea’s People’s Solidarity against Poverty/Democratic Labor 
Party/National Association for Poverty)—proposed that if the street vendors agreed with the 
World Design Complex construction, they would construct a substitute marketplace (later 
called the Seoul Folk Flea Market) near the Dongdaemun area (SMG, 2013:436). This is 
exactly the same translation strategy as Callon (1986)’s concept of “interessement”: seeking 
“to lock the other actors to define the actors into the roles that have been proposed for them 
in that program”(Callon, 1986). In other words, if street venders were to accept the substitute 
marketplace, it meant that they might disassociate from other national level associations that 
were continuously fighting against SMG’s plan together. The suggestion of a substitute 
marketplace became a strategy of moving street venders into a site where they could lose 
their connections to other like-minded actors, in this case the substituted market places that 
had been proposed in SMG’s program. In addition to this “interessement” strategy, SMG 




not accept this substitute marketplace offer. By using this ultimatum strategy of “choosing 
substitute place or law enforcement”, SMG smoothly disunited the street vendors group from 
other associations; thus most of them decided to accept SMG’s offers, and consequentially 
were excluded and dislocated later to the place once again called the Seoul Folk Flea Market.  
Finally, the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea (below CHAK) disagreed with 
the World Design Complex plan in terms of their excavation and restoration beneath the DS 
site, because the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility were built on this site 
during the Joseon Dynasty. A national law for restoration and protection of the cultural 
heritage and artifacts enforced that any excavation investigation of this area had to be done 
by the CHAK before the redevelopment and reconstruction of the area. By the request of the 
SMG, the CHAK actually confirmed that both the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military 
training facility were actually located beneath the DS site. After uncovering these buildings 
from the Joseon period, there were several divergent opinions within the CHAK. While some 
argued for a full restoration of the Seoul Fortress Wall and the Military training facility, 
others preferred a partial restoration or only a documented preservation of the site (SMG, 
2013:120). From the viewpoint of the SMG, however, the full restoration option simply 
meant the halting of the whole construction plan; therefore they needed to cope with the 
CHAK.  
One of the distinctive differences in the way that the SMG tried to define the role of 
the CHAK is they recognized this agency as neither an antagonistic nor an argumentative 
entity. Rather, the SMG defined the CHAK as a “mutual consultation” player because both 




with the CHAK, the report title was recorded as “consultation agenda (협의사항) of the date” 
rather than “negotiation” or “discussion”. Within this mutual relationship, the SMG explains 
that the international design competition had taken place already, so therefore the blocking of 
the whole construction project could spiral into an “international conflict” (SMG, 2013:121). 
For this reason, the SMG turned the World Design Complex plan into the “Dongdaemun 
Design Plaza and Park” as the ‘obligatory passage point’ for both the SMG and CHAK. In 
actuality, in the original design of Zaha Hadid’s “Metonymic Landscape”, there was no space 
assigned for an “historical park”. Yet because SMG had to avoid the full restoration plan, the 
SMG suggested instead to construct the historical park and to relocate the cultural artifacts to 
this site within the World Design Complex. For this reason, the historical park was newly 
added and assigned in the World Design Complex plan so that the “World Design Complex” 
was finally transformed into the new name of “Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park”.  In 
other words, in order to make a successful association with the CHAK, the Seoul Fortress 
Wall and the Military training facility were relocated to the “historic park,” along with the 
restoration of historic and cultural value for the DS became translated into the “athletic 
memorial space” in the park.  
3.4. DDP as Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming 
Through such a variegated negotiation process with their opponents based on the 
principle of "different strategies for different actors", the SMG chose Samsung and other 
large capital to be the executors of the DDP construction. During this process, the DDP 
became more and more costly to construct: the original construction costs rose from 153.9 to 




Plan into DDP construction, the local growth coalition of the Dongdaemun area, large capital 
(e.g., Samsung) and the developmental state successfully created what we can conceptualize 
as “neoliberal-developmental policy networks” similar to that of Yokohama’s MM 21. Not 
surprisingly, these soaring construction costs caused various citizen groups, social activists, 
and journalists to criticize this vast amount of city expenditures. These groups, who were 
once defined as "cultural groups" and assigned as “un-negotiable” by the SMG, argued that 
the SMG should increase welfare expenditures rather than spend the city budget for the 
hardware construction projects like the DDP venture. In January 20th, 2009, in the Yongsan 
redevelopment area—one of the places included in the Han River Renaissance project—five 
protesting tenants (who had refused to displace the building) and one policeman from the riot 
police team (who forcibly had evicted the dozens of protestors) were dead in the fire that 
occurred during the police raid (Ha, 2009). 
Figure 16. Artists’ Impressions of Yongsan Redevelopment Plan19 
 
																																								 																					






This tragedy received much attention not only from the domestic but also the 
international media; moreover citizens in Seoul and from the whole of Korean society started 
to question what the so-called “creative city policy” was actually doing to the city and its 
citizens. The Yongsan area also was planned to be redeveloped as a global business and 
commerce district by the establishment of a consortium of Korea’s Chaebol including Lotte 
and Samsung and the government-run transit authority, Korea Railway; yet what this plan 
desired was to promote the gentrification of the area and with it the dislocation of their 
original residents, even after the death of six innocent people.  <Figure 16> and <Figure 17> 
represent the contrasting images of “artists’ impressions of the plan” and “the death of the 
protestors”. Through the Yongsan tragedy, civil society activists and journalists began to 
criticize SMG’s creative city policy in terms of its hardware construction-centered planning, 
the vast amount of city revenue spending, and capital-friendly policy. Citizen groups argued 
that the SMG should not pour city’s funds into any urban mega construction project, 
including into the DDP construction. Rather, they claimed that the SMG should spend more 
money to expand social-welfare programs for its citizens. This agenda that pitted such an 
“urban mega project” against “social-welfare programs” became one of the strategies by 
which the actors involved criticized the SMG’s creative city policy20. In 2011, Se-hoon Oh’s 
																																								 																					
20 The old mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, was a member of the Hannara Party (recently 
renamed "the Saenuri Party"), a conservative political party in Korea. However, when he 
started his second term as the mayor of Seoul, the outright majority of city's education 
council was elected by the members of the oppositional party, the Democratic Party, a social-
liberal political party in Korea. For this reason, citizen groups, who were critical of Sehoon 
Oh's urban mega construction oriented-creative city policy, cooperated with the oppositional 
party to oppose both Se-hoon Oh's free lunch referendum, which proposed to offer a limited 






disagreement with citizen groups spurred his opposition political party to push for Seoul’s 
welfare budget to go to funding free school lunch programs. In response, the opposition 
party-controlled city education council proclaimed an ordinance to provide free meals to all 
elementary-aged children under its jurisdiction in defiance of the city government’s call to 
pay heed to the limited state budget. The mayor’s office then accused the opposition of 
flaunting a ‘populist’ welfare campaign and proposed holding a citizen poll to settle this 
ongoing dispute (Kim, 2011). Consequentially, Oh resigned because his referendum on free 
lunches was invalidated due to low voter turnout (Kim, 2011). The opposition party and 
citizen groups argued that the next city government should re-orient the urban redevelopment 
plan in a more citizen-friendly direction. 
Figure 17. One of the Dead Protestors in the Fire of the Yongsan Tragedy21 
 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																													
 




3.5. DDP for Citizens  
Won-soon Park, who is a civic society activist and a former human rights lawyer 
promoting himself as “a citizen’s candidate,” was elected as Seoul’s new mayor in 2011 after 
the resignation of Sehoon Oh. After taking mayor’s office, he invited citizens to express their 
thoughts about the DDP construction through “listening workshops” and “deliberation 
meetings”. He argued for a change of the initial concept of the DDP as a “World Design 
Complex” for mainly the fashion and local tourist industries (with convention/exhibition 
buildings, commercial shopping areas, and information/technology sites) to more citizen-
friendly usage. Under this circumstance, the mayor delayed the DDP’s opening for more than 
a year to transform its usage, organizing the Citizen Consulting Committee for the DDP to 
oversee these new plans. The committee proposed that the DDP consider its target users not 
only to be the local fashion and design industries, but also citizens, creative workers and 
artists as well (SMG, 2012).  
Moreover, the chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, which is 
responsible for the management of the DDP, was also changed to Sang-soo Ahn, a designer 
famous for the creation of one of the most popular Korean fonts, the ‘Ahn Sang Soo Font’. 
He was recognized as a person who could better share the new mayor’s vision: that of 
changing the usage of the DDP to be more citizen-oriented. After Sang-soo Ahn took the 
chairman’s office, the activities of the Seoul Design Foundation indeed were reformulated 
toward more ‘citizen-friendly’. For example, a new administrative division called the 
“Citizen Design Service Center” was established, with many workshops that invited ordinary 




Foundation launched the Facebook webpage called “What Can Design Do for Seoul?” where 
ordinary citizens, artists, creators and designers could express and share their opinions 
regarding the DDP management plan as well as Seoul’s creative city policy in general. My 
interview with a staff at the Seoul Design Foundation reveals how this group’s activities 
actually changed in terms of not only their organizational structure but also their actual tasks: 
After changing the Mayor and the chairman of the board, our foundation changed a 
lot in terms of not only our organizational structure but also our work itself. When I 
first joined the foundation, our major mission was to manage the DDP from its 
construction to actual management after its opening. So we studied many other 
design-related facilities’ management plans. Our job was mostly intended to manage 
the DDP as a successful “World Design Complex” and to develop the design industry. 
But with the former mayor’s sudden resignation, we were faced with dramatic change. 
The foundation appointed a new chairman, and he was a person who had a different 
vision from that of the former chairman. He stressed how we can serve not only the 
design industry but also ordinary citizens as well. I was originally in the DDP 
management department, but I was switched to the “Citizen Service Design Division”. 
We suddenly had to organize “citizen listening workshops” and open our Facebook 
webpage, “What Can Design do for Seoul?” This was quite a dramatic change, and 
many of our staff were confused about what we were supposed to do. (Personal 
Interview with the Seoul Design Foundation Staff employed since the Foundation’s 
creation).  
In response to public opinion surveys of various kinds, the SMG announced a new 
management proposal for the DDP. The new proposal argued that while the former mayor, 
Se-hoon Oh, viewed the DDP only in terms of the fashion, tourist and design industries, the 
new mayor’s proposal aim was to switch its focus to the social responsibility of design and 
open up the DDP to ordinary citizens. According to the new proposal, the SMG announced a 
management and space plan that was divided into five different sites: an art hall, museum, 





Table 4. The New Management Plan for DDP22.  
Former Proposal Differences New Proposal 
World Design Complex    (Result-
oriented) 
Vision Creativity and Knowledge Center (Role-
oriented) 
New Design Product Launching 
site, Trend setter, Design 
information experiencing 
(Expert-oriented place) 
Purpose New Idea, Various Human Resources, 
Wellbeing 
(Citizen-oriented place) 
Attracting designers, exhibitions, 
information 
Strategy 24 hours Opening for Citizens, making 60 
attractions, 100 % efficient management 
Design Experts as main target and 
citizen as passive visitor 
Target Group World Citizen, Creative Citizen, Future Citizen 
as active users 
Annual Visitor 180 million Target number of Tourist 
Gathering 
Annual Visitors - 550 million 
Convention Hall, Exhibition Hall, 
Design Library 
Space Plan Art Hall, Museum, Business Center for 
Creators, Historic Park and Amenities 
Content-oriented Content Platform-oriented 
Exhibit and Interior 
Centered Plan 
Space Construction Equipment and Property-centered Plan 
Financially Depended on 
The City’s Subsidiary 
Management Plan Financially Independent 
Revenue < Expenditure: 
20.6 Billion won 
Financial Plan Revenue = Expenditure: 
32.1 Billion won 
Attracting Human Resource, 
Capital and Information related to 
Design 
Effects Enhancing Public Service, Becoming Tourist 








<Table 4> shows the differences between the past management plan and the new one 
that was published by the SMG. Two major differences can be epitomized as “enhancing 
public service function” and “being financially independent”. These two major distinctions 
were based on incorporating citizens’ criticisms of the former mayor’s plan. First of all, the 
new plan stressed that the DDP would be not only for design and fashion experts but also for 
its citizens. (See Table 4). To enhance this public service function, it included as its amenities 
an art hall and museum spaces for the general public, along with a children’s playground that 
incorporated a learning facility. Moreover, in response to citizens’ criticisms about spending 
a vast amount of city budgets for managing the DDP, SMG argued that the DDP would be 
financially efficient and independent. In regard to this financial efficiency, the SMG 
explained that the design library space would be replaced by business centers, including 
design shops that would serve as incubators for new designers and creators (Kim, 2014).  By 
following the new management plan, the DDP was opened in March, 2014. Both domestic 
and international media reported its inauguration while one of Korea’s most famous comedy 
show, Muhan Dojeon (Infinite Challenge), ridiculed it as a “a forcibly landed spaceship” in 
the Dongdaemun area. <Figure 18> shows the DDP’s current features.  
During the opening ceremony, Won-Soon Park, the new mayor of Seoul, stated, “Is 
the DDP really crap established by the Seoul Metropolitan Government? Or is it a 
masterpiece, which can be the pride of Seoul? ….I am aware of the doubts and worries 
among civil societies, but this ‘DDP spaceship’ will be the beginning of Seoul’s new history.” 
His speech reveals that even though he wanted to develop the DDP in a different way, certain 




I know that many citizens and activists radically hate the DDP construction itself. I, 
myself, also really didn’t like the construction plan itself. They (the former mayors 
and its proponents) shouldn’t plan this kind of mega construction projects. However, 
when I took the mayor’s office, the construction already was underway. [When he 
was elected as mayor, already 70 percent of the construction process had been 
completed.] I had no choice. The best thing that I can do is not spend more of the 
taxpayers’ money to run the DDP because the original management plan expects the 
annual management cost to be 30 billion won. So I strongly claim that the DDP 
should be financially independent from the city government. 
(Translated by myself from Jung, (2014))  
As this speech clearly shows, the new translation of the DDP, “The DDP for the 
Citizen”, left certain limitations and regrets from citizens and even from the mayor himself. 
These limitations and regrets would ignite other criticism from citizen groups that had been 
designated as “un-negotiable” actors (e.g., the Creative Actions). I will discuss this issue in 
more detail in the next section by comparing this process with similar situations in 
Yokohama. 
Figure 18. The Current features of the DDP23 
 
																																								 																					




Figure 19. Seoul’s Neo-liberal Policy Network and Post-Developmental Policy Network 
 
In summary, by passing through several phases of the DDP construction from “The 
DDP as World Design Complex” to “The DDP for Citizens,” it is possible to observe that 
new policy actors emerged: citizen groups who were actively engaged with the state and 
organized in similar ways to what we found in Yokohama whose creative city policy network 
took a post-developmental policy network direction that was associated with neither state nor 
capital. Unlike Yokohama’s coexistence model, however, in Korea the two policy 
networks—the former mayor’s neoliberal-developmental network consisting of State and 




conflicted with each other over one site, the DDP, in a compressed time span from 2007 to 
2013. <Figure 10: See Page 93> summarizes how both Yokohama’s post-developmental and 
neoliberal-developmental policy networks occurred in different places: Kannai and MM 21.  
Conversely, <Figure 19> shows how Korea’s post-developmental and neoliberal-
developmental policy networks struggled with each other over the same project: the 
Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park.  
3.6 Unfinished Stories of the Neoliberal-Developmental Urban Reforming and the 
Emergence of the Post-Developmental Symptom in East Asia. 
 In his book, Post-Soviet Social, anthropologist Stephen Collier questions whether the 
antinomies having long been accepted as defining neoliberalism—public versus private value, 
social versus post-social, the state versus the market, and solidarity versus individualism—
are still useful in explaining the current global circulation of neoliberalism (Collier, 2011). In 
particular, he is skeptical about its exploratory effectiveness in terms of these binary 
oppositional terms, which have been constructed to explain “western” situations. In this 
regard, he suggests a consideration of “neoliberalism”—not as “ideologies”, “hegemonic 
projects” or “governmental rationalities”—but rather as forms of “critical reflection on 
governmental practices” (Collier, 2011). If we consider the global circulation of creative city 
policy as “neoliberal urban reforming”, as many political economists argue, do these 
antinomies match with the “creative city policy” in Seoul and Yokohama? Or, more precisely, 





To explain the current East Asian urban situation, Hill (2007) suggests the application 
of the distinction of the East Asian “neo-developmental” state versus the “post-
developmental” state. Comparing the levels of market openness and state planning along 
these two dimensions, he notes three types of East Asian countries: 1) the Neo-
Developmental State (Thailand: High Market Openness/Low State Planning), 2) the In-
Between State (Korea and Taiwan), and 3) the Post-Developmental State (Japan: High 
Market Openness/High State Planning) (Hill, 2007). Because Japan’s focus is now on 
“innovation” and “quality of life” rather than on catching up with the West’s rapid growth, he 
argues that Japan is currently in a post-developmental stage which marks “both the continuity 
with past developmentalist traditions and institutions” and “the emergence of new ideologies 
and structures in Japan that conform neither to neoliberal nor to developmentalist models” 
(Hill, 2007).  In regard to the creative city policy, however, one can observe that both Korea 
and Japan contain neoliberal-developmental as well as post-developmental elements.  
Importantly, in Yokohama in particular the Creative Core Area as a post-
developmental network was derived from MM 21’s neoliberal developmental network; thus 
Yokohama’s creative city policy can be seen as a response to neoliberal-developmentalism. 
In contrast, Seoul’s creative city policy encompasses two distinct dimensions: neoliberal-
developmentalist and post-developmentalist. Therefore the main differences between the two 
cases stem from how each society manages these different policy networks (i.e., Yokohama’s 
coexistence model and Korea’s more conflictual (or antagonistic) model). In this regard, I 
suggest a clearer conceptualization of the East Asian variant of post-




Developmentalism” or “Neoliberal-Developmentalism”—but rather within the framework of 
multiple “post-developmentalisms” or “neoliberal-developmentalisms.” Furthermore, with 
consideration of the post-developmental directions as meaningful responses to neoliberal-
developmentalism, should the emergence of the creative city policy be understood as a “new 
alternative of social inclusion”? Several examples in Yokohama and Seoul do indicate that 
certain limits actually exist in these post-developmental symptoms. In the case of Yokohama, 
how the YMG differentially treats the Koganecho area compared to the Kotobukicho area 
suggests important implications. For example, a joint venture between the YMG, the non-
profit organizations (NPOs), and the Koganecho Management Office turned the Koganecho, 
the city’s largest red light area, into a site for artists in residence and art-related shops. For 
this project, the YMG first used police enforcement to “clear-up” the area by eliminating 
gangs and prostitutes; then it recruited NPOs who were able to rebuild and change the image 
of the area. This case became famous as one of the successful examples of how creative city 
policy can function as “social inclusion” (Sasaki, 2010). Distinct from Koganecho’s sudden 
policy implementation, the Kotobukicho area—one of Japan’s three largest homeless and day 
laborer areas in Yokohama—has not received any attention from the creative city policy at 
all. Why does “the virtue of social inclusion” of the creative city policy not embrace one of 
the city’s most backward areas?   
My interview with a state official explains that the state does not have any plans for 
the Kotobukicho area within the creative city policy because the Koganecho area was an 
illegal site for prostitution and crime while the Kotobukicho area was not. In other words, the 




policy because they cannot expect rapid and clear results from such efforts as “clearing up 
the area” by police enforcement or reconstruction by NPOs. Nonetheless I did meet activists 
who are “not even NPO” but rather part of a loosely organized citizen volunteer group that 
initiated “Kotobuki Creative Action” with the aim of organically changing the image of the 
area and supporting homeless and day-workers through initiation of arts-related activities. 
Interestingly enough, one member of this group is a current YMG official who well knows 
about Yokohama’s creative city policy. In my interview with him, he mentions that the 
reason why he started this more grass-roots approach—while not “wearing the cap of a state 
official” but of “just one ordinary citizen”—is that the problems associated with the 
Kotobukicho area cannot be solved by current state administrative “logic,” which always 
must legitimize its policy practices with “eye-catching” results.  
With similar limitations as those of Yokohama’s post-developmentalism, the case of 
Seoul involves several activist groups that have radically criticized the new mayor’s 
somewhat “neutral” policy practices in his management of the DDP. For example, Cultural 
Action, who originally disagreed with the World Design Complex plan, argues that the new 
mayor’s DDP management plan called the “DDP for the Citizen” does not differ much from 
the old management plan. They contend that the original concept—which civil society hoped 
for—is not “a design plaza” but rather “a citizen park”. In this regard, the new mayor’s plan 
is still based on keeping the concept of the “DDP” as a “world design complex” by changing 
only some of the facility’s usage into more citizen-friendly practices. Moreover, the new 
management plan contains a fee-based policy, from which the DDP would become 




conventions and cultural events. Even though SMG argues that this fee-based policy was 
invented in response to citizens’ criticism of the old management plan, including the vast 
amount of city expenditures used to run the DDP annually, Cultural Action claims that such a 
fee-based policy evolved because the SMG still wanted to keep the facility as a “design plaza” 
by charging its citizens. For this reason, they argue that the DDP’s management plan should 
be radically re-envisioned by abandoning the “neutral” position it holds that lies between a 
“design plaza” and a “citizen park”.  
 Yokohama’s Kotobuki Creative Action and Seoul’s Cultural Action demonstrate even 
more contradictory positions, as reflected in the post-developmental propensities found in 
both cities. In the case of Yokohama, the actions of Kotobuki Creative Action show that the 
coexistence model of the State-Capital/NPOs can be “selectively” inclusive in their 
dependence on each policy actor’s respective interests. In the case of Seoul, the new mayor’s 
post-developmental direction does not necessarily mean radical change against the 
neoliberal-developmental direction in spite of the city’s efforts to listen to citizens’ voices. 
The ambiguities containing the concept of what Hill (2007) called “post-developmentalism” 
as “neither developmental (state-driven) nor neoliberal (market-driven)” are not necessarily 
connected in both Korea and Japan to an alternative concept like “society-driven”.  
Nonetheless, there may be a slight possibility that both Korea and Japan’s post-
developmental networks found in the creative city policy will become a form of “either state 
or market and NPO”. Within this inclusive policy network of the “Capital-NPO-State”, what 
is more important is that the emerging new policy actor—the NPOs as representatives of  




politics” which legitimizes assumptions about the neutrality of the category of civil society 
and its lack of politics. In this regard, it is important to note that neoliberal developmental 
urban reform is unfinished in spite of the emergence of post-developmental symptoms, as 
these chapters observed in Yokohama’s MM21 and in Seoul’s former mayor’s DDP project. 
Rather, these post-developmental symptoms are assigned to a certain site: in the case of 
Yokohama within the Kannai area and in case of Seoul within the DDP.  These symptoms 
also are connected with certain roles, both in the case of Yokohama as a “partially selective 
social inclusion” and of Seoul as a “neutral position between a ‘design plaza’ and a ‘citizen 
park’”.  
 To carefully interpret this ambiguous feature of post-developmental dimensions in 
East Asia, we should not stop with the identification of how each society’s post-
developmental network is assembled but further ask how it effectively counters the problem 
of neoliberal-developmental forces. Thus, the divergent and distinctive roles of the 
developmental state and its relation to capital and civil society in the creative city policy in 
Seoul and Yokohama empirically provide strong evidence about how differences and 





TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "ART TRIENNALES": YOKOHAMA 
TRIENNALES 
4.1 Introduction  
By focusing on four different Yokohama Triennales from 2001 to 2011, in this 
chapter, I examine the ways Yokohama's urban mega events are practiced by routinized 
techniques and standardized procedures. To better locate the Yokohama Triennale as one of 
the major urban events in Yokohama's creative city policy, the advent of the art Triennale in 
Japan has to be contextualized in longer history of urban mega events. In doing so, it is 
helpful firstly to explore how urban mega events in general have been developed and located 
within Japanese society in relation to their socio-political contexts, so I will introduce key 
researches, which show cultural history of urban mega events in postwar Japan by focusing 
on the development of the world fairs in Japan. Furthermore, I will move on highlighting the 
longer history of art Biennale beginning in the 19th century's colonial context to the recent 
Third Worldist attempting to change the terms, which shows how current globalization of art 
biennale and triennale is based on a tension between market and curators acting as brokers 
with local interests as well as broader political questions. With the consideration of these 
historical contexts, I attempt to show how "coexisting model of creative city Yokohama" 
consisting of the state-NPOs-citizens translates "civic participation" into a certain limited 
mode by fostering "volunteer subjectivity", which locates the role of citizens into apolitical 




which citizens can more "radically" participate from the actual planning and management 
process of Yokohama Triennale, in spite of their strong desire to become a “mediator” of 
urban mega events.  
In his book, Banbaku genso (The Expo Syndrome: Postwar Politics and Cultural 
Struggle in Postwar Japan), Yoshimi Shunya, a Japanese cultural studies scholar, (2005) 
traces how expos and world fairs – as among the largest urban mega events – were planned 
and practiced as part of postwar Japan’s obsolete development-oriented ideology. He claims 
that postwar Japan held a series of expos (i.e., the Osaka, Okinawa, Tsukuba and Aichi 
Expos) in order to project what he calls "expo fantasy", meaning "a system for mobilizing the 
desire of the Japanese population for launching expositions, which were linked to large-scale 
public projects orchestrated by the state" (Yoshimi, 2006:395). In other words, Yoshimi 
points out that there was a structural continuity between the dramatic economic growth of 
postwar Japan and the boom of expos, within which these events functioned as cultural tools 
or symbolic "fantasies" by which to make their citizens actually experience and confirm 'the 
dream of the rapid economic development' in their everyday lives (Yoshimi, 2005). 
Coinciding with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Japan’s first postwar expo – the Osaka Expo 
1970 – was an important example of how the Japanese national government effectively 
utilized this ‘expo fantasy' to attract 68 million visitors.  
 Importantly, Yoshimi shows that 'the expo fantasy' gradually lost its ideological 
power as it passed through the clash of the Japanese bubble economy in the 1990s onward. 
Through subsequent expos, the Okinawa Expo in 1975 and the Tsukuba Expo in 1985, 




these expos; finally local citizen groups actively responded to the state's planning and the 
management of the Aichi Expo 2005 (Yoshimi, 2005). Yoshimi closely analyzed how these 
local citizen groups reacted to the state's original Aichi expo planning, which had contained a 
vast amount of ecological issues such as the development of "the untouched area of Kaisho 
forest" to construct its venues (Yoshimi, 2005). Community groups consisting of 
environment activists, local politicians, and residents in Aichi areas not only actively 
developed knowledge about the natural environment of the area, but also dynamically 
collaborated with other national and international organizations such as the Japan Audubon 
Society and the World Wildlife Fund to request changes in the government-proposed expo 
venue construction plan (Yoshimi, 2005). Through this citizen engagement process, the 
original expo plan changed course and took a more environment-friendly direction in terms 
of not only its vision (i.e., "Beyond Development") but also the newly revised venue plan. 
From this analysis, Yoshimi argues that the current Japanese civil society in 2000 onward no 
longer has stayed within a stage in which it passively accepts a state-driven developmentalist 
planning process. Rather, there is an emergence of a new kind of citizen's political movement 
related to various socio-political issues such as the environment (as in the case of the Aichi 
expo).  
 In a similar vein, in her analysis on the recent setback of Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 
Summer Olympics, Kim, E. (2011) distinguishes two different policy networks: 1) what she 
calls the "growth coalition" that consists of state and corporate actors that is based on the 
pork-barrel politics of the previous high-economic growth era and 2) the "event coalition" 




She found that the two policy networks were in conflict around the recent setback of Tokyo's 
bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics. Importantly, through the participation process of the 
Olympic bidding, the growth coalition tried to internalize the relatively alternative concepts 
of "eco-friendly", "sustainable" and "financially compact" in the Olympic planning to 
persuade and lead its opposing citizen groups (Kim, E., 2011). For now, in Japanese society, 
it is clear that a subtler negotiation process is necessary to mobilize civic participation for the 
practice of urban mega events from state’s viewpoint; thus the proliferation of urban mega 
events under the global neoliberal movement needs to be examined with particular 
consideration of concrete East Asian local dynamics. In this regard, it is necessary to closely 
analyze the planning process of the Yokohama Triennale by considering the dynamic 
encounters among its various different policy actors: the Japanese national government, the 
Yokohama Municipal Government, art-related NPOs, and finally citizen groups.  
 Along with this consideration of Japanese socio-political dynamics, it is also 
important to locate the Yokohama Triennale within the general character of "art biennales" 
that differs from features of other types of urban mega events such as the Olympics and 
Expos. Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) introduce three different models of the art biennale 
in terms of its origin and historical trajectory. They explain that the first model was derived 
from the Venice Biennale in 1895. This initial model of the biennale can be epitomized from 
"the display of national visual cultures in an international frame toward a survey of current 
trends in art, providing an intimation of global culture" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:48). 
Unlike the Eurocentric perspective of the first model, the 1984 Havana Biennale as the 




orientation (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:48). These scholars argue that the second model 
forms a distinctive identity through a "combination of ideological oppositions" by mixing 
"the reversal of stereotypes and the rejection of racial hierarchies in cultural production and 
exhibition" with "the expansion of biennales in non-western cities"; the sites of Istanbul, 
Dakar, Brisbane and Johannesburg can be included in this second model (Papastergiadis and 
Martin, 2011:48). Finally, the third model emerged by the mid 1990s and was consistent with 
second-tier cities’ urgent acceptance of the global emergence of creative city discourse for 
the enhancement of global competitiveness in the field of cultural tourism and urban 
regeneration (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:49). This third model, so-called the 
"Biennalenization of art", includes the recent upsurge of over 200 Asian and European 
Biennales that include the Guangzhou Triennial; this international event has been criticized 
in terms of being "just another node in neoliberal networks of leisure and conspicuous 
consumerism" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:49).  
 Even though the recent global circulation of the art biennale has been critically 
assessed by art commentators and academics, Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) suggest this 
event is not fully managed by economic motivation but rather functions as a "hybrid 
creature" in which "alternative knowledge of global flows and local engagement is formed" 
or a "symposium which generate a critical dialogue about the contradictions of contemporary 
globalization" (Papastergiadis and Martin, 2011:50). In particular, by analyzing several 
critical curators of the recent biennales such as Gwangju Biennale in Korea and Istanbul 
Biennale in Turkey, they focus on the performance of the curators who often tend to reject 




local communities over the core of artistic practices as well as interactions related to non-
artistic issues such as social inequality. As a result, Papastergiadis and Martin propose the 
need to examine the art biennale as a "contradictory contact zone" between "art trends, 
aesthetic attitudes and strategies of representation" rather than viewing these events as "mere 
sites of self-representation and glorification of the values of the art market" (2011:57).  
 By considering these two important historical contexts, in a next section I will trace 
how the Yokohama Triennale was launched and developed from its first opening in 2001 to 
its fourth incarnation in 2011 through dynamic encounters and interactions among the 
various policy actors including the Japanese central government, the Yokohama Municipal 
Government(below YMG), art-related NPOs and citizen volunteer groups. Also, based on my 
field interviews and participant observation of the preparation of its most recent event, the 
Yokohama Triennale 2014, I will examine how the next Yokohama Triennale will be 
processed based on the dynamics of current policy networks.  
4.2. Yokohama Triennale 2001: Aiming for Japan's Largest "International Exhibition 
of Contemporary Art"  
The first edition of the Yokohama Triennale, planned as the "International Triennale 
of Contemporary Art", was held from September 2nd to November 11th in 2001. This 
predates the YMG launch of its creative city policy, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is important 




rather the Japanese national government; in particular the Japan Foundation24 oversaw this 
event. The main objective of the establishment of the Japan Foundation was to promote 
various international cultural exchange programs to enhance the nation's 'soft power' rather 
than to support local artists and community. My interview with the managing director of the 
Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office reveals that at first the Triennale 
was intended by the Ministry of Foreign Affair to become the "International Exhibition for 
Contemporary Art" in Japan. Also, Nanjo Fumio, who was one of the artistic directors of the 
Yokohama Triennale 2001, explained how the idea of holding the Triennale in Yokohama 
was developed at the Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off Meeting. At the meeting, he 
reported:  
 I'd like to explain first the very outset and how it (the triennale) all started. Shortly 
before the first Yokohama Triennale was staged in 2001, I had published a book titled 
Bijutsu kara toshi e (From art to city) in which I  pointed out that there weren't any 
art biennials or triennials yet in Japan, and expressed the earnest wish to realize such 
an event. I think it was around the year 2000 that the Japan Foundation convened 
some sort of commission with the aim to organize a biennial or triennial international 
art show, which means that an explicit intention of doing something like that had 
already existed on the side of the Japan Foundation" (Organizing Committee for 
Yokohama Triennale, 2011:38, italics added by myself).  
 As Nanjo Fumio noted, the city of Yokohama was selected as "a optimal place to hold 
the international event" in terms of its longstanding appeal as "an international cultural city" 
from its birth. My interviews with state officials in the YMG, who were involved in the 
planning and management of the subsequent Triennales 2005 and 2008, revealed that the 
main objective of the first Triennale focused on enhancing "international cultural exchange" 
																																								 																					
24 The Japan Foundation is a governmental arm which was established in 1972 as a special 
legal entity directly supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affair and subsequently 




and advancing Japan's role as a global leader in art and culture rather than supporting the 
community development of Yokohama. He said that such rival Asian cities as Shanghai 
(from 1996), Taipei (from 1998) and Gwangju (from 1995) already had started to hold art 
biennales or triennales; thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified the need to hold a 
similar international art exhibition so that Japan should keep up with this global trend and not 
lose its cultural power. In this regard, he said that before the Japan Foundation left its 
handprint on the Yokohama Triennale in 2011, the agency’s main goal was to develop a good 
reputation globally, particularly among foreign art societies, rather than to nurture and 
support the local community and artists.  
 The first official guide book of the Yokohama Triennale 2001 simply stated the 
event’s main aim from the viewpoint of the central government:  
 The aim of Yokohama Triennale 2001 is to supply a venue through which new 
advances in art across the world may be introduced to Japan. At the same time, this 
will be an opportunity for Japan to reaffirm its position within the art world and to 
develop its role as a site of global cultural production. (Organizing Committee for 
Yokohama Triennale, 2002:7, italics added by my self) 
 Following the Japan Foundation’s guidance, the organizational structure for the 
planning and management of the exhibition consisted of four different actors: the Japan 
Foundation, the YMG, NHK (Japan's national broadcasting organization), and the Asahi 
Shimbun (one of the five national newspapers in Japan). In other words, as an affiliated 
institution of the national government, the Japan Foundation easily could attract the national 
broadcasting organization, NHK, along with one of the major national level newspapers, the 
Asahi Shimbun, to take the roles of advertising and public relations for the Triennale. In my 




The Japan Foundation was the major organizer of the plan (Triennale). Originally 
they hoped to hold the event in Tokyo, but just by chance, they talked to some YMG 
officials, and the YMG positively responded to holding the Triennale in Yokohama; 
so in some sense, from the viewpoint of the Japan Foundation, it was even fine that 
the place for the Triennale was not Yokohama. Yokohama was just one of the 
candidate cities. Also, because the Japan Foundation had lots of contacts and 
networks with NHK and the Asahi Shimbun, they(NHK and Asahi Shimbun) easily 
decided to join the organizing committee of the Triennale.  
 At this time, the role of the YMG was restricted primarily to finding and managing 
the venue for the Triennale while the planning and organizing of the Triennale’s content were 
handled mainly by the Japan Foundation. Namely, the selection of the artistic directors and 
the curators was already carried out by the Japan Foundation, with the exhibition’s theme 
entitled "Mega Wave - Toward a New Synthesis". Nanjo Fumio, one of the artistic directors 
for the 2001 Triennale, recalled their intention for organizing such a theme and the major 
goal for selecting artists:  
....but from the standpoint of local citizens and the Japanese general public at large, 
things are certainly different. For example, if you go and ask how many people in 
Japan have visited the Venice Biennale, I'm sure you’d get a pretty small number. 
That's why launching an international art show is an opportunity to introduce the 
citizens of a respective city or country to the amazing world of art, and at once show 
them that people in other parts of the world have been enjoying these kinds of events 
for more than a hundred years already....Mr. Briggs (another speaker in the meeting) 
mentioned the question whether it (the Triennale) is a festival or an exhibition, 
whereas I think that biennials and triennials are expected to offer a "spectacular" 
kind of atmosphere. It's especially this notion that encourages people to go and see 
contemporary art for the first time in their lives; so in other words, this type of event 
holds the potential of being a strong hook that connects people with the realm of art. 
(Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:39-40, italics added by myself) 
 As Nanjo said, because it was the first time that Japan as well as the city of 
Yokohama hosted such a large-scale international exhibition of contemporary art, they 
intended to provide a unique 'strong impression' to stand among its rivals such as Shanghai, 




green bug entitled by "The Insect World/Locust" that clung to the Grand Inter-Continental 
Hotel in Minatomirai – was one of the best examples that clearly represented this intention; 
this work in fact became a mascot of this first Triennale (See <Picture 20>). With 105 artists 
from 30 different countries exhibiting a diverse selection of paintings, sculpture, photography, 
film and installation art, this Triennale attracted about 350,000 visitors. In addition to the 
exhibition, the Yokohama Triennale 2001 contained a variety of other programs including 
symposiums guided by four artistic directors, workshops organized by participant artists, art 
education programs for middle and high school students, and festival events including 
performance shows and music concerts. In addition, about 700 citizen volunteers participated 
in the exhibition to support the management.   
 One of the important points about the Yokohama Triennales was that they did not 
possess their own official venues like many others did such as the Venice Biennale. For its 
first Triennale, the YMG, which was mainly in charge of preparation and management of the 
venues for the exhibition, provided the Pacifico Yokohama Exhibition Hall located in the 
Minatomirai area and the Red Brick Warehouse No.1 located in the Kannai area. These two 
venues represented a contrast between the Minatomirai and Kannai areas. The Pacifico 
Yokohama Exhibition Hall was newly constructed in 2001 in keeping with many other 
recently built luxury shopping malls and hotels in the Minatomira area; by contrast, the Red 
Brick Warehouse No.1, one of the initial models of the renovation, was a reuse of an 
historical building in the Kannai Area promoted by the YMG's creative city policy. By 
evenly distributing its exhibition venues throughout both the Minatomira and Kannai areas, 




however, both venues returned to their "normal" usage. While The Pacifico Yokohama 
started a convention hall business, the Red Brick Warehouse No.1 became a shopping mall. 
This temporality of the venues for the Triennale became one of the major problems for the 
YMG’s Triennale planning.  
Figure. 20. Tsubuki Noboru and Muroi Hisashi's work, the Insect World/Locust, 
presented at the Yokohama Triennale 200125 
 
 To sum up, the Yokohama Triennale 2001 was launched as "a national project" from 
the Japanese central government represented by the Japan Foundation to enhance its national 
soft power, with the YMG taking a supporting role. After its first Triennale was successfully 
																																								 																					




launched, the initial configuration of its planning and management – consisting of the Japan 
Foundation, the YMG, NHK and the Asahi Shinbum – was retained until its 3rd Triennale in 
2008. Moreover, with its launching of the creative city policy, the Triennale became 
smoothly incorporated into the Yokohama's creative city project in 2005.  
4.3. Yokohama Triennale 2005:  Between a “World Cup of Art” and Civic Participation 
 The second Yokohama Triennale was delayed one year from its original opening plan 
due to the resignation of its initial artistic director, Isozaki Arata, a prominent Japanese 
architect. Isozaki proposed the plan called "World Atlas of Contemporary Art" for this 
second Triennale. What was distinctive about his proposal was that he suggested hold the 
event without any curators (Ozaki, 2004). Instead, he proposed that about thirty art 
foundations and art related-NPOs from around the world select their own artists and exhibit 
them in pavilions designed by architects chosen by the Triennale’s Organizing Committee 
(Onishi, 2004). Initially, about fifty organizations responded to his proposal, but most of 
them asked for insufficient time for preparation. Under these circumstances, Isozaki 
requested an additional one-year delay of the Triennale until 2006 to raise more funds for the 
exhibition and to give these organizations extra time to prepare for their exhibitions. Through 
this plan, he hoped to make the Yokohama Triennale a "World Cup" or "World Expo" class 
event (Onishi, 2004).  
 The Japan Foundation and the YMG, however, refused his request for a delay because 
the Triennale was already one year past its original opening date and this had resulted in 
financial considerations. Moreover, several artists and curators criticized his plan in the 




For one, the former director of the Yokohama Triennale, Nanjo Fumio, argued that this plan 
could not fulfill the promise to "bring out young artists onto the international stage"; in 
addition, Aomi Okabe, a professor at Musashino Art University, claimed that it did not stress 
Yokohama's locality. Faced with these criticisms and insufficient support from the 
Triennale’s Organizing Committee, Isozaki stepped down from his position in December 
2004 (Ozaki, 2004).  
 The current managing director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama 
Triennale Office recalled that because the Japan Foundation had selected Isozaki who then 
resigned from his position as artistic director, the YMG at that time recommended as the new 
artistic director, Kawamata Tadashi, whose vision could be more favorable to the YMG. 
After the Organizing Committee gave Kawamata Tadashi this position only nine months 
before the exhibition, the YMG suggested that the opening of the second Triennale take place 
in two publicly owned, recently renovated warehouses located at the Yamashita Pier in the 
Kannai area (see Figure 21). From the YMG’s viewpoint, since the launching of the creative 
city policy in 2004 the Triennale had been an invaluable opportunity to show off this policy 
to the outside world; therefore the newly renovated warehouses located at the verge of the 
Kannai area became an ideal place to highlight their achievements. The uniqueness of the site, 
which generally not easily accessible to the public, also was received favorably by local 
citizens and visitors (BankART 1929, 2009:118). Beside these main venues, various sites in 
the Kannai area – including the Yamashita Park, the Former Kanto Local Finance Bureau 
Building, the Motomachi Shopping Street and the Yokohama Chinatown – were used for the 




point of the second Yokohama Triennale was moved to the Kannai area in coincident with 
the city's creative city policy.   
Figure 21. Yokohama Triennale 2005 Yamashita Pier Venue26 
 
 Moreover, the new artistic director, Kawamata, had a strong vision about stressing 
locality and collaborating with citizens through the Yokohama Triennale. He emphasized the 
locality of Yokohama within the exhibition at the Yokohama Triennale 2011 Kick-Off 
Meeting:  
The relationship between visitor and location that is unique to the respective place – 
in this case, something that can emerge only in the particular environment of 
Yokohama in a broader sense – has always played a central role in my philosophy, so 
it was clear that this would be the base of my concept (of the Triennale). (Organizing 
Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2011:41) 
 In order to effectively connect the locality with the artists, the new artistic director 








about art and artists for ordinary citizens and volunteers, later called "Yokohama Triennale 
Supporters". He explained his intention for organizing the Triennale School at the opening 
symposium of the Yokohama Triennale 2005:  
The method (for civic engagement) that we have chosen...is to create the Triennale 
School, for example, and recruit participants from the general public there and 
introduce to them each time the situation of what is happening at the Triennale and 
what the artists are doing, this being an extremely reliable grass-roots movement kind 
of method.....I see it as a fundamental element of support for the next Triennale and 
other international exhibitions in Japan. Some 60 participants attend each time, and 
from among these people we shall be getting volunteers and "supporters" who are 
actively coming to take part. And the real reason is the artists themselves earnestly 
desire the support. They are saying "I need workers tomorrow, Help me out". The 
artists themselves explain the kind of help they need and their concepts and what is 
necessary. In this way...we can communicate to people who are willing to 
communicate and come to take part in the work. So I'm doing this, not just for the 
Triennale this time, but rather with the idea that it will be good to foster this kind of 
engagement with people as a base for future international exhibitions in Japan. 
(Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:118, italics added by myself) 
 As Kawamata stated, the Triennale School functioned not only as a place to introduce 
the Triennale as a contemporary art exhibition to the local community but also an efficient 
way to recruit volunteers for the exhibition. According to YMG's official reports for 
Yokohama Triennale 2005 (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006: 108), 
these supporters group consists of volunteered citizens who were mostly female (78 percent 
of sampled volunteered citizens are female) and relatively young (63 percent of sampled 
volunteered citizens are in their 20s and 30s). Most of them were recruited by contacting to 
the advertisements of Yokohama Triennale official websites and pamphlets, and common 
motivations for the participating these activities are based on their personal interests on 
modern arts and artists. For efficiently organizing and supporting these volunteer groups, 




which were covered by talks, presentations, and workshops, and thereby the Triennale school 
became a natural "contact zone" between these volunteered citizens and artists.  
Because about half of the artists were able to come to Yokohama without a rigid pre-
determined plan as to what to design for the exhibition, during the preparation period, artists 
– through engaging with the Triennale School – had the opportunity to contact to local 
citizens, explore the local environment, and interact with Yokohama society in general. One 
artist from New York city recalled his experiences with these citizen groups at the opening 
symposium of the Yokohama Triennale 2005:  
One thing that I do want to say, in my first exhibition in Asia, is the regard for the 
artists that I've gotten from the volunteers, and I think it has been an incredible 
experience for me to work with all these young people and old people who have sort 
of come just to help. I remember the first time I did the visit, Kawamata was doing a 
presentation for these volunteers, and I was quite curious as to what that meant and I 
was even cynical, "Volunteers? What the heck is that?" because in New York there 
are not many people who volunteer to work with artists. So I remember going to this 
and seeing all these people, and that they were curious about what we were doing, and 
I still didn't get it, still couldn't understand why they were here in the room, why they 
wanted to be around artists..... I see these individuals also as a kind of future in terms 
of laying down seeds for other triennales, and their experiences and their memories 
being really an important aspect in developing this notion of what an art exhibition 
can be. It's been a real pleasure and learning experience to participate in this 
particular dialogue with those volunteers. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama 
Triennale, 2006:114) 
 Not only artists recalled the experiences of collaboration with citizens as important, 
but also citizen volunteers themselves whom I interviewed expressed their strong impressions 
about their participation in 2005. Most of them chose the 2005 Triennale Supporters 
activities as the most memorable part of their experience in that they could more actively 
engage with artists and the event in general. About 1200 citizens ultimately were registered 




building, which was one of the historic buildings renovated as part of the YMG's creative city 
policy. The Triennale Supporters were actively organizing what kinds of activities they 
would do in keeping with Kawamata’s vision that such pursuits by the supporters be 
developed primarily by citizen groups' own discussions and agreements. Finally, the 
Supporters ended up with four main activities: "Production Assistant: helped participating 
artists with the actual work of producing the artworks"; "Education Program Operation Staff: 
conducted guided tours"; "Exhibition Venue Operation Staff: supervised displayed works and 
provided visitors with information"; and "Information Counter Staff: provided visitor 
information at the counter, made announcements in the exhibition venue, and interpreted for 
non-Japanese visitors" (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:170). One 
member of the Triennale Supporters whom I interviewed remembered that he and his peer 
supporters organized their own radio program called "Citizen Radio for Yokohama 
Triennale" during the exhibition period. Through this radio program, citizens introduced 
information about the Triennale through various activities such as interviews with 
participating artists. In addition, some supporters, whose role was as Production Assistants, 
actually engaged with the production process of artworks by working with artists.  
 Kawamata explained that these collaborating experiences themselves were the main 
goal of the Yokohama Triennale 2005. He strongly expressed this vision to the extent that if 
the Triennale could provide abundant space and time for bringing citizens and artists 
altogether as a ‘communicative’ process, the actual artworks that grew out of these 




About half of the artists could come to Yokohama without a clue as to what kind of 
work they wanted to show. This means that the preparation period actually becomes a 
creative period during which artworks are being made, and I believe that this is in fact 
where other people should actually be present and get involved. My desire is to create 
as much communicative time and space as possible, and I would almost go as far as 
to say that we don't even need the actual artworks as long as we have enough of these 
occasions for communication. When calling the exhibition a "moving body", I am 
referring to this idea that the establishment and sharing of a communicative platform 
would ultimately render artworks unnecessary. (Organizing Committee for 
Yokohama Triennale, 2011:41, italic added by myself) 
 In keeping with Kawamata's alternative translation about collaboration and 
participation, some members of the Triennale Supporters did experience a strong engagement 
with artists, artworks, visitors and the exhibition itself. They expressed that they were happy 
to be part of the exhibition and to interpret artworks actively, and consequentially they were 
eager to share their feelings, knowledge and interpretations with other visitors and their peers. 
Extracts from the Triennale Supporters Notes are clues that strongly convey their strong 
attachment to the Yokohama Triennale:  
At the sewing artwork site, an elderly couple said, "We've been married more than 50 
years, but this is the first time for us to get on a swing together". That made me 
happy......I am glad if they can feel art is something to enjoy, from such a young 
age...I'm happy to be a part of this exhibition...it makes me really happy when it lights 
up when many visitors are around. I feel a sense of togetherness with them all.....I 
don't know what Wang Te-Yu's intention was, but I think of it as "living art". A child 
of elementary school age became absorbed in looking at it....It made me sad to see the 
severe-looking gate around Tonico's work. I wonder if we can't somehow protect the 
work without having to rely on gates...The remaining time I have, surrounded by 
wonderful artworks, I want to spend in involvement with the site and the people. 
(Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 2006:176-177)  
 As shown in these extracts, supporters felt happiness and a sense of attachment as if 
they were themselves the creators of the artworks. I think that their desire for engagement 
and the role they really wanted to have in the exhibition could be seen as what Latour calls 




an intermediary is what transports meaning or social force without transformation, a mediator 
is what may lead meaning or social force in multiple directions (Latour, 2005: 39). Thus, no 
matter how complicated an intermediary’s role is, it may count for just one or even for 
nothing at all because it can be easily forgotten (Latour, 2005: 39). On the contrary, no matter 
how apparently simple mediators’ involvement may look, it may become so complex that the 
mediators cannot be counted as only one because they have a possibility to count for one, for 
nothing, for several or for infinity (Latour, 2005: 39). Thus, one might view the Supporters' 
activities in the Yokohama Triennale as "intermediary", since they involved assisting artists 
and doing some miscellaneous works such as guiding the visitors and working at the 
information desk. I think, however, that these Supporters’ demonstrated attachment and 
engagement with the artworks, artists and the exhibition itself could be read as a "desire to be 
a mediator" in that they intended to translate and transform the exhibition in their own ways, 
which can have a certain possibility to guide the city's one of the biggest art events into more 
democratic and community-oriented way.  
 Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) argue that the role of the curator becomes important 
because curators have the potential to be critical "mediators" who can reject the economic 
motivation of their marketing organizations as well as mediate the core of artistic practices 
and interactions with non-artistic issues with local communities. In the second Yokohama 
Triennale, the role of the artistic director, Kawamata was critical to mobilizing the new actor 
– citizen groups – that were represented by the Yokohama Triennale Supporters. His vision 
for collaboration with citizens and locality in general sparked more active civic engagement, 




urban mega event. All of the factors – the unfortunate resignation of the former director and 
the relatively short preparation period for the second Triennale, along with the designation of 
the new director who had a strong vision about the civil collaboration –were at work to make 
Yokohama Triennale 2005 be perceived as a "distinctive exhibition" in comparison with the 
other Yokohama Triennales. Therefore the second Yokohama Triennale shows a certain 
possibility that Yokohama Triennale can be close to what Papastergiadis and Martin (2011) 
called an "art biennale as alternative cultural public sphere" not only for artists but also for 
citizens and localities themsleves; as a consequence, the Triennale School, which was 
developed in 2005, became an important contact zone for mediating these two groups.  
4.4. Yokohama Triennale 2008: Back to the 'Normal' Triennale 
When I interviewed the current managing director of the Organizing Committee for 
the Yokohama Triennale Office, I asked her how she thought about the Triennale Supporters' 
positive impressions about the Yokohama Triennale 2005. Interestingly, she said that the 
second Triennale was a rather "unusual" exhibition in many aspects such as the delay of the 
events, a particularly short preparation period, and the artistic director's "distinctive" vision 
about the citizen collaboration. Moreover, when she explained about the next Triennale, the 
Yokohama Triennale 2008, she added that "it was back to the 'normal' Triennale", which 
pointed out that the Triennale would be instead an "International Contemporary Art 
Exhibition". Therefore, Mizusawa Tsutomo, the chief curator of the Museum of Modern Art 
in Kamakura and Hayama, was selected to be the artistic director by the Japan Foundation in 
2006 because he had a strong 'artistic' vision to make a "completely different Triennale" from 




coined the term "TIME CREVASSE" as the theme of the event, and used it as a metaphor for 
expressing the contemporary art experience, which was connoted to "transcend the 
coordinates of space-time created by modernity" (Koplos, 2008:199). He explained this 
theme:  
I wanted to deal with contemporary art conditions creatively and freely, looking at art 
as much as possible from the viewpoint of "time" rather than "space", which tends to 
limit things to certain regions. This was the thinking behind the title "Time Crevasse" 
that was given to this exhibition. (Organizing Committee for Yokohama Triennale, 
2009:16) 
 Based on this theme, what Tsutomo initially did was to organize "international 
curator teams", which consisted of five "all-star curators" who were in the forefront of the 
current global contemporary art scene; in this way, he wanted to provide "a fresh perspective 
on contemporary art to Japanese viewers" (Koplos, 2008:199). This international curator 
team included Daniel Birnbaum (Director of the Portikus, Frankfurt am Main), Hu Fang 
(Artistic director of Vitamin Creative Spaces), Miyako Akiko (Co-founder and Program 
Director of Center for Contemporary Art CCA Kitakyushu), Hans Ulrich Obrist (Co-Director 
of Exhibitions and Programmes and Director of International Projects, the Serpentine Gallery) 
and Beatrix Ruf (Director/Curator of the Kunsthalle Zurich). This curator team met with one 
another in several different cities (i.e., London, Frankfurt, Miami, Zurich, Tokyo and Madrid) 
and held numerous discussions to create a list of participant artists. Through this selection 
process, the curator team agreed on emphasizing performance programs and performance 
based-artworks in order to distinguish the event from its two predecessors (Organizing 




invite 72 artists; this third Yokohama Triennale was held from September 13th to November 
30th.  
 As in the past, the YMG took the role of providing the venues for the Triennale. 
Initially, the YMG had planned to use the same venues as were utilized in its second 
Triennale. However, because the volume of freight passing through Yokohama port was 
continually increasing, the YMG should have decided to reuse the Yamashita Pier's two 
warehouses for storage areas for containers, once used for the venue for the Yokohama 
Triennale 2005. Due to its making the Yokohama Triennale an "International Art Exhibition", 
the Japan Foundation requested that the size of the venue be at least 10,000 square meters 
wide; thus the YMG should have found a new site (BankART, 2007: 121). Nonetheless, 
under these circumstances, the YMG decided to build a warehouse-type new exhibition hall 
at Shinko Pier located in between the Kannai and the Minatomirai areas (See Figure 22) 
(BankART, 2007:121). Unfortunately, there was not enough space there to build 10,000 
square meter wide buildings at Shinko Pier; therefore the new exhibition hall was built only 
4000 square meters wide in size. For this reason, the YMG suggested to use instead the 
newly renovated BankART Studios NYK that were established according to the Yokohama's 
creative city policy. In addition, several other places, such as outside of Redbrick Warehouse 
No. 1 and the Sankeien Garden, were included as its offsite venues mainly for performance 





Figure 22. Yokohama Triennale 2008 Shinko Pier Venue27 
  
 In terms of the activities of the Triennale Supporters, even though the number of 
volunteers substantially increased and reached 1510, civic participation was limited due to 
the YMG's top-down administrative practices. In detail, after the Yokohama Triennale 2005, 
the Triennale Supporters group, who actively participated in the exhibition, created their own 
"Yokohama City Art Networks". Through this "Networks", they voluntarily held what they 
called the "Triennale Citizen Symposium" in order to discuss future activity and the role of 
citizen groups in future Triennales (Takahashi, 2009:85). In this symposium, about 60 
participants – consisting of YMG officials, the artistic director (Kawamat Tadashi), 
Yokohama based-art NPOs, the Triennale supporters group, and other volunteered citizens, 
who were interested in participating Yokohama Triennale, reached the conclusion that the 
"continuity" of citizen activities was critical and necessary for the next Triennale (Takahashi, 
																																								 																					





2009:85). As a result, they decided to regenerate citizen activities by taking over the spaces 
in the ZAIM building that they had used during the Yokohama Triennale 2005 (Takahashi, 
2009:85). So as to remain "the Triennale School", citizen groups newly organized the "ZAIM 
Supporters' School" that met once a month from 2006 to sustain their networks and develop 
their own ideas and opinions about future activities for the next Triennale (Takahashi, 
2009:85). After the new artistic director was selected in Novermber 2006, the citizen groups 
held the "Yokohama Triennale 2008 Hop Meeting" in April 2007, where they met with the 
artistic director, Mizusawa Tsutomo and YMG officials who were in charge of the planning 
and management of the Yokohama Triennale so as to learn about the main concept of the 
exhibition and the current preparation progress (Takahashi, 2009:85). After meeting with the 
artistic director and YMG officials, about 100 citizens voluntarily divided into six groups to 
actively and autonomously develop their own ideas and plans for citizen activities in the 
Yokohama Triennale 2008 based on their previous experiences and knowledge (Takahashi, 
2009:85). They advanced ideas through organizing several follow-up gatherings, the 
"Yokohama Triennale 2008 Step Meeting" and "Yokohama Triennale 2008 Jump 
Meeting"(Takahashi, 2009:85). 
 In July 2007, however, the Yokohama Art Foundation (the public art foundation 
established and sponsored by the YMG) suddenly held the "Yokohama Triennale Citizen 
Meeting"; this was an identical type of meeting to the ones that the citizen groups already 
were holding. Not surprisingly, the citizen groups were perplexed why the YMG had initiated 
this type of meeting by ignoring the citizen groups' own preparation and cumulative activities. 




citizen groups" lead citizen participation activities based on "their own planning" for the 
Yokohama Triennale 2008. The YMG's administrative logic was that  it might be "unfair" for 
other citizens who had aspirations to participate in this Triennale if they let "the citizen 
groups in the ZAIM building" guide the citizen activities. However, it is possible to predict 
that the YMG did not want these citizen groups more 'overly' or 'radically' involved the 
Yokohama Triennale such as the participating whole process of the events from planning and 
management process, so that the YMG might need to limit the Triennale Supporters' activity 
in somewhat 'controllable' position for themselves. In doing so, the YMG requested that if 
the citizen groups wanted to continue their activities, they needed to join the YMG’s 
"system" by officially registering as "Yokohama Triennale Supporters" just like other new 
comers (Takahashi, 2009:85). The citizen groups, who had developed their own autonomous 
citizen activities for the Triennale 2008 over the last three years, exposed that they decided 
not to contest the YMG. Rather, they chose to cooperate with the YMG and be “guided” by 
this governmental group, but at the same time they were frustrated at being back to square 
one and having to restart the planning of citizen activities (Takahashi, 2009:85).  
 Superficially, the Official Triennale Supporters activities in 2008 were not 
qualitatively different from previous ones in 2005. The Official Triennale Supporters again 
created "the Organizing Committee", developed several special project teams such as the 
"Information Team", "Managing Team" and "Communication Team", and organized such 
group activities as the "Event Activity", "Advertising Activity", and "Research Activity" 
(Yokohama Arts Foundation, 2009). Based on this organizational structure, the Official 




supervised exhibition venues, and helped to staff the information counter (Yokohama Arts 
Foundation, 2009:27). Nonetheless, as one supporter, who had been involved since the 
Yokohama Triennale 2005, revealed, what they really hoped in the first place was for the 
"continuity" of citizen activity based on their own autonomy; yet such continuity was highly 
damaged when the YMG asked them to "get into their system" and "follow their guidance". 
As a result, the Organizing Committee of the Official Triennale Supporters was dispersed 
after finishing the exhibition; subsequently, for the next Triennale the Triennale Supporters’ 
participation became even more weakened and limited.   
 The third Triennale attracted far more visitors: in 2005 there were 190,000 visitors, in 
2008 550,000 visitors. The Japan Foundation was satisfied in that the number of visitors 
reached a "sufficient" figure to call it an "International Contemporary Art Exhibition" 
(Yokohama Arts Foundation, 2009:113). Several art critiques and journalists, however, 
pointed out the limits of the exhibition. For example, Philip Tinari, a director of the Ullens 
Center for Contemporary Art, evaluated the Yokohama 2008 as "an unarticulated hybrid of 
Gwangju-style cultural localism and Singapore-style speculative boosterism" by arguing that 
"Yokohama appeared an almost archetypal instantiation of the international exhibition format, 
impeccably designed and unrelentingly cool, with no particular political or curatorial agenda 
anywhere in sight" (Tinari, 2009:201). He claimed that the selection of seventy-two artists 
was well in keeping with current contemporary art trends by its division into three distinct 
categories that were "well-known [to be] a perfect equilibrium of the long-canonized (Marina 
Abramovic, Yoko Ono, Matthew Barney, Douglas Gordon, Paul McCarthy, Joan Jonas, 




Jonathan Meese, Miranda July, Cao Fei, Terence Koh, Jérôme Bel)", and "the hopefully 
soon-to-be-canonized (Mario Garcia Torres, Shilpa Gupta, Pak Sheung Chuen, Pedro 
Reyes"(Tinari, 2009:201).  
 Similarly, another journalist criticized the Triennale 2008 in its failure to incorporate 
more participation from local artists. He argues:  
What if the Yokohama Triennale had taken a risk and let this new generation go to 
work on such themes in world class spaces with a generous budget? Not only would 
the triennale have offered something new, something that told us about Japan – rather 
than what's happening everywhere – it would have helped to ignite what is already an 
energetic local scene. (Eubank, 2008) 
 As shown in the criticisms above, in spite of the increased number of visitors, the 
Yokohama Triennale 2008 did not fully reach its potential for making the exhibition a 
"cultural public sphere" not only for its artists but also for visitors, citizens and local 
communities. Based on these limitations, the next Triennale underwent a tremendous change 
in 2011.  
4.5. Yokohama Triennale 2011: the Yokohama Art Museum not just "Infrastructure" 
but as "Actor-Network"  
On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan, a centrist political party in Japan, 
defeated the Liberal Democratic Party's, a major conservative political party in Japan, 
longstanding dominance and became the ruling party in the House of Representatives. This 
political shift incidentally influenced and changed the Yokohama Triennale 2011 in a 
radically different direction, because the Japan Foundation, the main organizer of the 




director of the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale Office explained how the 
Japan Foundation had withdrawn from the Yokohama Triennale:  
After the Democratic Party of Japan took over the government, they screened major 
works of the government agencies and related organizations; so when they screened 
the work of the Japan Foundation, they argued that the Japan Foundation's main task 
was not to 'bring international culture' into Japan but to 'send Japanese culture' to the 
outside world. In this regard, the Yokohama Triennale looks exactly like what they 
viewed as "bringing international culture and artists into the Japanese society", so 
they claimed that the Japan Foundation transferred their authority of organizing the 
Yokohama Triennale to the Agency for Cultural Affairs (bunkachō). On this point, 
the main organizer of the Yokohama Triennale became the city of Yokohama 
(because the main organized, the Japan Foundation, did not participate in organizing 
the Yokohama Triennale)" 
 From the viewpoint of the YMG, the Japan Foundation's decision to take the 
Yokohama Triennale off its hands had a tremendous impact on organizing, planning and 
managing future Triennales since the Japan Foundation was mainly in charge of "filling the 
content of the Triennale". As seen in the previous three Triennales, the Japan Foundation 
took the role of selecting artistic directors and curators while the main role of the YMG was 
mostly to focus on providing and managing the venues. In terms of financial support, the 
Japan Foundation also sponsored the largest portion of the Triennale. As a result, the YMG 
needed to find some actors who could take over the Japan Foundation's role; they finally 
decided to mobilize actors who were already in their own network: it was the Yokohama 
Museum of Art that the YMG chose in order to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of the 
Japan Foundation.  
 The Yokohama Museum of Art was established in 1987 and opened in 1989 in the 
center of the Minatomirai area. It had one of the largest public art infrastructures and 




of the YMG-sponsored public organizations. From the viewpoint of the YMG, the 
Yokohama Museum of Art was not only capable of being responsible for the material 
infrastructure of the next Triennale, but also for human resources with its availability of 
curators, artists and artworks; therefore it was an "optimal" or "safe" choice to use this actor 
to replace the Japan Foundation. As a result, the YMG appointed Osaka Eriko, the Director 
of the Yokohama Museum of Art, as the General Director of the Yokohama Triennale 2011. 
At the same time, the Museum itself was assigned as the main venue of the event (see Figure 
23). Thus one major actor, the Japan Foundation, was totally replaced by another actor, the 
Yokohama Museum of Art. As a consequence, the Organizing Committee for the Yokohama 
Triennale now consisted of the YMG officials, NHK, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Yokohama 
Museum of Art.   
Figure 23. Yokohama Triennale 2011 Yokohama Museum of Art Venue28 






 Even though the YMG successfully held the next Yokohama Triennale by mobilizing 
the Yokohama Museum of Art, this incoming new actor caused several problems in the 
process. First of all, the adequacy of the Museum as the main venue for the contemporary art 
exhibition was called into question by artists and critics. In the Yokohama Triennale 2011 
Kick-Off Meeting held in October, 2010, the panelists – comprised of three previous artistic 
directors, the general director and artistic director for the Yokohama Triennale 2011 – 
discussed what might be the benefits and costs of using the Museum as the main venue for 
the next Yokohama Triennale. They determined that one of the main benefits was financial in 
that the YMG did not need to spend more money to build another venue; rather it could use 
the established infrastructure of the Museum. On the down side, the panelists pointed out that 
the Museum was not intended to hold a global art exhibition. Even Osaka Miki, the Director 
of the Yokohama Museum of Art, worried that the museum was not large enough to host 
such a large-scale international exhibition because an "event like the Triennale could outgrow 
the framework of a museum show" (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale 
2011, 2012:63). In a similar vein, Kawamata, the former artistic director of the Yokohama 
Triennale 2005, argued:  
A museum playing a central role doesn't necessarily have to be a bad thing, but I think 
that it would be wrong to place too much emphasis on the museum itself. One may 
profess that the street is a museum, or even that the entire city of Yokohama is a 
museum, which in other words is to say that the idea behind a museum is not limited 
to one building or an object in general. It's not only a matter of space, but a museum 
always involves some kinds of authority or power-exerting aspects, and it somehow 
feels a bit like artworks are being returned to a museum setting". (Organizing 
Committee for the Yokohama Triennale, 2011:47) 
 By pointing out the weaknesses of the museum as the main venue for the Triennale, 




destination. He introduced the example of "Chambres d'mais", in which the curator, Jan Hoet, 
placed artworks in several private homes in the city of Ghent, Belgium. In this exhibition, the 
visitors had to stop by the city's museum – not to see the artworks – but to obtain information 
about the venues before they started the tour (Organizing Committee for the Yokohama 
Triennale 2011, 2011:47). In this regard, Kawamata warned that the museum should not 
"swallow up all the various things that have been done in the city" (Organizing Committee 
for the Yokohama Triennale 2011, 2011:47). In particular, in terms of Yokohama's urban 
layout, the YMG launched the creative city policy by recovering the degradation of the 
Kannai area, and the Triennale was one of the main events to show the result of the creative 
city policy to the outside world. Yet if the main venue for the Triennale were to move to the 
Yokohama Museum of Art located in the center of the Minatomira area, the Kannai area 
might lose its one major opportunity to show what it has accomplished in the area. When I 
talked about this issue with the current managing director of the Organizing Committee for 
Yokohama Triennale, she also agreed with this concern:  
Yes, we know the problem as well. I am actually from Yokohama, and I, myself, also 
do not really perceive the Minatomira area as the "real Yokohama". You know, 
historically, this place had been owned by Mitsubishi, so it never had been possessed 
by Yokohama's citizens. And by the development of Minatomirai, this area just 
suddenly emerged. Ordinary Yokohama citizens do not have that much attachment to 
this area. This is a whole new town. In this regard, I know that the Triennale can be a 
good chance to revitalize the Kannai area, so we will try to open as much 
collaboration with the galleries and art places in the Kannai area. However, for now, 
from the viewpoint of the YMG, holding the Triennale in the Yokohama Museum is 
the safest choice, because it is easy to access it and it has more amenities.  
 As a result of these concerns, the Yokohama Triennale 2011 designated BankART 
NYK Studio as its second sub-venue; in addition, art NPOs organized "Special Tie-Up 




Hall and the Koganecho area. Unlike during the previous exhibition, however, the Kannai 
area was turned into a sub-region.  
 Furthermore, in terms of the Triennale Supporters activities, one of the key activities 
for civic participation in the Yokohama Triennale 2011, the new actor, the Yokohama 
Museum of Art, made tremendous changes. After finishing the Yokohama Triennale 2008, 
the Organizing Committee of the Official Triennale Supporters was dispersed. In other words, 
civic engagement did not derive from citizens' own autonomous activities. Rather, the YMG 
recruited and invited "simple volunteers", whose role was solely to help and support the state. 
The staff of the Koganecho Area Management Office, who was one of the main organizers of 
the Yokohama Triennale Supporters since the Yokohama Triennale 2011, recalled that the 
newly established organizing committee was actually not that interested in the Triennale 
Supporters activities. One reason is that a venue like the Yokohama Museum of Art did not 
require the Supporters' help and activities because of its formal indoor nature. For this reason, 
even though there were 940 registered volunteers, their main tasks were limited to assisting 
exhibition venue operations staff, supporting information counter employees, and helping 
those involved in advertising the Triennale via social network websites. Thus one citizen who 
had participated in the Yokohama Triennale Supporters since 2001 said in an interview that 
he was disappointed a great deal with the Triennale Supporters activities since the previous 
Triennale in 2011:  
The supporters’ activity wasn't like this [before]. I felt that nowadays supporters were 
just doing what the government already planned. As you saw at the last supporters 
meeting, when people participated in roundtable discussions, etc., there was always 
staff present from the YMG or related NPOs. I even sometimes felt that they were 




seating in front of the artworks and telling visitors not to touch the artworks. I felt that 
it was so different from what we did in 2005. At that time, the work was far harder, 
but I felt a strong yarigai (sense of worth), but now it's not so much like that. So now 
I come to the Triennale School only to listen to lectures about contemporary art to 
gain some knowledge. I do not participate in any other activities now.   
 As this Supporter recalled, the Triennale School since 2011 functioned as a place to 
just listen solely to the artist director or to academics' lectures about contemporary art. Rather, 
the Triennale School 2005 used to be a possibility to become a contact zone between artists 
and citizens. Hence, the citizen groups' strong desire to become a "mediator" for one of the 
city’s largest urban events was transformed into mere volunteerism that acted to follow 
simply the government's plan.  
 The Yokohama Triennale 2011 held between August 6th to November 6th with 79 
artists invited by the selection of the artistic director, Miki Akiko. She coined the theme for 
the exhibition as "Our Magic Hour: How Much of the World Can We Know?" with the 
intention that the exhibition become like "a magical journey transcending time and space 
during which people from various eras and cultural backgrounds meet, share their amazement 
and emotional reactions, and pose a wide array of questions" (Organizing Committee for the 
Yokohama Triennale, 2012:69). In spite of the Great East Japan earthquake, the Triennale 
2011 successfully gathered 330,000 visitors and the tickets sales marked their highest figure 
among the four Triennales (See Table 5).  
 From the viewpoint of the YMG, the results of the Triennale were quite impressive, 
because its leadership role along with that of its affiliated organizations was central to the 
exhibition. An official in the YMG who was involved in planning and management of the 




more debates about whether to held future Triennales within the YMG itself29. In fact, based 
on these results, the YMG decided to hold its future Triennale again at the Yokohama 
Museum of Art, even going as far as to establish the office of YMG’s Organizing Committee 
for the Yokohama Triennale within the museum itself for the purpose of preparing for the 
next Triennale. Thus the new actor, the Yokohama Museum of Art, proved that it was a 
unique assemblage that consisted of both a stable infrastructure and abundant human 
resources. At the same time, however, one must note that civic engagement turned into mere 
volunteerism through the institutionalization of civic activities; moreover, there may be a 
latent problem in that this unique assemblage of the Yokohama Museum of Art located in the 
center of the Minatomirai "swallows up all the various things that have been done in the city", 
as Kawamata warned before. 
4.6 Yokohama Triennale and the Possibility of Civic Participation  
When I was conducting my fieldwork in Yokohama in 2013, the Yokohama Triennale 
School already had started its operations. The Triennale School was managed by the official 
Triennale Supporters' office, consisting of the staff from the Yokohama Museum of Art as 
well as from the Koganecho area management, an art NPO in charge of the management of 
the Koganecho area. The Triennale School broadly was comprised of two sets of activities: 1) 
"main curricular activities" and 2) "extracurricular activities". The “main curricular activities” 
included lectures and talks from artistic staffs, curators and the artistic director from the 
Organizing Committee for the Yokohama Triennale. Its meetings were held in the Yokohama 
Creative City Center, and generally there were about 60 to 70 citizens who participated. 
																																								 																					
29	The YMG reported that the economic impacts effect of the Triennale 2011 reached at 




  Table 5. The Yokohama Triennale: 1st to 4th Editions30  
 2001 2005 2008 2011 
Theme Mega Wave-Towards 
a New Synthesis 
Art Circus [Jumping 
from the Ordinary] 
TIME CREVASSE OUR MAGIC HOUR 
Period 
(Number of days 
opened) 
September 2 ~  
November 11 
    (67 days) 
September 28 ~  
December 18 
    (82 days) 
September 13 ~ 
November 30 
     (79 days) 
August 6 ~ 
November 6 
    (83 days) 




























Exhibition Hall (C, D)  
Yokohama Red Brick 
Warehouse No. 1 
Yamashita Pier No. 3 
and No. 4 
Warehouses 




Yokohama Red Brick 
Warehouse No. 1 
Sankeien Garden 
Yokohama Museum 




Total number of 
visitors 
Approx. 350,000 Approx. 190,000 Approx. 550,000 Approx. 330,000 
Number of 
visitors  
(to paid venues) 
Approx. 350,000 
• Ticket valid 2 days 
 (valid on any  
2 days) 
• Free for pre-school 
children 
Approx. 160,000 
• Ticket valid one day 
• Free pass available 
• Free for junior high 
school students or 
younger 
Approx. 550,000 
• Ticket valid 2 days 
 (valid on any  
2 days) 
• Free for junior high 
school students or 
younger 
Approx. 330,000 
• Ticket valid one day 
 (valid on any   
2 days) 
• Free for junior high 
school students or 
younger 
Ticket sales Approx. 170,000 Approx. 120,000 Approx. 90,000 Approx. 170,000 
Volunteer 
registration 
719 1,222 1,510 940 
Number of media 
coverage 
More than 237 
publishers (more than 
36 among them were 
overseas media) 
* Number of 
publications is not 
available 
1,089 
(40 of those were 
overseas media) 
1,233 
(165 of those were 
overseas media) 
1,763 
(139 of those were 
overseas media) 
																																								 																					




The content of lectures and talks covered educational programs, such as brief lectures 
about contemporary art, the introduction of participating artists in Yokohama Triennale 2014, 
and the explanation of the main theme of this next Triennale. In most cases, after the lectures 
and talks would end, there were five to six people organized for a roundtable discussion; in 
this case, an "inserted" staff from the official Triennale Supporters' office generally would 
guide these discussions. People from various backgrounds such as college students, business 
people, academics, city officials, and retired people would introduce themselves and share 
their opinions about a given topic. The topics focused primarily on how the Yokohama 
Triennale Supporters can effectively "support" the Yokohama Triennale.  
 By contrast, "the extracurricular activities" were mostly held in the Koganecho area 
management office, a newly redeveloped area in the once red-light area in accordance with 
the Yokohama's creative city policy. Here, the staff from the NPO and the Koganecho 
management office organized several groups to carry out certain tasks such as "making a 
logbook for the Yokohama Triennale", "creating local maps for the visitors of the Yokohama 
Triennale" and "doing public relations in social networks to spread information about the 
Yokohama Triennale". The participants were basically same as who participated in the "main 
curricular event" but who has relatively more strong interests within the participants of the 
main curricular activities because these activities are "extracurricular", which required more 
time and efforts. They could choose which groups they wanted to participate in based on 
their own preferences. Each group planned their own activity schedules and met with one 
another regularly. Sometimes there was a meeting in which all the groups gathered together 




autonomy, and most of them were actively attended. Thus the organizational structure for 
civic engagement was neatly organized and efficiently managed by the staff from the YMG 
and the NPOs through institutionalization of civic activities. Moreover, most of the tasks, 
which volunteers did, were already "approved" by the YMG so that they could "outsource" 
these tasks to the citizens.  
 So what is the problem with this well-organized civic engagement structure? Does not 
Yokohama's post-developmental policy network – consisting of the YMG, the NPOs and 
citizen groups – harmoniously hold the city's largest urban event in a mutual collaboration? 
Importantly, Ogawa (2004) points out that there has been a tendency to create what he calls 
"volunteer subjectivity" by the collaboration between the state and the NPOs in Japan. After 
legislating the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (NPO Law), there was a 
national mobilization of volunteer subjects by the state in Japanese society (Ogawa, 2004). 
He argues that through mobilizing volunteer subjects, the government efficiently 
"outsources" their social tasks to civil society. The problem with this mobilization of 
volunteer subjectivity is that it is "praised only for maintaining and strengthening the existing 
society" and for what is "done for the state" (Ogawa, 2004:89). In this regard, he argues that 
the current state-mobilized volunteerism reflects an "apolitical" situation and thereby never 
has evolved into "social activism", regardless of how actively citizens participate in the 
activities (Ogawa, 2004:89).  
 The current civic engagement structure of the Yokohama Triennale was organized to 
promote exactly what Ogawa calls "volunteer subjectivity", which is apolitical and supports 




the YMG as well as by affiliated state organizations such as the Yokohama Museum of Art 
and affiliated NPOs. Under this structure, what citizens do is simply carry out YMG-
outsourced tasks. There is no route by which citizens can more "radically" participate in the 
actual planning and management process of the exhibition. The selection of artistic directors, 
curators and the theme of the exhibition are fixed by a small number of state officials and 
experts. Likewise, the selection of artists and the criteria for choosing them are still in the 
realm of the experts. Or, more radically, the core question of "why Yokohama holds the 
Triennale" has never been seriously touched by its citizens. For this reason, the role of the 
citizen is positioned only as a mere "intermediary" whose task is to transmit simply meanings 
or social forces of the state without transformation. In other words, the current role of the 
citizen is limited to transmitting solely the decisions of the state and experts.  
 Many of the citizen volunteers whom I interviewed, however, had a strong desire to 
have more direct interaction with artists and artworks. What they really seemed to want was 
to be neither a simple volunteer nor a mere audience. Rather, they desired to engage actively 
with the actual production process of artwork, to share their interpretations about artwork 
with visitors and artists, and ultimately to be part of the exhibition itself. This is a desire to be 
a "mediator" who can form and guide meanings or social forces in multiple directions. Based 
on their experiences in relatively radical collaboration with artists and their peers that 
occurred at the Yokohama Triennale 2005, citizens could have the opportunity to develop 
their own visions and opinions. Unfortunately, that potentiality of more radical civic 
engagement – or what I am calling citizens as "mediators" – was dispersed through the 




material infrastructure and human resources successfully replaced and usurped these roles. 
Such limitations of the Yokohama Triennale and, more importantly, of Yokohama's post-
developmental policy network itself thus spring from how they promote more radical civic 


















TRANSLATING "CREATIVE EVENTS" AS "DESIGN OLYMPIAD": SEOUL 
DESIGN OLYMPIADS. 
5.1. Introduction  
I now turn to the struggles over events in Seoul. Here, I focus on three Design Seoul 
Olympiads and the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7, in order to examine the ways Seoul's 
urban mega events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures. Rather 
than frame the development of new urban mega events as solely the reflex of the expansion 
of neoliberal capitalism, an outcome of this analysis is the proposal that one views mega 
events as discursive and material fields of struggle by which where a variety of policy actors 
conflict and oppose each other by translating and counter-translating urban spaces and events 
in a different direction. In particular, the focus will be on how different policy networks such 
as "neoliberal-developmental" and "post-developmental" networks differently organized 
urban mega events.  
5.2 Seoul Design Olympiad 2008  
The Seoul Design Olympiad (SDO), one of the major cultural events in SMG’s 
creative city policy, was first held from October 10th to 30th over 21 days in 2008. As the 
title “Olympiad” suggests, the venue was the Jamsil Olympic Stadium built for the 1988 
Seoul Olympic (See Figure 24). The SMG (2008a) reported that the SDO 2008 gathered 
approximately 2 million visitors, including 1.79 million ordinary citizens, 150,000 design 




connection with Seoul being selected as the World Design Capital for 2010, was sponsored 
by various government ministries, including the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs, Korean 
Chamber of Commerce as well as 14 different domestic and international companies, 
including Samsung and Hanwha, well-known Korean Chaebol companies. Also, the event 
was supported by various national and international design-related institutions such as 
International Council of Societies of Industrial Design, the Korean Federation of Design 
Associations, and the Korean Institute of Design Promotion. In terms of staff numbers for the 
SDO 2008, there were approximately 1000 official staff members including SMG officials 
along with about 14,000 volunteers consisting of middle and high school students, college 
students and ordinary citizens.  
Figure 24. The Picture of The Main Venue of the Seoul Design Olympiad31 
 
																																								 																					




 For planning and managing the SDO 2008, under the direct connection with the 
mayor’s office, the SMG launched a special organization that was comprised of five different 
SMG internal divisions.32 While the General Planning Team performed as the chief 
management organization for the event, two Design Olympiad teams conducted and guided 
the actual exhibitions, conferences and festivals in the Olympiad. Also, the Design 
Cooperative team planned and conducted advertising and public relation affairs (SMG, 
2008:18).  <Figure 25> represents the organizational structure for the planning and the 
management of the SDO 2008. 
Regarding the role of the external committees, the members of the Consultative 
Committee – whose work was intended mainly for "supervising the planning and 
management of the event" – consisted of 20 international and national design foundation 
executives and chairmen including Carlos Hinrichsen, chairman of the International Council 
of Societies of Industrial Design; Peter Zec, chairman of World Design Capital; and Park 
Youngsoon, chairman of Korea Foundation of Design Associations (SMG, 2008a:18). The 
Organization Committee, whose major roles were “creating social consensus for the event” 
and “reviewing the important agendas of the event” (SMG, 2008a:18), was mainly comprised 
of nationally prominent cultural figures and designers including Lee O-Young, a renowned 
novelist and former Korean Minister of Culture as well as Kwon Myoung-Gwang, a 
prominent designer and chancellor of Hongik University, one of the most prominent art and 
																																								 																					
32	These divisions includes including “General Planning Team”, “Culture Design Team”, 
“Design Cooperative Team”, “Design Olympiad Team 1” and “Design Olympiad Team 2”, 
with three specially organized external committees: the “Consultative Committee”, the 






design schools in Korea (SMG, 2008a:18). Because the major responsibility of the Project 
Committee was intended to supervise the more “practical and actual” event planning and 
management, it contained relatively younger designers and academics who were working in 
the design industry and teaching in art and design schools (SMG, 2008a:18). The SMG also 
appointed Eunsook Kwon, a designer and professor at the University of Houston, as Director 
General of the Olympiad; her role was to coordinate the theme, planning and evaluation of 
the event.  
Figure 25. Organizational Structure for the Planning and Management of the SDO 
200833 
 
  In sum, the organizational structure for the SDO 2008 shows that the major actors of 
planning and management were composed of the SMG (state actor), the international and 
domestic design industry (business actor), and lastly academics and experts in the design 
																																								 																					




field (academic actors). Consequentially – within this process of planning and management – 
there was no space for its citizens. 
5.2.1 “The World’s first Seoul Design Olympiad 2008”: Symbolic Power of an “Olympic” 
and Urban Mega Event for City Branding 
‘Design is AIR’, the theme of the Seoul Design Olympiad 2008, addresses the 
design discourse and exploration for the design of life, which communicates with 
nature's elements: earth, water, fire, wind. Design in the 20th century was 
described as 'earth', while design in the 21st century will be considered 'air'. 
Beyond the boundaries of material and immaterial, digital technology in the 21st 
century has produced new design paradigms with connectivity and convergence. 
(from SMG official blog34, italics added by myself) 
 In March 2008, the SMG announced the event’s official title of the “Seoul Design 
Olympiad 2008” along with its formal theme “Design is AIR”. It is important to examine the 
reasons why the SMG used the metaphor of the “Olympiad”, which is one of the largest 
global sports events, for its major 'creative events' within the city’s creative city policy. As 
Cho (2009) demonstrates, the Olympiad as a global mega event is not solely a simple sensory 
and symbolic event but also "a spectacle par excellence" (Cho, 2009:31). Moreover, 
especially in an East Asian context, the Olympics as a spectacle par excellence has been used 
as a common “cultural tool” to legitimize the role of the developmental state, thereby 
enabling its citizens to experience “national development”, “economic growth” or “national 
pride” by labeling the winning of sports events as a national victory in global competition 
(e.g., Cho, 2009; Yoshimi, 2007). In this regard, the metaphor of the Olympics in the SDO 
2008 should not be perceived as a randomly chosen word but rather as a willed selection that 
has the potential to mobilize and legitimize the SMG’s ‘creative vision’.  
																																								 																					




 In the opening ceremony of SDO 2008, Myung-bak Lee, the president of South Korea 
and the previous mayor of Seoul, announced:    
 Since the 1988 Seoul Olympic improves our country’s level of economy and industry, 
the Seoul Design Olympiad 2008 will be a chance to enhance our national brand 
value. (SMG, 2008a: 58)  
Similarly, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon, Oh, said in his speech in the opening ceremony:  
 It is the Seoul Olympics Stadium, where we achieved the Olympic Miracle 20 years 
ago; we're striving to make a miracle of design with the passion with which we have 
made the IT miracle for the past decade. (SMG, 2008a: 60)  
 By using the symbol of “Olympiad” as a metaphor that conveys proof of the nation’s 
past economic miracles, both officials argued that design would be one of the best tools by 
which to provide “another miracle of the Han River” for the nation and its citizens. Here, 
importantly, design was being conceptualized as a “panacea” or a “Trojan horse” which had 
the ‘inherent’ or ‘fundamental’ character to solve economic and urban problems as well as 
enhance the city and nation’s brand value. In its official press release, the SMG (2008b) said:  
The theme of the SDO is “Design is AIR” which showcases the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government's vision and strategies as a promising design city. “Air” is always near us, 
but never discloses itself, and is deeply connected to the lives of people and nature. 
As such, air represents the spirit of design in the 21st century. (SMG, 2008b) 
 The above quote, by using the symbol of ‘air’ as an essential substance for human 
survival, argues that now studying, developing and experiencing “design” should not be 
considered as an optional choice but rather as an essential priority not only to improve the 
city’s competitive edge and brand power but also to successfully survive midst global 
competition. With identifying design as an essential resource, the SMG introduced its five 




"connecting" –by arguing that all terms basically refer to Seoul's future scheme of city design. 
The SMG explained each keyword in more detail:  
1) “Sustainable”: an eco-friendly approach to design, thinking of both the present and 
future of the earth, 2) “Convergent”: exchange between design and other disciplines, 
convergence of design and urban developmental policy, 3) “Experiential”: increasing 
the interaction among humans, products and the environment, 4) “Participatory”: 
Creating human-centered designs through citizen participation, 5) “Connecting”: a 
design city connecting to the world. (SMG, 2008b:5)  
          Based on these keywords, the SMG claimed that the SDO will be a comprehensive 
design event that "develops the design industry, promotes young designers, increases Seoul’s 
design competitiveness and pursues globalization" (SMG, 2008b:3). Under these keywords, 
the entire event consisted of four different sub-events including: 1) the Seoul Design 
Conference, 2) the Seoul Design Exhibition, 3) the Seoul Design Competition, and 4) the 
Seoul Design Festival.  
 Interestingly enough, what we see in the main keywords of the event is neither a 
familiar neoliberal mantra of "competition” or “efficiency”, nor is it an East Asian 
developmentalist chant of “growth” or “progress”. Rather, these keywords coined by the 
SMG suggest relatively alternative concepts like “sustainable”, “participatory”, “connecting” 
and “interactive”, most of which are somewhat underdeveloped and overlooked practices in 
East Asian society. Why did the SMG fuse the discourse of “sustainability” and 
“participation” with a neoliberal discourse of “global competitiveness” and “city branding 
power”, and more importantly one should examine how the SMG linked these heterogeneous 
concepts seamlessly or incoherently within the discourse of "the value of design" as a 




As many urban scholars argue, it is not surprising that the so-called growth coalitions 
consisting of elite politicians, urban developers and commercial sponsors use the self-serving 
rhetoric of “development” and “growth” to deceive and mislead governments and the publics 
in order to approve the urban mega-event (e.g., Hall, 2006; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Lowes, 
2002, Gotham, 2011). Hall (2006) claims that such self-serving rhetoric is often based on 
“assertion rather than concrete evidence” (Hall, 2006:63). For example, in an East Asian 
context, through an analysis of the Beijing Olympic event, Broudehoux (2007) argues that 
Olympic events perform like "smoke screens" to conceal China's current socio-political 
problems such as uneven development and rising social inequalities by exploiting the 
symbols of progress, efficiency and economic success. Similarly, by analyzing Beijing 
Olympics’ official slogan of "harmonious society", Shin (2014) argues that the urban mega 
event as "spectacle" functions as "false consciousness" or "delusion" not only to aid capital 
accumulation but also to support the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In 
sum, based on political economic concepts of "false consciousness", "delusion" or 
"deception", these scholars tend to consider urban mega events as symbolic means for 
supporting a handful of economic and political elites' interests.  
 If we accept this argument about urban mega events as "false consciousness" for 
favoring the ruling blocks' interests, how can we explain the suggested concepts like "(civic) 
participation" or "sustainability" suggested by the SMG in the SDO 2008? Also, how can we 
comprehend the 200 million voluntary visitors at these events? Or, more importantly, how 
can we make sense of the articulation of "participation" and "sustainable" within the 




answer these questions, I suggest that we should not perceive the urban mega event as a mere 
reflection or simple false consciousness of ideology promoted by the ruling block or political 
and economic elites, but rather scrutinize how it actually achieves its real power and effect in 
relation to its concrete discursive and material policy practices. Here, my intention is not to 
refute political economic criticism about urban mega events but to move such critiques 
forward to capture subtler dimensions of how actual discourse can create the power to 
mobilize and recruit actual citizens and even non-human actors. This helps us more carefully 
inspect these various policy practices, so we need to reconsider the urban mega events not as 
a mere reflection of "false consciousness" but as an active process of "translation" among 
various policy actors.  
 To shed light on such re-visioning, I apply the concept of translation developed by 
Actor Network Theory. Choy (2005) argues that the theory of translation is particularly 
useful and crucial to explain the process of articulation among heterogeneous discourses and 
concepts. I, thus, seek to exemplify how alternative concepts like "(civic) participation" and 
"sustainable" were domesticated and internalized within the neoliberal discourses like 
"global competition" through the SDO 2008 events. In the next part, I will analyze how each 
sub-event of the SDO 2008 – the exhibition, conference, competition and festival – was 
performed in relation to the suggested keywords of the SDO 2008 as well as materialized by 
a certain assemblage of various policy actors, both human and non-human. Furthermore, I 
will show how the SDO 2008 event formed certain "routinized techniques" or "standardized 




5.2.2. Seoul Design Conference: Mobilizing Experts to Speak for the SMG 
In the official press kit for the SDO 2008, the SMG boldly introduced the Seoul 
Design Conference by declaring: "World-renowned designers discuss the present and future 
of design" (SMG, 2008:10). SMG (2008) argued that the major goal of the Seoul Design 
Conference was to provide educational opportunities for young designers and citizens. The 
conference was held from the 9th to 12th of October in 2008, and included keynote and 
invited speeches, roundtable discussions, and paper/poster presentations. Famous foreign 
scholars and designers – including Richard Buchanan, Professor at Case Western Reserve 
University and the editor of Design Issue; Yves Behar, founder of Fuseproject; Ross 
Lovegrove, a renowned industrial designer; and domestic designers such as Youngse Kim, a 
founder of Inno Design – were invited to be speakers, panel members and presenters. The 
conference themes were sub-divided into three distinct topics: "City Design", "Design 
Leadership" and "Sustainable and Social Design" in line with the daily schedule.  
 During the "City Design" session, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, delivered the 
keynote speech titled "Designing Seoul", in which he explained Seoul's creative city policy. 
About 3,500 people registered for the conference that lasted four days; a majority of them 
were students and professionals in design-related fields (SMG, 2008a: 112). The Seoul 
Design Conference in 2008 had a somewhat typical format with the role of experts lecturing 
about their knowledge and experience with design juxtaposed with the position of 
participants as listening to the experts' talks. From the viewpoint of the SMG, these globally 
renowned designers, corporate executives and academics were important expert actors who 




design policy by providing their own expert knowledge and communicating their public 
recognition via their successes in the design field. At the same time, these global expert 
groups were the 'precious' actors who were able to support the SMG's argument that the 
importance of design policy is an irresistible global trend to enhance the city's competitive 
power and brand. In this regard, mobilizing global and domestic experts to present and 
spread the value of design and the importance of design policy became one of the key 
"standardized procedures" or "routinized techniques" utilized in the future events in 2009 and 
2010. 
5.2.3 Seoul Design Competition: Civic Participation via Competition  
 Another important part of the event was the Seoul Design Competition. The SMG 
introduced this international design competition to provide a new opportunity for the 
participation of students and young designers in the SDO 2008. In line with its theme 2008, 
the SMG argued, “the Competition aims to seek eco-friendly and creative designs that will 
make urban life sustainable in the future" (SMG, 2008a:15), resulting in four categories of 
the Competition announced as: 1) Earth (Environment) referring to architecture, landscaping 
and space design; 2) Water (Communication in Flow) including graphic and information 
design and animation; 3) Wind (Experience in Media Cityscape) referring to communication, 
information service systems, and transportation design; and 4) Fire (Objects in Urban Culture) 
including products, fashion and industrial art. Ultimately the SMG received 670 submissions 
from 40 countries around the world; the submissions were first reviewed by academics and a 




 One important thing about the Seoul Design Competition was that the review for the 
award not only was conducted by experts such as academics and designers but also voted on 
by ordinary citizens via online and on-site. When visitors entered the event sites, they 
received a ballot on which they could pick two of their top choices for each sub category. 
The winner was determined on the basis of the sum of both the experts panel's review points 
and the citizens' votes. This here was one approach to civic participation – "participation via 
competitions" – newly developed by the SMG. In other words, while young designers and 
students could participate in the events via submission of their design work, ordinary citizens 
also could participate by viewing the exhibited design work and voting for which design that 
they found most desirable. This configuration of civic participation, what I call "participation 
via competition", became a major "routinized technique" of "civic participation" for the 
future Design Olympiad; moreover, the competition component grew and grew over the next 
two events in 2009 and 2010.  
5.2.4 Seoul Design Exhibition: Promoting Corporate and State Actors 
Seoul Design Exhibition was the largest activity and provided the major content of 
the SDO 2008 for its audiences. The SMG introduced the main goal of the exhibition as:  
An interactive, experience-oriented experimental design exhibition through which the 
public can observe and experience the competitiveness and complex value system of 
the city with its sustainable environment, products, graphic design, fashion and 
information design. (SMG, 2008a: 177) 
 The SMG argued that sustainable design of various fields such as product, fashion 
and environment could enhance the city's competitiveness, and audiences actually could 




exhibition. Following this major goal, the exhibition was divided into three parts: the 
"Organizer's Exhibition", the "Special Exhibition", and the "Participatory Exhibition".  
Furthermore, there were four different major exhibitors at these exhibitions: "state actors", 
"domestic and international business actors", "domestic and international academic actors" 
and "invited domestic and international designers". In the Organizer's Exhibition, 59 Korean 
designers and 19 international designers were invited by the director general, Eunsook Kwon 
and the SMG. It was the signature exhibition of the SDO, and invited designers were asked to 
create their final design in line with the theme of the SDO 2008. The exhibited items 
included graphic, product, furniture, interactive and image design.  
Figure 26. The Corporate PR Pavilions35  
 
																																								 																					




 Even though the Organizer's Exhibition was the signature feature of the SDO 2008, 
the largest part of the exhibition was assigned to domestic and international corporate 
business actors. More specifically, about two-thirds of the exhibition space were assigned to 
92 domestic and international business actors, along with large corporate actors such as 
Hanwha, one of Korea's chaebol companies which constructed their own company public 
relations pavilion within the stadium (see Figure 26). Typical content of these corporate 
exhibitions was filled with advertising and pubic relations materials along with products of 
these companies. Furthermore, there was a special space called the "World Design Market", 
in which these businesses actually had their products for sale to the audiences.   
Another large part of the exhibition space was occupied by state actors such as the 
SMG as well as by other foreign city governments including Paris, New York, Milan, Hong 
Kong and Beijing. The SMG itself occupied the largest spaces and actively exhibited the 
city's design policy vision and ongoing creative city policy projects such as the Han River 
Renaissance Project and the Floating Island. At the same time, the Special Exhibition was 
assigned solely to promote the DDP construction; it was filled with potential images of the 
DDP and artistic works of its designer, the star architect Zaha Hadid. Similar to the SMG, 
other foreign city governments also displayed their own city's design-related policy along 
with their famous design companies and products. For example, under the theme of 
"Lifestyle Made in Italy", the city of Torino exhibited the images and actual products of its 
own famous motor vehicles, fashion and jewelry products. Through this exhibition, the SMG 




desired to locate its creative city policy within the global trends by comparing it to other 
global cities' policies.  
 Korean domestic and international design schools were another category of actors 
who actively participated in the exhibition. Seventeen Korean design schools such as Kukmin 
University and Seoul National University and six foreign design schools such as Purdue 
University, School of Visual ARTS in New York and IED Design Milano were invited by the 
SMG. To attract prospective students, these schools also publicized their curricula as well as 
some of their notable faculties and students' works. These three actors – corporate, state and 
academic – comprised the so-called "Participatory Exhibition" while the Seoul Design 
Exhibition functioned well as a platform for the promotion of corporate and state actors. 
Under this structure, the possible role of the citizens was positioned either as mere 
“audiences” to view design experts' works or as future “consumers” targeted by corporations.  
5.2.5 Seoul Design Festival: Uncertainty and Flexibility of the concept of “Design” 
Another big part of the SDO 2008 was the Seoul Design Festival, which was planned 
for "focusing on citizen participation where visitors can see, hear, smell, taste and touch 
design" (SMG, 2008b: 23, italic added by myself). Based on these goals, various events were 
performed including the opening and closing ceremonies aired by MBC (one of Korea’s 
national pubic broadcasting stations), music concerts, dance and other performances, fashion 
shows, and food festivals. As seen in the above quote, one of the interesting features of the 
Seoul Design Festival was that many heterogeneous activities were performed under the 
central concept of "design". In other words, rather than conceptualizing  "design" as abstract 




entities that people can actually "see, hear, smell, taste and touch" via all the five senses. The 
problem, however, was that this conceptualization was uncertain and extremely flexible so as 
to include almost every cultural activity within the umbrella of "design".  
 Under this conceptualization, traditional music, dance performances, and even 
cooking – which conventionally do not have any explicit relation to "design" – were gathered 
together. For example, while music festivals, which were here were ordinary music concerts 
filled with rock bands and dance music performances, were designated as part of the "Sound 
Design Festival" while food decorating events such as the East Asian foods Exhibition, the 
Chocolate Cake Exhibition and the Baking Class were publicized as part of the "Food Design 
Festival". Furthermore, the flash mob, performed by volunteer college students to advertise 
the SDO 2008 event, was listed under "Shocking Design"(SMG, 2008a: 300).  
 Hesmondalgh and Pratt (2005) noted that the conceptual fuzziness of the "cultural 
industry" or "creative industry", in which any activities related to the production and 
distribution of symbols and meanings can be included, causes measurement problems when 
gathering statistical data because it is unclear which industry should be included or excluded. 
Similarly, in the case of the SDO 2008, by using the ‘fuzzy’ concept of "design", the SMG 
could include any possible cultural events within their SDO 2008 designations that opened 
the door for clarity problems. In other words, this translation strategy, which appears to 
exploit the uncertainty and ambiguity of the concept of design, nevertheless allowed the 
SMG to assemble together multiple heterogeneous activities such as food, music, dance and 




because of this conceptual ambiguity, ‘design’ became perceived as comprising ubiquitous 
and existential entities which people could actually 'see, smell, and sense'.   
 To sum up, the SDO 2008 was important in that it created the initial configuration of 
how future design Olympiads would be "routinized” and “standardized”. The format of sub-
events such as conferences, competitions, exhibitions and festivals became a regular 
occurrence, with the major actors and their relationships not being transformed until the new 
mayor, Won-Soon Park, was elected and decided to put an end to these events. Again, the 
major ‘players’ in these events – state actors, domestic and international business capitals, 
and globally and domestically renowned design experts – resulted in less civic participation.  
Citizens, according to the emphasis of the SMG, were translated only into listeners of experts’ 
talks at the Seoul Design Conference, viewers of exhibitions prepared by state and business 
actors at the Seoul Design Exhibition, voters of products liked at the Seoul Design 
Competition, or lastly participating in the festival as an audience at the Seoul Design Festival. 
Even though citizens could 'actively participate' in all of these four distinct sub-events, civic 
participation in the SDO 2008 was extremely limited to pre-given configurations created by 
the SMG, business actors, and design experts.  
5.3 Seoul Design Olympiad 2009   
The second Olympiad, the SDO 2009, was held at the same venue as the first one at 
the Jamsil Olympic Complex, and during the same 21-day period (October 9th-29th). In 
terms of its number of visitors, the SMG reported that the second year attracted 
approximately 2 million visitors including 92,186 foreigners, which is similar to the numbers 




actors: eleven government ministries including the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Ministry of Environment, and 44 domestic and 
international business firms including Samsung and Starbucks (SMG, 2009:28).  
 In terms of its organizational structure for the management and planning of the SDO 
2009, the Seoul Design Foundation was newly involved with the SMG's special SDO 
management branch. Moreover, in order to collaborate with the design industry and design 
academia, the same three external committees – the Consultative Committee, the 
Organizational Committee, and the Project Committee – were organized with similar actors 
as those in 2008. For example, the Consultative Committee was filled with domestic design 
foundation and business executives and chairmen, while the Organization Committee 
consisted of nationally prominent cultural figures and designers. Finally the members of the 
Project Committee were selected from design practitioners and academics. In addition, the 
SMG appointed Eui-young Chun, a designer and professor in Kyonggi University as Director 
General of the Olympiad.  
Likewise, the four sub-events – the Seoul Design Conference, Competition, 
Exhibition and Festival – were planned and performed with similar procedures and actors as 
its previous event. But at the same time, the aim and target audience of each sub-event 
became more clarified than noted in the SDO 2008. For example, while the objective of the 
Seoul Design Conference was explicitly stated as "spreading the value of design" to ordinary 
citizens and young designers, the main goal of the Seoul Design Exhibition was publicized as 




Competition was "to promote talented young designers" while the Seoul Design Festival 
aimed "to educate citizens and students who are future designers" (SMG, 2009). 	  
 In sum, the organizational structure for the planning and the management of the SDO 
2009 remained consistent from 2008, and citizens in Seoul still did not receive any assigned 
place within the planning and management of this city's mega event.  
5.3.1 Spreading the new economic value of Design: "Designomics" 
Even though citizens did not participate in any management and planning process of 
the event, ironically the SMG explicitly strove to combine the concepts of "civic 
participation" and "the economic value of design" to legitimize the necessity for the event in 
SDO 2009. In its official white paper of that year, the SMG stressed two main goals of its 
second Olympiad that were "civic participation" and "Designomics: design +economics":  
 The main goal of the SDO 2009 is "civic participation". The SDO 2009 should not be 
an opportunity for only design experts who usually create a discourse on "design" and 
unilaterally deliver it to citizens, but be a chance to share the idea that design can be 
applied to all areas and that citizen themselves are actually the subject of design. 
Furthermore, (by actively participating in the SDO 2009), all citizens should find the 
latent value of design, and they should develop their ability to look at "design" for 
being a foundation to construct the nation as a design power. (SMG, 2009:12 
translated and italics added by myself).  
 As shown in the quote, the SMG stressed the importance of civic participation in the 
event, stating that since "design" has "latent value" and applicable to every field, every 
citizen has the potential to be a 'potential' designer. Under this notion, the SMG introduced 
the main theme of the SDO 2009 – "i DESIGN" – connoting that "I am a designer, you are 




citizen as "(potential) designer", the SMG explicitly claimed that design could create new 
economic value. The SMG also introduced the term "designomics":  
This implies that design not only can solve current economic depression, but also can 
enhance a nation's long-term economic and industrial development. (SMG, 2009:13) 
 Arguing that design is a major tool to enhance a nation's economic development, the 
SMG highlighted the following positive features:1) investment in design has a relatively 
short investment recovery compared with investment in technology, 2) a citizen's great eye 
for design can contribute to economic development, and 3) design is a useful tool to enhance 
the quality of citizens’ welfare and social services (SMG, 2009:13). Once again, design was 
presented as a “panacea” which has the ‘fundamental’ character to resolve economic and 
urban problems and to enhance the quality of life for citizens.  
 Here, what is distinct is that the SMG started framing "civic participation" within the 
discourse of developmentalism, in which citizens should develop or enhance their own 
abilities not only for themselves, but also for the nation and city's development. In this regard, 
the SMG argues that "i DESIGN", the main concept of civic participation, means that we all 
(every single citizen) should be "the subject of design (designue juche,디자인의 주체) in 
order to find new economic value and to overcome this economic depression" (SMG, 
2009:17). This clearly goes against more liberal understandings of creative individuality 
found in similar creative city projects in western cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, 
Sheffield and Barcelona (Bell and Jane, 2003).  
 Moreover, this clearly shows how the SMG articulated such neoliberal values as 




of the developmentalist idea of "national development". Several Korean scholars argue that 
the influence of neoliberalism in Korea brought various reforms not only at the level of the 
government and business practices – such as enhancing "innovation" and "flexibilization" – 
but also at the personal level with the creation of the "self-managing subject" (Seo, 2011:88). 
Song (2007, 2009) argues that the subjectification of individuals through these new values of 
"self-autonomy", "creativity", and "self-cultivation" became a part of the pivotal "technology 
of neoliberalism" for young people in Korea.  Similarly, Cho (2008) points out three 
important elements of South Korea's new governmentality after the IMF intervention in 1997 
in terms of the "legitimation of global competition", "emphasis on responsible individuals" 
and "the birth of a new kind of citizenship" (Cho, 2008:249). By analyzing the popularized 
image of Korean MLB players in the U.S, he argues that the successful Korean MLB players 
provide the best examples of those who are successful in global competition and responsible 
for their own well-being. He argues that these globally successful and self-responsible 
individuals are "a particular type of citizen" who is also "responsible for national competence 
and development" (Cho, 2008:249).  
 Through the SDO 2009, the SMG strove to promote a new type of citizen called the 
"creative citizen" who had the potential to discover the new economic value in relatively 
noble fields such as "design" through active participation in global mega events such as the 
"SDO" and to develop her/his own creative ability not only to win global competitions but 
also to enhance national development. By articulating the neoliberal values within 




Competition and Festival) utilized "routinized techniques" or "standardized procedures" to let 
citizens experience and explore these values.  
5.3.2 Seoul Design Conference: Evidences of Designomics?  
The SMG's vision of "i Design" in the SDO 2009 – in which every citizen should find 
a value of design in order to create a new economic value – was directly supported by the 
Seoul Design Conference. The SMG introduced this conference which was given the themes 
of "Interflow and Consilience" and "dedicated to discovering new alternatives for future 
design through tearing down boundaries between different disciplines and seeking integration 
between design and other areas" (SMG, 2009b). Under these themes, three distinct 
conferences took place: the "Design Seoul International Conference", the "Citizen Design 
Forum" and the "48 Hour Inclusive Design Challenge in Seoul". The Design Seoul 
International Conference was the largest conference among the three with its three thousand 
visitors.  
 Taking on the theme, "Designomics(Design+Economy)/Design is Economy", the 
conference took place from October 9th to the 11th, with a keynote speech by Mayor, Sehoon 
Oh, a sessional Speech, and a round table discussion with international and domestic design 
firm executives/chairmen36. With these international and domestic design experts, Sehoon Oh, 
the mayor of SMG, also gave a keynote speech, which stressed and publicized the 
																																								 																					
36 These international experts in the field of design include Gianfranco Zaccai, Chairman of 
Design Continuum; Davin Stowell, CEO and founder of the Smart Design group; Dan 
Formosa, Co-founder of Smart Design; prominent designers including Hara Kenya, Art 
director of Muji and Youngse Kim, CEO of Inno Design; and famous academics such as 
Olivier Peyricot, Professor in Ecole Nationale Supeieure d'Art Decoratif de Paris in France 




importance of Seoul's creative city policy.  By following the SMG's main theme of the SDO 
2009, the main content of the conference consisted of three sub-categories: "Design 
Leadership", "Designomics" and the "New Value of Design"; the actual speech topics 
included "Aesthetic Sense as Economic Resources", "An Economy of Innovation", "New 
Value of Design", "Design Power, Design as Life Culture and its Economic Role" and 
"Designomics and Korea's Design Education".  
 As shown in the titles of the conference programs, it was obvious that these renowned 
figures emphasized the importance of design and its economic value based on their 
experiences and specialties both domestically and globally. Therefore, from the viewpoint of 
the SMG, these were the key actors promoting "designomics" grounded through their own 
success and public recognition in the field of design. At the same time, these experts could 
become important "translators" who actually would provide evidence of how the importance 
and value of "design" does not solely lie with domestic trends but rather with undeniable 
global trends. Moreover, given that these people and their economic and academic successes 
often were viewed as "innovative" and holding "new value" in the field of design, they could 
be perceived as "living evidence" of "the value of design", which was what the SMG really 
wanted to prove with its utilization of particular tangible actors and their achievements.   
5.3.3 Seoul Design Exhibition 2009: Promoting Corporate and State Actors  
The Seoul Design Exhibition 2009 was structured followed similar organizational 
structures. The SMG introduced its main theme of the 2009 exhibition as the "forecast of 
global design prospects, presentation of design status quo and future possibilities and 




was divided into four different sub-exhibitions: "Principal Exhibition- i Design", "Citizen 
Participatory Exhibition", "Design Exchange Exhibition" and "Special Exhibition". <Table 
6> indicates the detailed information about each exhibition plan and major organizer.  
Not surprisingly, the major exhibitors were the same actors as participated in its 
previous exhibition including state actors (the SMG and other city governments and national 
governments); domestic and international business actors (corporate actors); and domestic 
and international design-related schools (academic actors). In particular, with the SMG's 
emphasis on "designomics" as the overall theme of the SDO 2009, the participation of 
domestic and international business actors was strongly encouraged so that consequentially 
most of the sub-exhibitions actually included the direct involvement of corporate actors. For 
example, the "Principal Exhibition" included "World Design Market Seoul 2009", in which 
both domestic and international design products were presented and directly sold to its 
visitors, and similarly the "Design Exchange Exhibition" contained the "Design Corporation 
Exhibition", in which design-related corporations presented their design projects and 
products (SMG, 2009a). In addition, "i-Brand Marketplace", another noteworthy program, 
had one of its main sub-events as the Principal Exhibition that aimed to show how the total 
process of design-to-production-to-marketing was actually performed by the interplay of 
actual designers, manufacturers, and marketers together (SMG, 2009a: 144-158). Moreover, 
by collaborating with the Seoul Broadcasting System, one of the Korea's commercial 
network TV stations, the SMG produced a TV show titled "Design How Much?" which first 
illustrated how selected designers developed their designs together with manufacturers and 




recording time. In addition, the products being bid upon were exhibited at the on-site 
exhibition site of the SDO 2009 (SMG, 2009a: 144-158). The SMG argued that this 
collaboration between the exhibition and the TV show would be helpful for the general 
public to learn about the "the new economic value of design"(SMG, 2009a: 144).   
Table 6. The Participants of Seoul Design Exhibition 2009 
Exhibition Type Sub-Exhibition Major Organizers 
Principal Exhibition i Brand Marketplace Domestic Corporate Actors and 
Domestic Designers 
Architecture: A User's Manual Domestic and International Architects 
Seoul Vision State Actor (SMG) 
Cultural Design of Korea, China, Japan State Actors 
World Design Market Seoul 2009 Domestic and International Corporate 
Actors 
Design Exchange Exhibition Seoul Designer's Dream Domestic designers 
World Design Cultures State Actors (11 national governments) 
Design Corporation Exhibition Domestic and International Corporate 
Actors 
Design Exploration Academic Actors 
2009 Design Job Domestic Corporate Actors 
Citizen Participatory Exhibition 2009 Beautiful Bench Competition 
Winners’ Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
2009 Featured Artists Competition 
Winners’ Exhibition 
State Actor(SMG) 
Seoul Public Design Certification 
Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
Public Facilities Standard Design 
Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
2009 Public Design Competition 
Winners’ Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
i Plaza State Actor (SMG) 
2009 Seoul “Good Sign” Exhibition State Actor (SMG) 
2009 Steel Design competition Winner’s 
Exhibition 
Corporate Actors  
2009 Seoul Architecture Culture Festival State Actor (SMG) 
World Design Capital Seoul 2010 Young 
Designer’s Workshop Results Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
World Design Capital Seoul 2010 
Citizens Competition Winners’ 
Exhibition 
State Actor (SMG) 
Special Exhibition INDEX :Award 2009 Exhibition  International Corporate Actors 
Design Seoul Tube State Actor (SMG) 
i-Green Design State Actors (SMG) 
DDP Collection State Actors (SMG) 
Flower Design Domestic Designers 
Seoul Call Center : Dasan 120 State Actors (SMG) 





 In terms of the promotion of state actors in the exhibition, the SMG used a vast 
amount of spaces at which to publicize not only the city's design-related policy but also more 
broadly the city's urban policy itself. Within the Principal Exhibition, the SMG organized the 
special exhibition titled "Seoul Vision" that consisted of eight policy projects which 
represented the SMG's current and future designs along with such urban policy projects as 
the "Design Seoul Policy", the "Han River Renaissance Project" and the "Yongsan 
Redevelopment Project" (SMG, 2009a: 162-184). <Figure 27> shows the Seoul Vision 
exhibition. Many of these exhibited policy projects such as the Han River Renaissance 
Project and the Yongsan Redevelopment Project, however, already had sparked public 
controversy and strong social criticism. From the viewpoint of the SMG, this exhibition itself 
was an important public relations opportunity for making public naturally exposed to the 
messages that conveyed the necessity of SMG's policy projects within such a positive 
'climate’ of creativity, innovation, and the new economic value of design.  
Moreover, besides this special exhibition for the SMG, all the sub-exhibitions that 
constituted the "Citizen Participatory Exhibition" were filled with booths showing various 
award-winning products and designs from several competitions promoted and held by the 
SMG. As illustrated in <Table 6>, there were eleven different exhibitions; most of them – 
with the exception of only one exhibition – were planned for presenting designs or products 
awarded by the SMG’s design competitions. For example, the 2009 Seoul "Good Sign" 
Exhibition displayed the winners of the 2009 Seoul Good Sign Competition held by the SMG 
while the Seoul Public Design Certification Exhibition presented the winners of the first and 




Figure 27. The Picture of the Seoul Vision Exhibition37  
 
  The SMG argued that these competitions were organized to encourage ordinary 
citizens, who participated in the events, to reflect upon their opinions and thereby spark 
"civic participation" in relevant public policy. However, at the same time, these competitions 
functioned as one way for public relations strategies to spread and legitimize the city's design 
policy. Because the SMG decided on the theme, format and the guidelines of the competition, 
the very act itself of civic participation in these competitions functioned only as a support of 
the city's policy. In other words, when someone chose to participate in these competitions, he 
or she had to follow the SMG's already established, themes, guidelines and formats in order 
to win the competitions; therefore such participation demonstrated that the participant’s 
support of the policy regardless of whether he or she actually intended to support the policy.  
																																								 																					




5.3.4 Seoul Design Competition 2009: Limiting "Civic Participation" via Competition 
 The strategy, coined here as "participation via competitions", due to its selective 
structure is a limited way to be involved in civic participation. The Seoul Design Competition, 
another main event in the SDO 2009, clearly had its limitations in terms of civic participation. 
The SMG argued that it chose the theme of the Seoul Design Competition 2009 as "Interflow 
and Consilience" in order to emphasize the event’s focus on the multi-disciplinary and 
multicultural aspects of the competition, given that the competition was open to everyone 
regardless of nationality, education level or design category (SMG, 2009a: 377). Also, the 
keywords of the competition were "Low carbon", "Eco-friendly" and "Natural energy" to 
demonstrate the city's interest in a green and eco-friendly policy direction. Of the 1206 
submissions, 80 percent were from Korean nationals and 10 percent from foreign nationals, 
with only fewer than 10 percent of the submissions from ordinary citizens. The majority of 
these submissions were made by undergraduate/graduate students in the arts and design and 
professionals in design-related fields (SMG, 2009a: 383).  
 As distinct from the previous event of the SDO 2008, the SMG argued that one of the 
innovative features of the 2009 Seoul Design Competition lay with the participation of 
citizens in the selection of its winner. Thus, during the three stages of screening by the 
professional jury (consisting of academics and design experts), 126 designs were displayed in 
the main venue of the SDO 2009. Citizens then could vote for five of their top choices among 
these 126 designs; the final winner was decided by the sum of the jury's evaluations and the 




citizens was limited to either their "participation in the competition" or their "voting for the 
design they prefer," similar to what occurred in the previous year’s event.  
 This whole process of competition – allowing for only a limited type of "civic 
participation" via "voting" or "participating in the competitions" – thus represents how the 
SMG articulated and combined the heterogeneous concepts of competition, sustainability and 
civic participation. For the SMG, progressive concepts like "sustainability", "eco-friendly" or 
"creativity" functioned as conceptual resources which could induce and encourage people to 
participate in the competition by using them as keywords of the Seoul Design Competition as 
well as of the framework of the "competition" itself based on the logic of selection and 
exclusion; therefore the competition evolved into an overall translation strategy by which 
these progressive concepts of "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity" were explored 
and experienced by citizens. More specifically, because civic participation was structured 
only in terms of becoming either a "voter" who evaluated the submissions or a "competitor" 
who actually ‘raced’ in the competition, citizens would come to recognize these concepts in 
terms of the hierarchy of which one was better or which one was worse. What is missing 
from this strategy was any inquiry into why such progressive concepts like sustainability, 
eco-friendly, and creativity should be explored and experienced under the framework of 
competition, itself in turn based on the logic of "exclusion", "selection", and "assortment".  In 
other words, one should ask whether the framework of a competition is a proper way to 
discuss social issues surrounding "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity".  
 Thereby, under this framework of "competition", these progressive concepts were 




alternative values by which to solve social problems. Through the SDO 2009’s molding of 
these concepts within the framework of various competitions, the SMG thus explicitly and 
inexplicitly ‘domesticated’ these concepts in ways that transformed them from being 
considered as tools to avenues by which to win "global competitions". This approach appears 
to be inherently connected to what the SMG continually argued for which was the 
enhancement of global competitiveness and city brand power. Therefore, it is important to 
question why civic participation had to be limited in this context to a form of "voting" or 
"participation in a competition" in order for everyday people to experience or explore notions 
of "sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity". The more radical question, however, lies 
with why this structure of civic participation had not been raised until Won-Soon Park, the 
new mayor, decided to discontinue the annual Seoul Design Olympiad.   
5.3.5 The Seoul Design Festival: experiencing the value of "design" 
 Another facet of the SDO 2009 was the Seoul Design Festival, which aimed to enable 
citizens to actually 'experience' design. At its previous event in 2008, the SMG added many 
heterogeneous activities under the concept of "design" by exploiting its conceptual flexibility 
and ambiguous features. Through this translation strategy, the SMG was able to 
conceptualize its music festival as a "Sound Design Festival" and its food-decorating 
exhibition as a "Food Design Festival". By following this strategy, the SMG similarly 
divided the festival into four different sub-categories including "i-Design Playground", "i-
Design Stage", "i-Design Square" and "i-Design Seoul".  
 One of the distinctive features of the Seoul Design Festival in 2009 was that more 




Importantly, many of these educational programs – which originally aimed to guide children 
to experience and explore design for developing their 'creativity' – were guided by the SMG 
and corporate business actors; each of these programs used the mini-festivals as opportunities 
to promote their policies or products. For example, the Green Cooking Festival organized by 
Fissler Korea, a Korean branch of the multinational cookware company of Fissler, became a 
chance to ‘naturally’ introduce their cookware to its participants via a hands-on format 
(<Figure 28> represents the Green Cooking Festival). Similarly, the Color Design Festival 
was planned and guided by Alpha Colors, a Korean domestic art supply company; likewise 
Alpha Colors had the opportunity to let children and their parents ‘naturally experience and 
explore' their art stationary. The SMG also organized many festivals that guided participants 
to experience and discover the city's design policy. For example, the Design Seoul Tour was 
executed to enable citizens to tour the Design Seoul specialized streets while the Haechi 
Festival as well as Parade were performed to boost the recognition of Haechi, which was 
newly created as the symbol of Seoul under the city's creative city policy. In this regard, what 
the SMG argued was that "experiencing and exploring" design within education programs 
that were ‘designed’ especially for the campaign ‘converted’ corporate products and the 
promotion of Design Seoul policy into learning opportunities.  
 To sum up, The SDO 2009 emphasized the economic value of ‘design’ by using the 
concept of "designomics" and relied on the participation and the promotion of state and 
corporate actors to such a degree that their presence increased quantitatively and qualitatively. 




participation, however, was not different from how it played out at its previous event: limited 
in its form to "participation via competitions". 
Figure 28. The Picture of the Green Cooking Festival38 
 
5.4. The Seoul Design Fair 2010: Seoul as "World Design Capital" and "UNESCO 
Creative City" 
In 2010, the city of Seoul received two international awards, the World Design 
Capital 2010 and City of Design (as a member of UNECO’s Creative City Network). The 
SMG argued that these two appointments conferred by the global organizations of UNESCO 
and ICSID (International Council of Societies for Industrial Design) greatly contributed not 
only to the acquisition of Seoul’s international brand as a creative design city but also to the 
advancement of Korea's national brand (SMG, 2010b). This global recognition tended to be 
																																								 																					




publicized as among the important achievements of the city's ongoing creative city policy. 
Within this atmosphere, the third Seoul Design Olympiad, newly named the "Seoul Design 
Fair", was launched as one of the main programs to publicize these two global renowned 
awards and as a major campaign tool itself to raise public recognition and to expand “public 
participation” in the creative city policy. The Seoul Design Fair (SDF) was held from 
September 17th to October 21st for a duration of 21 days. The main venue for the events was 
the same Jamsil Olympic Stadium used in previous years; the sub-events, however, were 
performed in the newly built four design clusters within the city of Seoul that included the 
Dongdaemun DDP area, the Mapo-Hongik University area, the Guro Digital complex area, 
and the Gangnam-Shinsa area. These specially designated areas formed Seoul’s major 
creative industry clusters, which contained artists, creative workers, and fashion and other 
companies in the field of design (i.e., industrial, product, environmental, packaging, and 
visual multimedia content production). It is important to note that the participation of 
corporations and design-related academic institutions was greatly increased at the SDF 2010. 
 As shown in <Table 7>, the number of corporations participated in the events 
increased from 69 in 2008 and 158 in 2009 to 243 in 2010. Moreover, the number of 
academic institutions increased from 23 in 2008 to 56 in 2010. In terms of the numbers of 
visitors, the SDF attracted 1.86 million visitors, a figure similar to attendance in the previous 
two years. The SDF 2010 was similar to its previous events with regard to its organizational 
structure for planning and management; therefore the SMG and the Seoul Design Foundation 
took a major role by collaborating with the same three external committees: the Consultative 




consisted of international and domestic design foundation executives and chairmen, 
prominent cultural figures and designers, and academics in design-related fields. Of special 
note is the fact that more corporate executives were selected as members of these external 
committees. For example, the Consultative Committee included Mooksuk Kang, vice 
president of LG Telecom, along with Kukhyun Jung, a design management adviser for 
Samsung Electronics while the Organization Committee contained Seunghan Lee, CEO of 
the Samsung Tesco Homeplus Group. Interestingly, the SMG appointed an academic, 
Kyoung-Ran Choi, professor of Kookmin University, as Director General of the Fair.  
In terms of its sub-events, four different sub-events – the Seoul Design Exhibition, 
the Seoul Design Conference, and the Seoul Design Competition – now were reconfigured 
into three distinct segments: "Design for Economy", "Design for Participation", and “Design 
for Education". Although the titles of the sub-events were changed under these new names, 
the actual sub-events within each segment contained activities that were comparable to those 
of the previous two Seoul Design Olympiads. In particular, the major participants of the sub-
events were filled with the same actors (e.g., the SMG and other state actors, international 
and domestic corporate business actors, international and domestic academics, and design 
professionals). Also mirroring the two previous Olympiads, citizens again could not 
participate in the planning and management processes, and their roles were limited once 






Table 7. The Summary of the Seoul Design Olympiads 2008, 2009, 2010 




State actor 42 50 109 
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5.4.1 Design For All?  
The theme for SDF 2010 was "Design for All" that connoted "the true value of design, 




people communicate harmoniously" (SMG, 2010b: 17). Under this theme, the SMG 
introduced three keywords of the SDF 2010: "Economy: Design can develop economy; 
Sharing: Design can share jobs; and Future: Design can offer the future vision" (SMG, 
2010b:17). In keeping with these themes and keywords, the SMG proposed three distinct 
goals of the SDF 2010. Firstly, the SDF 2010 would contribute to guiding citizens to 
understand and share the value of design with the aim of further developing the design 
industry. Secondly, the SDF 2010 would enhance its function as a "market" where design-
related business corporations would sell their products to create actual economic value. 
Thirdly, the SDF 2010 would offer educational opportunities for citizens to develop their 
"creative minds" (SMG, 2010:13). These three goals were performed in line with the newly 
titled segments of the event: "Design for Economy", "Design for Participation", and "Design 
for Education".  
 One of the important changes in the SDF 2010 was that the participation of private 
corporations dramatically increased from 69 corporate participants in 2008 to 243 corporate 
participants in 2010. This dramatic increase in the participation of corporate actors was 
directly related to the planning and management of the Design for Economy segment that 
explicitly aimed to promote corporate actors; therefore the main events held by this segment 
were filled with corporate public relations booths. For example, the Seoul Brand Exhibition 
was occupied by the campaigns for Samsung's Galaxy cell phones and LG's interior products 
while both the Domestic Corporation and Global Corporation Exhibitions were filled with 
domestic and international design-related companies' products. These companies included 81 




including Samsung and Hanssem. <Figure 29> shows Seoul Brand Exhibition's Samsung 
Galaxy cell phone booth. At the same time, in the Design Market, design corporations 
ranging from large companies like Samsung to small design firms and independent designers 
were able to promote and sell their products and design works. From the SMG’s viewpoint, 
the innovative and novel products displayed and sold at the events were important non-
human actors that demonstrated and provided strong evidence of "the new value of design" in 
the same way that the internationally and domestically renowned designers and academics 
functioned as human actors who supported "the new value of design".  
Figure 29. The Photo of the Samsung Galaxy Cellphone Booth39 
 
																																								 																					





 The “Design for Participation” segment was intended to pursue the objectives of 
"enhancing of citizen participation" through "eco-friendly and sharable design" (SMG, 
2010b:14). Even though the SMG argued that Design for Participation was planned to show 
how "Designomics" could bring about societal benefits, the main sub-events nonetheless 
focused on displaying the results of various design-related competitions in which civic 
participation was practiced solely in terms of what I refer to as "participation via 
competitions". For example, nine different competitions, among them the Seoul International 
Design Competition and the Seoul International Bicycle Design Competition, were promoted 
primarily by the SMG and occupied 37 sub-events in the Design for Participation segment. In 
addition, the rest of the sub-events were planned mostly to promote the SMG's creative city 
policy. For instance, the Urban Design Exhibition presented Seoul's urban design policy by 
focusing on the Design Seoul policy while the Seoul Upcycling (Reform) Fair displayed the 
Upcycling Competition submissions in order to promote Seoul's environment policy. Due to 
such structural constraints, civic participation was performed only in a highly limited form, 
reminiscent of its format at the previous two events.  
 Finally, the Design for Education segment was constructed to encourage citizens to 
explore and exercise their 'creative minds' through design education. The Seoul Design 
Conference was reorganized as one sub-event of this segment, and 15 internationally and 
domestically renowned designers and academics were invited to give presentations, lectures 
and open discussions to the general public. The topics included such themes as "Creating 
Economic Value through Design", "Re-designing Design for Future Survival" and "Seoul, 




to what the SMG was striving to promote by means of its concept of the "creative citizen" 
who could actively develop his/her creative ability to successfully win global competitions 
not only for themselves but also for national economic development such as those held in the 
previous years.  
 Moreover, the SDF 2010 focused on children and youth education programs 
consisting of interactive and experience-oriented activities. Similar to the previous event in 
2009, the main organizers of these educational programs were the SMG and corporate 
sponsors except for a few NGOs, so therefore these presentations were ‘naturally’ related to 
the promotion of Seoul's creative city policy and corporate branding. For example, the Seoul 
Color Therapy Class was organized by Alpha Colors, who conducted the Color Design 
Festival in 2009. In this program, children and their parents together painted various pictures 
in order to understand their psychological condition and relationship. What is noteworthy is 
that the children and their parents used crayons provided by Alpha Colors and filled in 
pictures with "Seoul Color", comprised of 10 colors that had been designated as the Colors of 
Seoul by the SMG (one of the projects of the Design Seoul policy). In this regard, an 
education program became but another opportunity to promote state and corporate actors.  
 To sum up, three urban mega events of the SDOs were organized and managed by an 
assemblage of three key actors: the SMG (state actors), international and domestic private 
capital (corporate actors), and international and domestic design-related academics and 
professionals (expert actors). The SMG successfully mobilized its supporting actors of 
private capital, academics, and design professionals to effectively present its 'creative vision'. 




own products and design works through participating in and supporting Seoul's urban mega 
events. Nonetheless, civic participation was limited to what I refer to as "participation via 
competition," thereby completely neglecting citizens’ involvement in the planning and the 
management processes of the events. Through the three SDO events, four sub-events – the 
Conference, Exhibition, Competition and Festival – also were developed as "strategies" that 
were guided by certain procedures. For example, the Seoul Design Conference’s function 
was to spread "the new value of design" via global and domestic experts' lectures and talks 
while the Seoul Design Exhibition was designed to promote state actors and business actors 
by displaying their products and design works.  
 Through these sub-event formats, the SMG planned to promote a new type of citizen 
– the "creative citizen" – who actively could explore and utilize the new economic value with 
in a ‘noble’ field like "design" to enhance not only his or her own creative ability but also to 
contribute to the development of the city and the nation by winning global competitions. In 
order to foster this 'creative citizen', the SMG actively articulated various heterogeneous 
concepts such as "global competition", "city branding", "designomics", "civic participation", 
"sustainability", "eco-friendly" and "creativity". Neoliberal values such as “global 
competition” and “autonomous” individuals became knowledge that was taken for granted, 
and progressive concepts like "sustainability" and "eco-friendly" were exploited as tools by 
which to win "global competitions". At the same time, the SMG put this new concept of 
'creative citizen' into the framework of developmentalist discourse, through which 




power. In this regards, it is possible to conceptualize the SDO as a "neoliberal-developmental 
urban mega event", in which neoliberal values were articulated with developmentalist ideas.  
 In its final closing ceremony in the SDF, the mayor of Seoul, Sehoon Oh, mentioned 
that the third Olympiad – newly named the "Seoul Design Fair" – was extremely successful 
in terms of the increase in corporate and citizen participation. Based on this success, he 
boldly argued that Seoul Design Fair would be held bi-annually in the newly built venue, the 
DDP, constructed as the major policy project within Seoul's creative city policy. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, however, the mayor’s dream never came to fruition due to 
his sudden resignation in 2011 because his referendum on free lunches was invalidated due to 
low voter turnout. The new mayor, Won-Soon Park, decided to stop the Seoul Design Fair 
from being an urban mega event, just as he delayed the construction of the DDP and re-
discussed the usage of the DDP with its citizens.  
5.5. From “Urban Mega Events” to “Citizen Hearing Workshops”: Dongdaemun 
Design Jam 7.7.7 
After taking the mayor's office, Won-soon Park opened various "citizen hearing 
workshops" and deliberation meetings, which aimed to gather reflections of citizens' opinions 
about Seoul's creative city policy. Through these workshops and deliberation meetings, 
various topics such as the construction of the DDP and Seoul's Design policy in general were 
discussed among SMG state officials, the mayor, and various citizen groups that included 
civic society activists, academics, creative workers and artists.  
 When I started my fieldwork in June 2012 in Seoul, I found the public announcement 




said that there would be no more 'SDF-like urban mega events' for directly supporting only 
the design industry, and it added that the SMG and Seoul Design Foundation were together 
gathering citizens' opinions about the new plans for the SDF and the Design Seoul policy in 
general. Various citizen-hearing workshops were posted at their websites, and the topics of 
the workshops were selected in many cases from the Seoul Design Foundation-launched 
Facebook club named "What Can Design Do for Seoul?" where ordinary citizens, artists, 
creative workers and artists could express and share their opinions regarding the city's Design 
Seoul Policy.  
 During my stay in Seoul from June 2012 to September 2012 and from September 
2013 to December 2013, I had the opportunity to participate in several workshops held by the 
Seoul Design Foundation. In most cases, these workshops were relatively small in size, in 
which generally 20 to 40 volunteers gathered and discussed certain topics regarding the city's 
design policy and creative city policy in general. For example, the topic of the workshop in 
which I participated was "The Workshop for Seoul's Public Information Design: Making 
Kind Seoul", where various citizens discussed problems related to Seoul's public information 
design policy. The participation was on a voluntary basis, and open to the general public; as a 
consequence, participants were from various backgrounds including designers, architects, 
artists, musicians, undergrad/graduate students, and state officials. Most of them actively 
participated in the "What Can Design Do for Seoul?" Facebook club, and had a strong desire 
to discuss more deeply the city's Design policy in an off-line environment. Seoul Design 




workshop were discussed with the new chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, 
Sangsoo Ahn.   
 Within these various citizen-hearing workshops, I had a chance to participate in one 
of the relatively 'biggest' events, which was named the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7". 
This event included public discussions, volunteer citizens' public talks about their opinions 
on Seoul's creative city policy, and such cultural happenings as music concerts. The overall 
event epitomized how the new mayor – and what I call the "post-developmental policy 
network" consisting of state actors, citizen groups, and NGOs – re-organized the city's urban 
mega event in distinctively unique ways from its planning to its management.  
 The event actually was born from simply one casual Facebook post in June 2012. 
When the number of the Facebook club members reached over 10,000, the new chairman of 
the Board of Seoul Design Foundation, Sangsoo Ahn, posted an innocuous Facebook 
message on the club’s page:  
Now, the citizen members of "What Design can do for Seoul" are about to reach 
10,000. Shouldn't we open some kinds of festival to celebrate it? What should we 
do?...about one month from now... the 1st weekend of July...7th July to 8th July?  
How about an overnight festival? What role would designers play? Please write 
unique ideas about this festival!  
 In response to this 'casual' message, there were 225 replies from various citizens that 
contained ideas about the format and the content of such celebratory events; the members of 
the club also discussed one another's ideas on the Facebook club page. Among the 225 
replies, some people suggested a TED conference-like event, in which volunteers presented 
their opinions about the city's design policy; others proposed a 21st Century Town Meeting-




per table) and deliberate in depth about policy issues. Through these active discussions 
among the members of the Facebook club, the event’s proposed formats ultimately were 
formulated as two different main activities entitled "I am a Talking Designer" and the "100 
People Round-table Discussion". The "I am a Talking Designer" section intended that 
volunteer designers and ordinary citizens would present their opinions about the city's design 
policy and design in general. The "100 People Round-table Discussion" section proposed that 
ordinary citizens would discuss two topics: "What do citizens of Seoul want from Design?" 
and "What can Design do for Seoul?" Both sets of discussions were proposed and agreed 
upon by the members of the Facebook club.  
 After deciding the format of the event, citizen volunteers who had experience in 
event-planning worked with the staff at the Seoul Design Foundation, and frequently posted 
about the progress of the event preparation at the Facebook club page and at the official 
website of the Seoul Design Foundation. Finally 15 people volunteered for the "I am a 
Talking Designer" section that consisted of various types of citizens such as designers, a 
physician, academics, artists, a librarian, and NPOs (See Table 8). Moreover, the new mayor 
of Seoul and the new chairman of the Board of Seoul Design Foundation joined as presenters 
in the event as well. Regarding the "100 People Round-table Discussion", participants were 
recruited via e-mail, the Facebook club, the Seoul Design Foundation website, and even via 
on-site registration. In addition, the discussion facilitators, who helped to keep participants on 
point, were recruited via the online website and the Facebook club; the Seoul Design 
Foundation set up a special training workshop for these recruited volunteers. I myself also 




decided upon as the "Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 Festival", and four goals of the event 
were chosen via citizens' discussions. These goals set up that 1) the event would be a "public 
sphere" for designers and citizens to discuss the Design Seoul policy; 2) the event would 
strive to formulate a new governance structure for civic participation; 3) the results of the 
discussion would be reflected directly in the future creative city policy; and 4) the event 
would be an off-line meeting opportunity for the members of the Facebook club to deepen 
their interaction and idea-sharing.  
 The event was held on July 7th in the Dongdaemun Historical Park within the DDP, 
where the SDF was originally planned to be held. About 300 participants including 230 
citizens and 70 SMG and Seoul Design Foundation officials were involved in the events. In 
the first section of the event, "I am a Talking Designer", fifteen presenters from various 
backgrounds, who were mostly not renowned designer/academics, presented their opinions 
about the Design Seoul policy and their own design-related work. Each presentation 
contained different ideas, but not any single presentation argued that design could comprise a 
"new economic value" nor enhance the city’s brand power or global competitiveness. Rather, 
some presenters, like Action Start, criticized the current labor situation of freelancer 
designers in Korea, and introduced their Freelancer Designer Cooperative's work. 
Furthermore, Won-soon Park, the new mayor, gave a presentation about his new vision of the 
city's creative city policy (See Figure 30), in which he argued that the Design Seoul policy 
should not focus on hardware construction like the DDP construction or Urban mega event 




 Meanwhile, in the "100 people round-table discussion" – based on the two main 
themes "What do citizens of Seoul want from Design?" and "What can Design do for Seoul?" 
– 100 citizens were divided into fourteen small discussion groups (See Figure 31).  
Figure 30. The Picture of The Mayor, Won-Soon Park, Presenting the New Vision of 
the Design Seoul Policy in the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 
 
In the first section, participants freely expressed what they wanted from Design; 
afterwards the discussion facilitators gathered each of the thirty tables’ opinions. The main 
discussion leader shared the results of the first set of mini-discussions; then each group 
explained to all the participants what these opinions exactly meant and why they chose them. 
Based on these thirty opinions, the main discussion leader and the discussion facilitators 




next in the second discussion section, participants discussed these citizens' opinion categories 
in more depth. The eight opinion categories related to "What can Design do for Seoul?" 
included: 1) Offer new communication platforms between the Citizen and the State and 
among citizens through Design, 2) Avoid a mere display like Design Policy, 3) Place IT 
technology into public design, 4) Balance "old" and "new" for Urban design, 5) Add 
inclusive Design for disabled persons and disadvantaged groups, 6) Utilize an eco-friendly 
design, 7) Satisfy public needs via Design, and 8) Include all other themes. After the second 
set of discussions, participants voted for which issue was the most urgent for Seoul's Design 
policy; 44 percent of participants chose "Offer new communication platforms between 
citizen and state and among citizens through Design" 
Figure 31. The Picture of 100 People Round-Table Discussion in Dongdaemun Design 





Table 8. The List of the Presenters in Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 
The Name of Presenters Type of Actor Title of Talk 
Sangsoo Ahn State Actor (the Chairman of the 
Board of Seoul Design Foundation) 
The Festival Celebrating Dance 
Performance 
Youngse Kim  Designer (Inno Design) Human Centered Design 
Yoonhee Han  Journalist (Yonhap News Media 
Lab) 
Dreaming Data 
Seungbum Kim General Practitioner (General 
Doctor at a Hospital) 
How can Design help a small-
sized medical clinic?  
Hwalmin Park  Designer (Haja Design Company) No Money Design 
Bumkyu Lee NPO (Bring your Cup) Youth newly design tumbler 
culture 
Namhee Lee, Jinwoo Park NPO (Action Start, Freelancer 
Design Cooperative) 
Socially Creative, Creative for 
Society 
Ranki Kim Architect (Korea History Culture 
Policy Research Institute) 
Historical Artifacts and Seoul's 
Design Policy 
Jiyoon Yang Freelancer Designer Urban agriculture project in 
apartment rooftop  
Wonsun Park State Actor (The mayor of Seoul) I am a designer, too! 
Hyunjoo Park Librarian (Incheon Library) Libraries talk with 'design' 
Mijin Jung Social Enterprise (Miracle 
Bookshelf Project) 
Miracle Bookshelf Project 
Nami Lee  Designer (Studio Bap) Beautiful Wedding Culture 
Design 
Inae Jung NPO (the DOMC) Design for Social Inclusion 
Muyoung Oh Freelancer Designer Minus, Plus 
 
 The results of the round-table discussions implied that citizens had a strong 
dissatisfaction with and antipathy toward how the past mayor carried out the creative city 




citizens' opinions". As shown in three SDO events, there was no place for citizens in the 
planning and management of the events. Moreover, the DDP construction project was pushed 
ahead despite citizens’ response and criticisms. Participants harshly censured the past 
mayor's unilateral administration style and asked for more direct and responsive 
communication with the SMG and state officials. In this regard, they argued that the real role 
of design is neither constructing "DDP"-like urban landmarks nor performing "SDO"-like 
urban mega events. Rather, they argued, as presented above, that the real role of design for 
Seoul should offer "new (or better) communication platforms between citizen and state as 
well as among citizens themselves".  
 In summary, the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 was organized by what I 
conceptualize as "the post-developmental policy networks" in which state actors interacted 
directly with ordinary citizens and NPOs. During the event, as distinct from the previous 
three SDOs, civic participation was not limited to either attendance at exhibitions as a mere 
spectator nor participation in competitions as a competitor or voter. Citizens also actively 
created the events’ format and content; consequentially – as a result of this more direct and 
in-depth citizen participation – the role of design for Seoul was neither conceptualized as a 
"new economic value" nor perceived as "a tool to win global competition". Rather, citizens 
explored the role of design as "a tool to offer a better communication platform between the 
state and citizens and among citizens". In this regard, the two different types of events – the 
SDOs and the Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7 – strongly demonstrate that each policy 





CHAPTER 6  
CREATIVE WORKERS AS MORAL AND ETHICAL SUBJECTS IN YOKOHAMA  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to reconsider and re-evaluate Yokohama’s creative city policy from 
the viewpoint of its creative workforce. One of the main policy rationales of Yokohama’s 
creative city policy is to revitalize the Kannai area by recruiting a so-called “creative class” 
that includes artists, designers, and architects. To entice and promote this creative workforce, 
as shown in previous chapters, the Yokohama Municipal Government (YMG) reconfigured 
its historic downtown area into the “Creative Core Area.” Here, the creative workforce would 
live, work and hold a series of urban mega events such as the Yokohama Triennale as a 
venue to present their work to the outside world. This policy rationale was originally 
influenced by Richard Florida’s writings on the creative class, which argued that post-
industrial prosperity was largely led by the creative class (Noda, 2008; Florida, 2002). 
Taking on Florida’s propositions, the YMG viewed the creative workforce as important 
“human capital” who could revitalize the Kannai area and enhance the city’s competitive 
power (Noda, 2008:102). In fact, the YMG’s policy vision reflects the idea that this creative 
workforce comprises so-called “role model subjects” for building the creative city.40.  
 Despite the prominent place of the creative workforce in discussions about urban 
transformation, policy makers and urban planners have paid little attention to how these 
workers actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resist the given creative 
																																								 																					
40 There are several scholars who argue that creative workers were perceived as role model 
subjects for a post-industrial/neoliberal economy. (See de Peuter, 2014a , 20014b; McRobbie 




city policy. This chapter explores these neglected voices and experiences of the creative 
workforce in Yokohama’s creative city making process. To shed light on their everyday 
experiences and labor subjectivity, this chapter draws ideas from the recent growing research 
trends of “creative labor” from media and cultural studies, sociology of work, and political 
economy of communication. Based on in-depth interviews and participant observations, this 
chapter focuses on how the ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are 
prominently important to explain workers’ everyday living and working experiences as 
creative labor in Yokohama. Nonetheless, this chapter addresses how these ethical and moral 
values in creative work are actually preferred within the given creative city policy and have 
certain limitations to overcome a “moral but apolitical volunteer subjectivity”.  Through this 
observation, this chapter explores whether "the articulation of moral-political and social 
values in the course of cultural work”(Banks, 2006) can be possible from creative workers’ 
moral and ethical sensitivities and actions.  
6.2 Creative labor as a site of moral work   
 The role model analogy of creative work for contemporary capitalism has been 
widely discussed  by prominent politicians and celebrity intellectuals such as Tony Blair, 
Daniel Pink and Richard Florida, but also by its critical counterparts in the study of media, 
cultural and creative works (de Peuter, 2014a). In particular, by opposing the celebratory 
discourses of creative work, many researchers focus on how these creative occupations are 
perceived as a "favored labor profile" for post-industrial economy in terms of the contrasting 
correlation between high flexibility and high insecurity, blurring boundaries between work 




low solidarity (e.g., Heelas, 2002; Ursell, 2000; McRobbie, 2002). To explain these new 
types of labor subjectivities and work experiences, the research based on a Foucaultian 
framework of “subjection-subjugation” as a modern subject formation highlighting neoliberal 
values of “self-enterprise”, “self-exploration”, “passion for creativity” and “autonomy” take 
on an immense role in allowing for young workers to voluntarily enter these high risk labor 
markets and exploit themselves (e.g., Heelas, 2002; Ursell, 2000; McRobbie, 2002; Kim, 
2014).   
However, several scholars claim that it is necessary to view beyond this post-
Foucaultian approach so as to more fully understand the complexity of labor subjectivity 
within creative occupations (e.g., Banks, 2006; Lee, 2012; de Peuter 2014a, 2004b). In 
particular, questioning some of these assumptions, Banks (2006) questions the argument that 
rampant individualization and exploitation of creative works often draw images of not only 
overlooking “notions of workplace rights, entitlements or responsibilities” but also denying 
“notions of participation and equality” (Banks, 2006). He argues that some of these studies 
tend to “under-develop the notion of agency” “toward a universalist position” (Banks, 2006).  
By analyzing the local cultural community in Manchester, U.K, Banks argues that the 
emergence of various types of social enterprises and ethical businesses in cultural sectors 
influenced by a ‘slow’ and ‘soft’ capitalist spirit newly represent the important moral 
motivations and ethical aspects of selfhood based on “individual self-reflexivity” (Banks, 
2006). His research results reveal that moral commitments of cultural works can contrast 
with popular images of the self-interested and de-politicized creative labor (Banks, 2006).  
By following the argument of Banks (2000, 2006), Lee (2012) also tries to locate 




independent television production workers in the U.K. He acknowledges that self-
exploitation and a high level of risk for self-actualization and self-enterprise are prevalent, 
however, he also found that U.K television production workers had an “ethical desire for 
social impact”. This included orienting audiences towards social justice and against racism 
and prejudice. In fact, he finds that their “desire for fulfillment through an internal sense of 
having done good work and receiving public recognition” has become an important 
“emancipatory purpose” for these workers (Lee, 2012:492). Through these findings, he 
argues,  
Exploring how the creativity doctrine impacts on worker’s subjectivities and expresses 
itself through their passionate attachment to work is not to suggest that these workers 
are ideological dupes (of the discursive regime of truth). (Lee, 2012:494, italics added 
by myself).  
 
From this viewpoint, autonomy of creative workers is considered as particularly open 
and ambiguous enough to be a “self-reflexive and negotiated autonomous subjectivity” rather 
than “only engendering alienation, promoting compulsory individualism, or fostering status-
seeking and instrumentality” (Banks, 2010: 266, italics added). Along these lines, cultural 
and creative works are perceived to be in the realm of “mixed opportunity”, in which the 
highly individualized and de-socialized creative workers co-exist with progressive, ethical, 
and politically motivated actors (Banks, 2006: 466, italics added by myself).  
Beyond the fact that creative workers are in fact more complex reflexive subjects in 
practice, however, it is still unclear how these moral and ethical dimensions of labor 
subjectivity are “political subjects” capable of meaningful resistance or opposition given their 
precarious working conditions.	Are they ("individualized/de-socialized workers" and 




both these positions? Or is it that this is a new kind of political subjectivity altogether? In 
other words, as Banks (2006) himself argues, how can “the articulation of moral-political and 
social values in the course of cultural work” be possible from creative workers’ moral and 
ethical sensitivities and actions?  
This chapter focuses on the moral and ethical dimensions of labor subjectivity in order 
to understand the lived experiences of creative workers in Yokohama. However, this chapter 
has uncovered that these moral and ethical motivations and actions of creative worker in 
Yokohama are not enough to develop a political subjectivity to resist given precarious 
working and living conditions and to create a collective solidarity. Rather, this chapter will 
show how ethical and moral subjectivity is actually preferred in the YMG’s creative city 
policy and how it is in reality connected to apolitical “volunteer subjectivity” that is “praised 
only for maintaining and strengthening the existing society" and for what is "done for the 
state" (Ogawa, 2004:89).  
6.3 Creative Core Area as a Failed Creative Cluster ? 
When I started my field research in 2012, I had the impression that Yokohama’s 
creative city policy is not so much focusing on the development of a particular industry 
within a broad range of creative industries; thus this approach is different from that of Seoul 
where the city government concentrated on one specific industry such as "design" for its 
policy plan. In Yokohama, by contrast, several different and somewhat heterogeneous 
occupations such as designers, architects and artists mixed and resided together in the 
Creative Core Area. In other words, there was not any single main creative industry in 




designated as part of UNESCO’s Creative City Network in spite of its renowned reputation. 
In this network each participant city is sorted by the name of a certain industry, such as Seoul 
as "The City of Design" and Kanazawa as “The City of Crafts and Folk Art.”   
When the YMG initially prepared to implement its creative city policy in 2002, the 
former mayor, Nakata Hiroshi, first organized a special committee for the Urban Center 
through the Promotion of Art, Culture and Tourism. The committee, chaired by Kitazawa 
Takeru, the former city official of Yokohama and the professor at the University of Tokyo, 
originally proposed several different but inter-related plans including: 1) the Creative Core 
Area plan, 2) the National Art Park Plan, and 3) the Yokohama Image Culture City. As I 
explained in previous chapters, Noda (2008) asserted that the Creative Core Area plan, 
influenced by Richard Florida’s work of creative class, was more about “human capital” in 
terms of a policy plan. On the other hand, the National Art Park Plan aimed to newly 
regenerate the Zou No Hana District and its adjoining areas to the west of Yamashita Pier 
into a public waterfront park for building new tourist amenities. Finally, the plan of “Image 
Culture City Yokohama” had the goal to gather and entice media industries such as film and 
animation companies and education institutes in Yokohama. The special committee 
especially designated this plan as “economic policy”, and one of the main detailed action 
plans included the attraction of large media corporations such as Nikatsu, a film production 
company, as well as SEGA, a game production company in Yokohama. However, the plan 
was not successful, and thus the YMG failed to entice these big media corporations to move 
to Yokohama.   
When I started my interviews with city officials in 2013, art-related NPOs, and 




Image Culture City Yokohama. They said that even though the creative city policy of 
Yokohama became famous domestically and internationally, the failure to entice large media 
corporations prevented the Creative Core Area from becoming a “creative industry cluster” 
in which various inter-related companies within certain industries complied together and 
created synergy effects and innovation. A graphic designer, Hideyuki (CW141), with 20 years 
experience and had moved to Yokohama from Tokyo in 2010 told me: 
Since I moved to Yokohama, I found what is most needed in this area [Kannai’s 
Creative Core Area] is “industry”. As you might know, we do not have any single 
main industry here. If we really want to make the Kannia area self-sustainable, I think 
it is necessary to develop “real” industry here. If the city does not take this problem 
seriously, this policy might become hazy … (Personal interview with Hideyuki, a 
male designer with 20 years experiences) 
 
This kind of concern is actually widely shared by city officials, art-related NPOs, and 
other creative workers in Yokohama. When I conducted participant observation at the 
Creative City School organized by BankART 1929 – in which the city officials, art-related 
NPOs, and creative workers weekly discussed and shared current problems and future ideas 
of Yokohama’s creative city policy – there was a special session for discussing the economic 
efficacy of Yokohama’s creative city policy. In this session, two current city officials in 
charge of the economic and financial part of the creative city policy in Yokohama exposed 
that there had been certain limitations to developing a “creative industry” in Yokohama, 
As you might know, Image Culture City Yokohama was the main industrial policy 
plan within the creative city policy in Yokohama. One of the main projects of Image 
Culture City Yokohama was to attract media content production companies in the 
Kannai area. The city provided a financial incentive of 50 million yen to the 
companies if they moved to the Kannai area, but from 2005 to 2008 we attracted only 
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seven companies. At the initial stage, there were several more animation production 
companies who showed some interest to move, but many of them said that “crossing 
Tama-river” (which means leaving Tokyo) for media content production companies 
would prove difficult for survival for this industry. In this sense, we know that Image 
Culture City Yokohama plan was not so successful at all. So for now, the city 
considers to change the plan toward more fostering human capital than enticing actual 
industries(Transcribed from the Creative City School held in July 8th, 2013). 
 
As this state official reported, because Tokyo has an already well-grown media 
content production cluster, there are practical limitations to developing a creative industry 
cluster in the Kannai area in Yokohama.. Under these circumstances, the groups who fill this 
void would be artists, designers and architects based in small-sized and independent 
production companies or self-employed freelancers who currently reside in the Creative Core 
Area. As such, most of my interviewees in the Kannai area were either self-employed 
freelancers or were employed by small companies. In most cases, they worked in shared 
offices dubbed “co-working spaces” that were partially supported by the city of Yokohama. 
The shared office in the Utoku building, which I discussed in the previous chapter, was one 
of the main examples of a co-working space in the Kannai area. In this building, 19 different 
groups of creative workers including artists, photographers, designers, and architects shared 
an office space, and most of them met one another via participating in several creative city 
policy projects such as Kitanaka White and Brick.  
Without one single prominent industry in the Kannai area, creative workers I spoke 
with told me that the unexpected result was the heterogeneity and diversity was a “positive 
stimulation”. Nishio (CW2), an architect with 13 years experience put it this way:  
After completing my B.A, I started my personal architecture design office around the 
Yokohama station area. When the city started the creative city policy, I had heard that 
one of the main policy plans was focusing on the renovation and the reuse of old 




naturally had some interest on the creative city policy. When I heard about the 
Kitanaka Brick and White project, I thought that it might be an interesting chance to 
meet different types of people so I decided to move into that co-working space. At 
that time, there were various different groups of people who were artists, designers, 
community development NPOs and architects and I found that this diversity and 
heterogeneity gave me a chance to broaden my eyes … For example, one day, when I 
went to the bathroom, some artists had drawn a post-modern painting on the 
bathroom’s wall. I was very surprised and never thought about that kind of idea. Just 
like this example, I found that meeting with various different types of creators gave 
me positive stimulation even for my own works.  (Personal interview with Nishio, a 
male architect with 13 years experiences) 
 
Similarly, Kanda (CW3), a designer who used to participate in the artists in-residence 
program in the Koganecho area and now worked in the co-working space in the Utoku 
building stated:   
I know that the city itself regrets that the Kannai area is still not developed enough as 
a “creative industry cluster” based on one prominent creative industry. However, I 
personally think that the Kannai still has its own potentiality based on heterogeneity 
and diversity. You know, currently there are various different types of people from 
various different occupations and backgrounds in the Kannai area. For example, when 
I joined Creative City School held by BankART 1929, I even met some people who 
were farmers doing organic agriculture in the city. And some designers actually plan 
to co-work with these farmers by including their own ideas of packaging and 
marketing. I think that this kind of co-working and cooperation, which was never 
really thought of before, can be really innovative and creative. So I think that the 
future role of the YMG not only could be to attract more big companies from outside 
but also to put more effort into providing more opportunities to connect those various 
groups of creators in the Kannai area.  (Personal interview with Kanda (CW3), a male 
designer with 4 years experiences) 
 
On the one hand this heterogeneity and diversity gave these creative workers the 
opportunity to positively stimulate one another and develop noble cooperative experiences; 
yet on the other hand this heterogeneity and diversity suggest that there are certain economic 
gaps and differences in labor motivations among various groups of creative occupations. For 




those of artists groups including fine art painter and modern artists. Most of my interviewees 
in designer and architect groups reveal that the first priority of their work motivation is based 
on satisfying their “clients” rather than pursuing their own artistic expression. Two 
interviews with Eri (CW4),  an architect with 10 year experience, and Tomokawa (CW5), a 
designer with 10 year experience exemplify this difference:  
After I started my career as an architect, I was very surprised how much this work is 
less creative, which is different from what I imagined. I know there are some 
architects who design an artistic building, but that is an extremely rare case in this 
field. Except for only a few talented people, the rest of architects’ work is more 
technical, and it is not to express your artistic vision but more like to satisfy your 
clients. So I found the pleasure for my work not in expressing my own creativity but 
in satisfying my clients. When they are happy with my design, I have a sense of 
feeling that I did good work. (Personal Interview with Eri (CW4), a female architect 
with 10 years experience) 
 
I became a graphic designer because I like drawing very much, and it was one kind of 
work that I can do well. And I like the fact that I can choose drawing as my job. That 
is one of the reasons why I can keep doing my job. However, the designer work is not 
always for expressing my own creativity. Some work is very routine and not so much 
creative at all. So in many cases, I divide my work into two different parts: the part 
that I should meet client’s requirements and the part that I can pursue my own 
autonomy and creativity. (Personal Interview with Tomokawa (CW5), a female 
graphic designer with 10 years experience)  
 
As shown in the personal interviews above, what these creative workers can achieve 
by giving up some parts of creativity and autonomy is a relative economic stability compared 
to “artist groups” including painter and modern artists. The continuous job requests from 
clients are based on how much they are able to satisfy their past clients rather than how much 
they can pursue their own creativity and artistic expression, and this is one of the ways to 




My interview with Mori (CW6), a painter who used to be a graphic designer and now 
is a full-time fine art painter stated:  
I have been around the field of “drawing" for 30 years. I started my career in a small 
graphic design company and found that I really liked drawing, so I really wanted to 
be a full-time fine art painter. Ten years before, I almost quit my illustration work and 
did only tempera painting … After participating in an artist-in-residence program here 
(in the Koganecho area); luckily I could paint more and almost manage my living by 
selling my paintings. Still sometimes when I have some urgent financial need, I do 
illustration work or even do some other work as well, which is not anything related to 
art…but I am so happy that now in most cases I can use the majority of my working 
time for only tempera painting … people might think that design work is similar to 
fine art painting, but it is a very different process. For illustration work, you always 
first need to think about your clients’ requests rather than your own artistic expression, 
so I really hoped to have a chance to be a full time painter for myself. And now I 
think that I am almost there. I still keep my computer and graphic tools in my house, 
but I don’t think that I will do illustration work for a full time job any more in the 
future. (Personal Interview with Mori(CW6), a female painter with 30 years 
experience) 
 
During my conversation with Merino, she said that her current income as a full time 
painter had decreased compared to her earnings as a full-time illustrator, and she would 
sometimes have to do some manual labor to make her own living. However, she said that she 
wanted to remain as a full-time artist because she really likes “when she draws what she 
wants to draw”; the moments when focusing on her painting were precious for her. My 
interview with her illustrates that artists generally have a stronger passion for creativity as 
compared with architects and designers. Moreover, for architect and designer groups, passion 
or a desire for doing creative work is not a main work motivation, but "doing good work" for 
others (in many cases, their clients) is more important. Here, as Lee (2012) argues, it is 
possible to view that the so-called doctrine of “creativity”, “self-exploration”, or “self-
enterprise” –which is reported from many previous studies – does not always explain the 




creative workers in Yokohama, what I found to be the common ground lies with their 
explanation of their working and living experiences in terms of anxiety and a sense of 
precariousness for their future regardless of the level of passion for creative work or relative 
economic stability.  
6.4 Precarity and Anxiety as ‘Normalized’ Living and Working Conditions  
One of the reasons why critical scholars from media and cultural studies, sociology of 
work, and political economy of communication argue that creative employment is “model 
work” for a post-industrial economy is that this work represents a growing “precarious” life 
under the global circulation of neoliberalism (e.g., McRobbie 2002, de Peuter 2014a, 2014b, 
Banks 2006). de Peuter (2014b) argues that “broadly precarity refers to existential, financial 
and social insecurity exacerbated by the flexibilization of labour associated with post-
Fordism”(de Peuter, 2014b, p 32). Obviously, the growing labor flexibility represented by the 
increase in freelancing, contract work, and self-employment has been a typical employment 
arrangement in creative occupations (de Peuter, 2014b). Therefore, it is meaningful to shed 
light on how creative workers cope better with or even resist their given precarious working 
conditions because they are located at the forefront of the post-industrial economy.   
 Two young female workers, Eri and Tomokawa, who share a co-working space in the 
Utoku building are typical examples of working conditions and life experiences of creative 
workers in Yokohama’s Creative Core Area. Both of them are in their mid-30s and met each 
other when they participated in the Kitanaka Brick and White project in 2006. Even though 
their jobs are different – one is an architect while the other is a graphic designer – their 




graphic designer started her career in a small design office in Tokyo, and then she became a 
freelancer and mostly worked at home by herself. She said that it was not easy to have her 
own office as a young freelance designer due to economic pressures, so when she 
accidentally saw the announcement about the Kitanaka Brick and White project providing 
co-working space, it looked like a great opportunity for her to have her own office. Her office 
partner, an architect, also was in a similar situation. She too had started her architecture 
career in a small design office, and had been working as a full-time instructor at a small 
professional college when she decided to participate in the Kitanaka Brick and White project 
about seven years ago. Both of them were young, single, freelancing, and looking for a space 
for working in better and affordable conditions.  
 When I asked them about their working conditions, both of them said that these 
conditions were and are still “hard” and "difficult" in terms of excessive work hours, long 
apprenticeship periods to become a “real” independent designer and architect, and a 
precarious economic situation. As self-employed freelancers, there is no union for them to 
join and no unemployment benefits. Also, one of the most difficult aspects to handle is the 
reality of having to continually look for the next job by themselves. Without the benefit of a 
marketing department  within a large design or architecture firm, Tomokawa and Eri must 
constantly be on the lookout for their next job through their own personal networks. During 
the past seven years in Yokohama, they moved to three different locations: from Kitanaka 
Brick and White, then to the Honcho Building, and finally to the current Utoku building 
because both previous projects supported by the YMG were temporary. Nonetheless, the 
current co-working space is still based on a four-year contract under the building owner’s 




have to find other places when the contract period ends. Their current goal is to become 
successful enough to have their own offices before their current leasing contract ends.  
Instead of temporary work leading to a permanent or at least more stable position, this is a 
way in which the city is subsidizing new forms of permanently temporary jobs.  
 These kinds of precarious working conditions and experiences are commonplace 
among creative workers in the Creative Core Area, regardless of their professional 
qualifications. Of course, the level of precariousness is more severe among artists who are at 
the bottom in terms of economic stability. One creative worker, Erika (CW7), who has been 
in Yokohama since 2005, reveals that living as an artist has never been easy for her. In her 
interview, Erika said that one of the most difficult issues for her is not having a “stable” 
income to make her own living. She said that this kind of unstable economic situation is not a 
choice but rather a typical way of living as an artist in Japan. Another artist, Mori (CW6), 
with 30 years of experience reveals that she sometimes does manual labor when she has some 
urgent financial needs. Both of them said what they really want is better working and living 
conditions in which they can sustainably work and live as artists.  
 It is natural that these precarious working and living conditions are often related to 
their anxiety about their futures. Most of my interviewees reveal that they feel constant stress; 
an interesting point is that many think that this anxiety about the future is already well-
scattered midst the whole of their society, so they believe that their anxiety is not so different 
or special from that of other workers who are not in creative industries. Mori (CW6)’s 
perspective was shared by many interviewees:,  
I know that my life, in particular my economic situation as an artist, is not so ideal. I 
feel some anxiety about my future life, but I don’t want to think that my unstable 




not many jobs providing stable employment for their workers. Even ordinary workers 
always worry about job stability and their future. You know, it is the era of anxiety, 
so I don’t think that my feeling of anxiety is so different from that of other people 
[who are not in creative occupations].  
(Personal Interview with Mori (CW6), a female artist with 30 years experience) 
 
When I first started my career as a graphic designer, it was right after the crush of the 
Japanese bubble economy. At that time, the society was dramatically changed. From 
that moment, I think that people already started living with some kind of anxiety. So 
to me, feeling anxiety is a kind of thing that you have to accept. And I think that only 
to keep worrying about the future is not very helpful … I think that it [anxiety] is a 
kind of given living condition now. 
(Personal Interview with Hideyuki (CW1), a male graphic designer with 20 years 
experience) 
 
What these interviews suggest is that the precarious working conditions have become 
normalized in the everyday lives of artists in Yokohama. For them, anxiety is not a special 
feeling that only creative workers feel due to their unstable work and living situation, but an 
ordinary emotion that people who live in a precarious era share across all of Japanese society. 
If precariousness and anxiety are perceived as "normalized" living and working conditions, it 
is important to scrutinize how these creative workers cope with these anxieties and risks in 
their everyday experiences because it can tell us about how people in general cope with such 
psychological and societal factors in a post-industrial/neoliberalizing society. Accordingly, 
one of the common strategies that I found among my interviewees in Yokohama is to 
rigorously build and manage “networks”.  
6.5 Networking as a tool for retaining employability and a buffer for reducing anxiety  
Gina Neff’s research about the work and life of venture labor in Silicon Alley clearly 
reports that personal social networking is one of the main resources for retaining 




privatization of job security”, in which individuals are desperately building and managing 
their own social connections to seek employment security under the absence of other 
organizational and industrial supports such as unions (Neff, 2012: 128). In her study, 
common networking activities such as participating in evening parties, meetings, and online 
communities became enormous pressures for workers, and most importantly, she argues that 
the creation of social capital via individual networking activities actually served only as a 
shield for workers who were able to access and retain them, but  “they do little to help buffer 
workers against the “systemic risk” of an industry downturn”(Neff, 2012:125). In this regard, 
she claims that networks ultimately failed to protect workers during the economic crash (Neff, 
2012: 131).  
Despite Neff’s reservations about the limitation of networking in the creative industry, 
my interviewees in Japan insisted that what was urgently needed for the Creative Core Area 
was to develop more “networks” among heterogeneous creative workers in Yokohama. My 
interviewees felt that there were not enough networking events and opportunities, and believe 
that developing personal networks among creative workers in the Creative Core Area can 
create new opportunities for both workers as well as the city itself. Commonly, regardless of 
their trade, my interviewees revealed that general ways of securing their next work and jobs 
are based on managing personal networks. Kanda (CW3), who worked as a graphic designer 
mainly organizing art education events for children, reported simply that his main strategy 
for maintaining job security is based on personal networking activities: 
When I first moved to Yokohama about four years ago, my personal living situation 
was very bad. I just started living by myself at that time, and it is still difficult but I 
found that it is getting better. In case of my work, after finishing one event, some 
people who participated in that event introduced me to other people, and I keep 




to Yokohama, my work is increasing, and I feel that my personal network is also 
getting wider than before. So in my case, I handle my anxiety through this network 
and my colleagues. (Personal interview with Kanda (CW3), a male graphic designer 
with 4 years experiences)     
 
As with the above graphic designer, my interviews revealed that in order to manage 
and build up personal networks in Yokohama's Creative Core Area one of the common 
strategies is to participate in cultural events and educational programs held by Bank ART 
1929. Bank ART 1929, as the first and most well-known creative city project in Yokohama, 
functioned as one of the main “contact zones” for building and maintaining networks of 
creative workers in the Kannai area. Even though the Bank ART 1929 building was initially 
renovated for usage as a modern art gallery, it also regularly holds numerous arts events, art-
related educational programs, and public meetings for the purpose of discussing Yokohama’s 
creative city policy.  
When I did my fieldwork in 2013, Bank ART 1929 held an event called “Creative 
City School”, in which state officials, art NPOs, academics, and creative workers gathered 
together weekly to discuss and share their opinions and ideas about Yokohama’s creative city 
policy. The general format of the Creative City School was divided into two sections: first a 
“lecture” in which state officials and policy experts in creative city policy introduced current 
policy projects and second a “small group meeting” in which several participants organized 
one group to discuss the current creative city policy and suggest new policy projects by 
following such special topics as “promoting tourism in Yokohama” and “proposing new 
urban design in Yokohama.” Because the Creative City School generally started at 7 pm, 
people often had small gatherings in the down hall café in Bank ART 1929 and sometimes 




gatherings over about two month periods, it was a sufficient amount of time for them to 
develop a somewhat "deeper" relationship among the participants. Through involvement in 
these events, state officials on the one hand actually could monitor and obtain opinions about 
the city's current creative city policy from creative workers and art NPOs. On the other hand, 
creative workers had the opportunity to build networks, find their next jobs from one another, 
and acquire the most recent information about the city's creative city policy. I was able to 
locate many of my interviewees by participating in this event, and many of them said that the 
existence of a place like Bank ART 1929 was a "strongpoint" in the Creative Core Area as a 
vital asset for them and the city.  
Beside the example of Bank ART 1929, there are several shared offices and co-
working spaces developed by other NPOs such as Sakura Works and the Kannai Future 
Center in the Creative Core Area. Sakura Works, developed by the community development 
NPO, Yokohama Community Design Lab, provided co-working spaces and held both regular 
and occasional cultural events. The Kannai Future Center was founded as a social enterprise 
incubation space, which offered not only educational and consulting opportunities but also 
shared offices for those with an interest in social enterprise. In these co-working spaces, more 
heterogeneous people tended to gather in addition to creative occupations, such as social 
workers, business consultant, even farmers.  
Some of my interviewees claim that developing this kind of infrastructure for 
networking can be a solution for not only enhancing economic stability but also reducing 
their sense of “anxiety” based on their precarious living and working conditions. I visited one 
group of young workers who together opened a small art-related social enterprise company 




designers in their early thirties who had graduated from the same art school in Tokyo. Before 
starting their business in Yokohama, one of them had worked at several cultural event 
management companies, and the other had worked at a community development agency. 
Some in that company who used to work at larger companies revealed that they felt a strong 
anxiety after they entered this social enterprise business. They said that they never had 
experienced this kind of strong anxiety when they had worked at larger companies. Takuya 
(CW11), who worked in a bigger design company, told me that "I can't even sleep well, 
sometimes when I think about my future"; when I asked him how he coped with this, he 
responded that "I can handle this anxiety because I have my colleagues and personal 
networks here [in the Kannai area]". For him, the existence of networks is more than an 
instrument or tool to maintain their future employment arrangement. Rather it seems that he 
perceived it as a psychological buffer to protect him from a strong sense of anxiety. Along 
this line, some creative workers achieved a strong sense of togetherness and belonging 
through maintaining their networks. One interviewee, Nishio (CW2), who is an architect and 
participated in several creative city projects since 2006, reported,  
I think that one of the precious things that I have received through participating in 
creative city projects (Kitanaka White and Brick and Honcho Building) was my 
personal networking with various different people. I think this networking is a kind of 
capital for now from the city's creative city policy. We participated in the creative city 
project voluntarily and spent our time together. It is different from some kinds of 
compulsory or interest-oriented relationships, which you might get in your business, 
so this is the reason why we tried to find new co-working spaces together when 
Kitanaka White and Brick and the Honcho Building project ended. I want to keep 
moving together with these people if we have to move to another place in the future. 
(Personal interview with Nishio (CW2), a male architect participated in Yokohama's 





Importantly for this creative worker, the existence of networking functions as a strong 
sense of togetherness or belonging. He often called his shared-office partners as “nakama (仲
間)” which means literally “company, fellow or colleague,” although this term generally 
connotes a stronger sense of mutual trust and friendship in Japan. This attachment to 
networking is similar to what Banks (2000) argues: the role of networking is a common way 
to temper or spread risk in absence of a more formal support structure. Banks (2000) more 
importantly argues that cultural workers can get the opportunity to break “out of the self to 
the other, which now includes a process of mutual narrative and emotional disclosure” 
through a dependence on networking, because the relation of personal network is based on 
what sociologist Anthony Giddens calls an “active trust” (Banks, 2000). In doing so, Banks 
(2000) tries to connect “activities of developing and dependence on networks” to one way of 
“trusting each other” as new social relations in the post-traditional society, and the moral 
sentiment of “trust” is considered as an essential value to develop personal networks. Similar 
to what Banks (2000) found in Manchester’s local cultural sector, creative workers in 
Yokohama strive to get advice, training, jobs and sometimes find mentors through personal 
networks. Along this line of thought, some workers argue that their own vision of creating 
“community” in the Creative Core Area is grounded in a moral and ethical sense of "trust" 
and "autonomy," a possible alternative to coping with their precarious work and living 
conditions and with their sense of anxiety as well. For example, one male graphic designer, 
Kanda (CW3), and another female painter, Erika (CW7), said:  
I think that the Creative Core Area has still more potential to develop "networks" 
among creative workers. I think that people in this area still do not know one another 
much. The city government provides several events such as the "Kannai Open" to 




I think that spontaneous and voluntary participation is more necessary. What is ideal 
is developing voluntary networks with each other to develop a sense of "community". 
Until now, the city government focused only on providing a "place" like the Creative 
Core Area and creating "events" like the Yokohama Triennale; so in the future, it is 
necessary to make more opportunities to let creators develop networks one another .... 
I think that just keeping worrying about the future and precarious situations is not 
helpful at all. If people have more of these kinds of networks based on voluntary 
participation, I think that we might turn "anxiety" into the "expectation" that I can do 
something with these people whom I can trust. (Personal interview with Yoshiyuki 
(CW3), a male graphic designer, 10 years experience who moved into Yokohama in 
2008) 
 
I think that we do not need to be overly connected to each other. In my opinion, ideal 
connection is based on "autonomy", so I think that the ideal situation would be as "if 
there is something that people want to join, they can naturally join" and "if they don't 
want to join, they can leave freely". Actually I used to try to intentionally introduce 
people to each other in the Koganecho area (to help them settle down the area), but 
you know, people want to go is to go anyway. So I think that the ideal relationship is 
to naturally gather with one another when people have certain mutual interests or 
concerns. (Personal interview with Erika (CW7), a female painter, 15 years of 
experience who moved into Yokohama in 2005)  
 
 Here, both Kanda (CW3) and Erika (CW7) perceive that they need to be connected to 
one another and build some kind of “solidarity” to better cope with their precarious working 
and living conditions and reduce their anxiety for the future.  From their perspectives, ideal 
forms of connection should be based on voluntary participation; moreover, a sense of 
autonomy should be guaranteed for anyone in any situation. Furthermore, one of the most 
ideal forms of solidarity that they imagine is the development of more personal networks 
based on “active trust” and “mutual interests” among the creative workers in the Creative 
Core Area. By considering these worker’s ideas seriously, it becomes necessary to ask 
questions like these: can this idea of developing networks based on trust and autonomy be 
read as what Banks (2000) calls “the articulation of moral-political and social values in the 




resist the “systemic risk” of an industry downturn as argued by Neff? More importantly, is 
this idea of solidarity and collectivity based on trust and autonomy parallel to what other 
studies view: “artists and other cultural workers as the protagonists of struggle against 
exploitation and inequality in the neoliberal era” (de Peuter, 2014a, p 274). However, what I 
found in Yokohama’s Creative Core Area is that this idea of developing personal networks 
based on trust and autonomy continues to be only a “moral” and “ethical” value by not 
putting forth a political move to oppose and counter precarious working and living conditions. 
This phenomenon became clear when I asked my respondents about the idea of “labor” and 
“union”.  
6.6 “Network is fine but no union!” 
 In the previous chapter, I explained that the differences in translating creative city 
policy between Yokohama and Seoul can be conceptualized in terms of Yokohama’s “co-
existing” model in contrast with Seoul’s “antagonistic” model in terms of the relationship 
among state, capital, and civil society surrounding the creative city policy. Because of 
Seoul’s dynamic conflicts regarding this policy, it was not easy to even obtain an interview 
with SMG’s state officials when I was conducting my fieldwork in Seoul. These government 
officials worried about expressing their opinions, and many of them refused to participate in 
an interview about the city’s creative city policy because it was too “sensitive” and “political” 
an issue for them. However, when I started my fieldwork in Yokohama, I found that this 
city’s atmosphere was dramatically different from that of its counterpart. Almost everyone 
related to the creative city policy, regardless of state officials, NPOs, and creators, and thus 




"inclusiveness" and "acceptance" may be attributed to one of the unconsciousness reasons 
that led me to start conceptualizing Yokohama’s creative city policy as a model for the 
images of “co-existing” and “harmony”.  Nonetheless, there was one significant moment that 
made me reconsider Yokohama’s “co-existing” model not in a sense of an “alternative” but 
rather as a sense of “limitation”; moreover, this sense of “limitation” is directly related to 
people’s responses and opinions to the words “labor” and “union”.  
It was during the time when I did the participant observation at the Creative City 
School in Bank ART 1929. Because I arrived there a bit early that afternoon, I was reading 
some of my previous interview transcripts in the café there. At that time, one of my key 
informants, who was working at Bank ART 1929 introduced me to many important state 
officials and creative workers in the area. Because he was very much interested in my 
research, he asked me about the study’s progress; naturally we had chatted about my research. 
At that time, because I was doing a series of interviews with creative workers in order to 
listen their labor conditions and opinions about the city’s creative city policy, I asked him 
about what he thought about the working and living conditions of creative workers in the 
Creative Core Area. Surprisingly, he very bluntly asked me why I am interested in “labor” 
kinds of questions. I told him if the city’s creative city policy really wanted to “revitalize” the 
area, I thought that the creative workers’ living and working conditions should be improving 
as well. I meant that these conditions should be one of the key indicators of the sustainability 
of the creative city policy even though they had been consistently overlooked in research on 





They handle their lives by their own ways. We did not recruit artists and creators here 
for doing “seikatuhogo” (生活保護). We contact them to make the town “genkini” 
(元気に). You should think about it more seriously. (Personal conversation with 
informant at Bank ART 1929)   
 
“Seikatuhogo” means “livelihood protection or social security assistance”; it is 
generally given as social welfare assistance for people who are below the poverty line in 
Japan. In addition, “genkini” means “healthy” or “vital”. I was lost for words by his angry 
reaction and did not want to upset him more. So I did not react to him, but started to think 
about questions like: How can insecure workers make the town “vital” and “healthy” without 
changing and improving their precarious working and living conditions? Furthermore, why 
does this NPO officer react so sensitively to words like “labor conditions” or "union"?  
Some recent research reports that there have been uprisings by collective movements 
of creative workers to oppose precarity and flexploitation by means of anti-corporate 
sentiment and entrepreneurial forms of self-understanding (de Pueter 2014a, 2014b; Murgia, 
2014; Neilson & Cote, 2014). These studies report that there are emerging new forms of 
organizational models such as the Fashion Industry Frictions in New York, independent 
worker initiatives such as the Freelancer Unions in New York, and politicized co-working 
spaces such as the “Brooklyn Creative League”. Along this line of examples, I talked with 
my interviewees about what they think about these types of more “politicized” models of 
collectivity and solidarity to cope with their precarious working and living conditions. They 
commonly reacted that the responsibility of such conditions among creative workers lies with 
the workers themselves. Many of them believe that their precarious working and living 




conditions before they decided to enter these industries, they are the ones who are responsible 
for their own choices. As Nishio (CW2), who worked as an architect explained:,  
In Japan, there are no creators or artists who are actually “starving” by living and 
working as creators or artists. If some artists or creators are in serious economic 
straits, they can find other part-time jobs in order to take care of their own living. You 
know, if you work in even convenient stores full-time, you can manage your own 
living in Japan; so none of these creative workers choose only this work for managing 
their own livings. Therefore, the decision to continue or quit this work is based on 
their own responsibility. (Personal interview with Nishio (CW2), a male architect 
participated in Yokohama's creative city policy since 2006)  
 
Here, personal responsibility was key understanding the problem. From this "logic", 
the solution for changing this circumstance can be perceived as not based on broad structural 
or social action, but rather on personal action. Similarly, most who eagerly proposed to 
develop “networks” based on trust and autonomy demonstrated pessimistic views or 
questions about the efficacy of “union” type models. Kanda and Erika, who strongly 
proposed the necessity for building networks for creative workers, conversely expressed their 
negative viewpoints about the model of unions:   
Hmm … Unions for artists and creators? ... I don’t think that is very useful. When I 
used to work in the publishing company, there was a union. There, I found, if you 
enter that type of organization, you also need to give up some sort of autonomy and 
freedom. I felt that the union seemed “closed” or was associated with “stiff” types of 
networks. I don’t think that the state or the city can change our current working 
conditions (even though we make a union and ask them to provide more organization 
and industrial support). I believe that if we can make more “soft” type of networks 
(based on autonomy and trust) and if we can include various different types of 
occupations such as lawyers or social workers, people [creative workers] naturally 
share their problems with these people. In that situation, we might make our own 
solutions. Anyway, in my viewpoint, a union seems “rigid” and “closed”. (Personal 
interview with Kanda (CW3), a male graphic designer with 10 years experience, 
moved to Yokohama in 2008) 
 
 I don’t agree with the idea of making some kind of union for artists and creators in the 




What we need is a network based on autonomy. I felt that idea of union is very much 
compulsory … There were some people I met in several creative city projects really 
who kept blaming and asking the city for more support such as rent and utility fees for 
the co-working space. I thought that those people consider the city support to be like 
“seikatuhobo”. I think that is not correct. If you start depending on the city’s support, 
you might not be able to be independent yourself …” (Personal interview with Erika 
(CW7), a female painter with 15 years experience, moved to Yokohama in 2005).  
 
Both of these respondents reveal that they do not prefer more “social” models like 
unions. One of the reasons is that they think that the idea of a union model represents some 
kind of closed, rigid and compulsory network that differs from what they believe an ideal 
network should be, based on trust and autonomy. The more important reason why they do not 
support the idea of unions, however, is that a union-type solution might more strongly and 
publicly argue for their workplace rights, entitlements or responsibilities than would a 
personal network-typed solution, which means that union-type model might entail the 
possibility of creating "conflict" or even "opposition" to the city government. What I found 
that my interviewees really want to avoid is any kind of “conflict” and “counter-arguing” 
over the existing creative city policy given by the YMG. One interviewee, Mori, replied to 
my explanation of union-type movements,  
It sounds like an interesting idea. I think that it will be great that we have some kind 
of place that we can share our concerns and distresses. However, if that group or 
organization is too much focusing only on the negative side (of our works such as 
anxiety and harsh labor conditions), I don’t think that I want to join. I think that it 
should be based more on “positive thinking”. (Personal interview with Mori (CW6), a 
female artist with 30 years experience) 
   
Actually, she was the only respondent who showed some interest in the idea of a union-
type model for artists and creators. Nevertheless, when she cautiously framed her opinions 




‘spirit’ of criticizing or opposing the existing system. In this sense, her views suggest that the 
ideal model of solidarity that is based on developing "network" is working solely in the realm 
of a "moral" and "ethical” sense of trust and autonomy rather than in a political sense that 
includes the actions and sentiments of opposition, resistance, and sometimes the creation of 
“conflict” with the existing system. In other words, a moral and ethical worker who connects 
with others based on trust and autonomy is directly related to a “volunteer subject” who 
supports solely the current system.  
6.7 Moral but volunteer subjectivity and the order of the creative city Yokohama 
Ogawa’s ethnographic research that is based on NPO movements from the 1990s 
onward argues that Japan’s social movement guided by the emergence of NPOs has certain 
limitations in terms of its lack of a “movement” spirit. He found that Japanese NPOs 
functioned primarily to pursue outsourced tasks from the state without opposing or 
countering the current system; thus he argues that these NPOs “invited by the state” function 
like arms of the state and therefore are prone to volunteer subjectivity in that they are 
“praised only for maintaining and strengthening the existing society" and for what is "done 
for the state" (Ogawa, 2004: 89).  
 This volunteer subjectivity is a preferred subjectivity in Yokohama’s creative city 
policy, as demonstrated by the various events and projects represented by the Yokohama 
Triennale. When the YMG “recruited” creative workers to revitalize the Kannai area and to 
change the image of the Koganecho area (i.e., Yokohama’s old red-light area), it became 
evident that a preferred subjectivity is a volunteer subject who can actively understand and 




this volunteer subjectivity tends to be connected to the moral and ethical sensitivity and 
actions of its creative workers. This subjectivity is shown when creative workers prefer to 
develop personal networks based on a moral sense of “trust” and “autonomy” rather than to 
build a union-like, more politicized organization; as a result, some other moral and ethical 
values – such as “changing the image of the town” or “helping people to fall in love with 
their communities” – also become some of the important motivations to participate and retain 
their work and lives in Yokohama. Erika, a female painter with 15 years experience and had 
moved into Yokohama in 2005, preferred to develop her network based on autonomy as an 
ideal type of solidarity; she also said that the reason why she continued to stay and work in 
Yokohama relates to her sense of ethical commitment and achievement in spite of harsh 
working and living conditions: 
 One of the reasons why I want to stay in the Koganecho area is that I feel my artistic 
activities help the town and people here. You know, this area [the Koganecho area] 
used to be an insecure and dangerous red-light town, full of prostitutes and gangs. 
However, after the creative city policy project started, children and their parents come 
here to see paintings and other cultural activities. What I want is to make people like 
their town and have a sense of a pride about their town. I think that art and my work 
can play some kind of role to support that ... Art can make people like their town and 
give them a sense of pride about their town … In that sense, I think that I feel a sense 
of achievement that my work here helps them and keeps supporting them. (Personal 
interview with Erika (CW7), a female painter moved to Yokohama since 2005)  
  
 This creative worker thus expresses that she likes her work because it can contribute 
to change the image of the town and help people have a sense of pride about where they live. 
Here, her ethical and moral commitment and achievement became an important reason to 
continue her work in Yokohama. However, her moral and ethical commitment demonstrated 
by her desire to "change the image of the town" is exactly the same task and role as what the 




workers when they "invited" them to Yokohama is solely “ethical and moral actions” by 
those who spontaneously reside in the town, change its image, and vitalize the community 
rather than “political actions” that take the form of opposing and resisting their current 
precarious working and living conditions. In turn, creative workers like her with a strong 
moral commitment to support local community appear to sincerely follow this vision of the 
YMG.  
 In Yokohama's "co-existing" model of the creative city, the role of the creative 
worker is thus allocated solely within moral and ethical ways of doing and being that are 
preferred by the YMG. This co-existing model of the creative city favors a "harmonious" 
relationship among the state, capital, citizens and creative workers. The state takes its role as 
a primal "planner" which is in charge of what Hill (2007) points out is Japan's high level of 
"planning"; consequentially, the place of the creative workers – again based on their ethical 
and moral commitment – lies mainly in supporting the state's plan. In other words, in keeping 
with the argument of my interviewee from Bank ART 1929: “we did not recruit artists and 
creators here for doing “seikatuhogo (生活保護). We call them to make the town “genkini 
(元気に)”.  The YMG’s mandate to creative workers thereby is limited to “revitalizing” and 
“changing” the image of the city based on their moral and ethical involvement. The creative 
workers in the Kannai area tend to "identify" their roles just as the YMG planned and 
requested in spite of their sense of precarity in their working and living conditions. Of course, 
moral sensitivity and ethical actions are "important" and "precious". However, they are not 
enough when they hinge on a volunteer subject who is conforming only to the given systems 




by the state” tend to follow this preferred volunteer subjectivity; more importantly, their 
moral and ethical sentiments and actions take on the tremendous role of retaining their 
volunteer subjectivity yet limiting the development of a political subject who can resist given 
precarious working conditions and build a collective solidarity. In doing so, the creative 
worker's subjectivity retreats to a moral subject solely rather than toward a political one.  
 Several scholars who have shed light on the ethical and moral dimensions of creative 
work strive to find certain "emancipatory purposes" among creative workers (e.g., Banks, 
2006; Lee, 2012). They believe that creative workers are not only "governmental subjects" in 
the process of subjection and subjugation under the flexpolitation production regime but also 
moral and self-reflexive subjects who work midst "mixed opportunities" for emancipating 
themselves through their works. However, my findings in Yokohama suggest that when 
moral subjects only support the existing political economic system and order, emancipation 
from their precarious living and work conditions becomes dubious. For this reason, what is 
necessary in a "co-existing" model of creative city Yokohama is not the "right" or "high" 
level of the well-planned "policy" from the state which assigns, allocates, or distributes the 
right roles of creative workers, but rather the possibility of  "politics" in which creative 
workers claim the fundamental assertion of workplace rights, entitlements and 
responsibilities.  
 In the next chapter, I turn to the context of creative workers’ experiences in Seoul. 
Here, a more antagonistic model of the creative city shows somewhat different and 
contrasting directions in terms of its possibility of a more politicized subjectivity. In the next 




their Yokohama counterparts and explore how creative workers in Seoul strive to resist the 













WORKING AND LIVING AS "PRECARIAT" CREATIVE WORKERS IN 
CONFLICTING CREATIVE CITY SEOUL  
7.1 Introduction 
 This chapter turns to the experiences and voices of creative workers in Seoul in 
parallel to their counterparts in Yokohama. Similar to Yokohama’s, the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government (below SMG)’s creative city policy reflects the vision that creative industries 
have a great potential for regenerating economy and providing abundant employment 
specifically by focusing on the design industry. As shown in previous chapters, the SMG not 
only has constructed urban mega landmarks such as the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park 
but also has held numerous urban mega events including Seoul Design Olympiads. The 
SMG’s ‘creative’ vision clearly represents how it has viewed creative workers as “role model 
subjects” who are important ‘human capital’ not only to regenerate the city’s economy but 
also to enhance overall national economic development.  
As in the case of Yokohama, there has been less attention placed on how these “role 
model workers” actually live and work in the “creative city” of Seoul. While there are 
similarities in the lived experiences of workers in both Yokohama and Seoul this chapter 
aims to show how creative workers in Seoul actually experience, evaluate, participate, 
negotiate and even resist the given creative city policy in their everyday lives and work. 
Furthermore, in contrast with its portrait of Yokohama’s “moral and ethical volunteer 




to resist and oppose not only their given creative city policy but also their precarious working 
and living conditions. I locate the specific subjectivities of the creative workers’ interviewed 
in Seoul within the growing scholarship on the “precariat” in Europe and North America (e.g, 
Murgia, 2014; Neilson and Cote, 2014; de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Lorey 2014, 2015). 
Based on in-depth interviews, participant observations, and archival research, I show that 
there are various different types of resistance arrangements in Seoul such as Artists Social 
Unions. Furthermore, this research – based on Jacque Ranciere’s concept of “political 
subjectivation” – examines how creative workers through solidarity resist and oppose their 
precarious working and living conditions.  
7.2 Creative Worker as the Protagonist of the Precariat Movement   
 As I shown in the previous chapter, there is growing research that strives to fully 
comprehend subjective responses to creative work in order to overcome the post-Foucaultian 
approaches that focus mainly on the doctrine of “passion for creativity”, “self-enterprise”, 
“self-exploration” and “individualization”. Along these lines, Banks (2006) and Lee (2012) 
have explored the moral and ethical dimensions of creative workers in terms of such concepts 
as  “self-reflection”, “trust” and “ethical work”. However, different from this moral and 
ethical direction, other scholars whose research focuses on the growing global precariat 
movements attempt to show that the leading mechanisms of post-Fordist exploitation – such 
as “flexploitation”, “individualization” and “precarisation” – have not prevented “labour’s 
capacity to act collectively” (de Peuter, 2014b). These studies not only attempt to fully 
"understand” the labor subjectivities of creative workers but further explore how creative 




and oppose to their given precarious working and living conditions (e.g, Murgia, 2014; 
Neilson & Cote, 2014; de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Lorey 2014, 2015). 
To respond to questions like “how can [we] create solidarity in conditions of 
precariousness?” (Berardi, 2011), a series of research conducted by de Pueter (2011, 2014a, 
2014b) found that various creative workers’ collective movements, mostly based in North 
America and Europe, start “recomposing” themselves with “autonomous communication” 
toward solidarity across difference, in a “collective organization” based on experimental 
structures, and around “policy proposals” and “institutional innovations” for coping with 
their precarious working conditions (de Peuter, 2011: 421-22). In particular, de Peuter (2014b) 
introduces numerous significant creative workers’ organizations and groups such as New 
York’s Freelancer Union, W.A.G.E (Working Artists and the Greater Economy), Arts & 
Labor, and Italy’s creative workers in Italian Occupy Movements. de Pueter (2014b) reports 
three different but common strategies: 1) “aggregation” in which creative workers solidify 
based not on their occupations – which are conventional sources of labor solidarity – but 
rather on their employment status; 2) “compensation” in which creative workers bond with 
one another based on their shared sources of agitation, such as “unpaid work”; and finally 3) 
“occupation” in which creative workers actually become a part of more broad social 
movements such as Occupy movements (de Pueter, 2014b). Based on the evidences of these 
collective movements of creative workers, he argues that creative workers are not only 
“model workers” for a post-Fordist economy but are also among “the protagonists of struggle 
against exploitation and inequality in the neoliberal era” (de Pueter, 2014b).  
de Peuter’s studies (de Peuter, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) are meaningful in that they 




labor subjectivities of cultural works. de Peuter (2014b) draws his examples from various 
different workers' organizations and movements such as the Freelancer Union and Working 
Artists and the Greater Economy(W.A.G.E) in New York City, Canadian Intern Association 
and Canadian Artists Representation in Toronto, and Creative workers' activities in Italian 
Occupy movement in Milan. By introducing these various examples, de Peuter's works 
(2014b) on the precariat are more interested in describing the emergence of these movements, 
so that sometimes it seems unclear how creative workers’ organization solidify themselves, 
via what routes, under what circumstances, and by what processes. In this regard, his work 
somewhat under-explores questions like: by or under what “principles” can certain groups of 
creative workers become “political subjects” and are their any shared ways that allow 
creative workers to overcome the doctrine of “creativity” and “individualization”? More 
importantly, is it possible to find any “theoretical” resources that allow us to move past the 
post-Foucaultian approach so as to rightly capture creative workers’ solidarity through these 
various creative workers’ movements?  
Regarding these questions, this chapter strives to explain creative workers' 
subjectivities by using Jacque Ranciere’s concept of “political subjectivation” (1992) in order 
to more effectively theorize how creative workers can not only become moral and ethical 
subjects but also empower themselves as “political subjects” who strategically disavow their 
given self-identities as “individualized creators”. Furthermore, this approach will examine 
how these creative workers recall the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor” to resist and 
oppose their given precarious working and living conditions. Here, my intention is not to 
refute the current researches on global precariat movement but to add theoretical insights to 




with Yokohama’s “co-existing” model of post-developmentalism that focuses on the 
promotion of “moral and ethical volunteer subjects”, this chapter shows how Korea’s 
“conflicting” model of post-developmentalism actually contains and fosters two different and 
contrasting sets of labor subjectivities: the SMG and capitals that promote “a conformist self-
development creator” on the one hand and the creative workers who are empowered “artist 
labor” on the other.   
7.3 Creative City Policy about which creative workers disagree: creative workers speak 
out! 
When I began my field research in Korea in June 2012, the former mayor of Seoul, 
Se-hoon Oh – who had initially proposed the creative city policy called “Design Seoul” –had 
recently resigned over a failed referendum for “free lunch plan for schools”. As a member of 
Korea’s conservative party (the Saenuri party), he was criticized by both opposition parties – 
the Korean Democratic party and the Korean labor party – as well as by various civil society 
activists, journalists and academics (e.g. Im 2009). As discussed in Chapter 1, the criticism of 
the Design Seoul policy converged, based on two different opinions. Firstly, there was the 
critical view against the “top-down elite-driven urban and design policy”, which is 
commonly considered as one of the problems caused by the developmental state. A series of 
news articles reported the problem of homogenization of urban design and “anti-democratic” 
policy-making and implementation processes (e.g., Im, 2009). For example, the Design Seoul 
Street Project, regulation of the size and the font of street shops’ signboards, was one of the 
repeated points of contention. There was also opposition more broadly to the gentrification of 




as one among many broad symptoms of neoliberal urban reform by critics like Jamie Peck 
and David Harvey. The DDP construction project became a symbol of neoliberal 
development in Seoul.  
As I shown in Chapter 3, reflecting upon such critical views from various citizens, 
activists and academics, the new mayor, Won-soon Park, made an election pledge to stop 
top-down elite-driven urban and design policy and to listen to what citizens really wanted 
from the creative city policy. When I started my fieldwork in Seoul, I was able to locate 
numerous citizen workshops held by the SMG; and found there that the former mayor’s 
creative city policy faced broad public criticism and opposition. For example, when the Seoul 
Design Foundation opened the Facebook page titled “What can design do for Seoul?” in 
2012, there were immediately an array of posts expressing antipathy and criticism toward the 
past mayor’s creative city policy42. This context of opposition to the city government policy 
meant while many state officials were hesitant to talk to me given that the creative city policy 
had become too ‘sensitive’ and ‘political’, designers, architects, and academics in design-
related fields as well as with social and environmental activists were eager to discuss their 
opinions and ideas with me.  
My conversations with two critics of the Seoul Creative City policy, both of whom 
were directly involved in the process initially, are indicative of the more antagonistic 
approach. First, Jungbong (CW13), a university professor of design who was initially called 
in as an expert lamented: 
																																								 																					
42 Interestingly, even though the Facebook club was initially opened for designers by the 
Seoul Design Foundation, the website was filled not only with designers but also with 
various types of “creators” including architects, painters, and musicians who shared their 





I think what Sehoon Oh [the past mayor] did with design is “Design politics”. He 
simply used “design” for his own political ostentation. There was no such long-term 
plan based on a deeper understanding and reflection, including questions like “why 
design is important for whom and for what?” Politicians and state officials just 
wanted to make something easily noticeable and superficial in an extremely short 
time span. In this process, citizens’ opinions were completely neglected … and some 
of designers frivolously participated in that policy … Those designers worked not for 
citizens but for the mayor and capital… Look at the examples like the DDP and the 
Design Street project. These examples reveal clearly how much they just want to 
show something “big” and “luxurious”. I think that the Design Seoul policy was such 
a flimsy way to exploit “design”.  (Personal interview with Jungbong (CW13), a 
design professor who participated in one of the Design Seoul projects) 
  
 Similarly, Dongil (CW11), an architect, who was also involved in several creative 
city projects, accounts for his disappointment with the past mayor’s creative city policy:  
I think that design doesn’t simply mean that ‘making something physically beautiful’ 
or ‘changing something superficially pretty’. It should touch a deeper level of social 
and cultural dimension. However, the past mayor’s policy simply tried to make 
something physically and superficially. So some of my colleagues who are in 
architecture and construction fields said that the policy [past mayor’s Design Seoul] is 
not ‘design policy’ but ‘construction policy’… In architecture works, you know, you 
can make ten different buildings by spending one million dollars, but, at the same 
time, you can make only one building by spending same one million dollars. The past 
mayor just wanted to put a lot of money into one big project to build something 
“fancy” like the DDP … (Personal interview with Doingil (CW11), a male architect 
who participated in one of the Design Seoul projects) 
  
 Such overt criticism was unexpected given that both respondents had been involved 
in some of the creative city projects in the past mayor’s city government. For the academic 
expert in design, his strong sense of disappointment was based on his experience witnessing 
what he considered an “anti-democratic” process that neglected of citizens’ voices. Jungbong 
actually had pledged that he would not participate in any activities promoted by the SMG and 
the Seoul Design Foundation (below SDF) any more in the future. He somewhat “carefully” 




workshops – was that the mayor and the chairman of the Board of the SDF were new, and he 
strongly supported the current mayor’s more citizen-oriented policy. Dongil (CW11), the 
architect above,  also revealed that he strongly supported the current mayor’s citizen-friendly 
direction, and that he spent much time in sharing his ideas about the creative city policy with 
other Facebook club members. In my 7 months in Seoul, I did in-depth interviews with total 
20 of designers, architects, activists, painters and musicians—all of whom voiced strong 
oppositions to the past mayor’s creative city policy43.  
 Given the broad criticism of the former mayor’s “mega” constructions and events, the 
SMG did not propose any new large-scale policy plans furthering creative city policy. In 
2012, the opening of the DDP was delayed to modify its usage toward a more “citizen-
friendly” direction, and the Seoul Design Olympiad was not going to be held any more. 
However, the SMG and the new mayor himself did not actively oppose the economic 
potential of the creative economy and creative industries. Rather, as shown in his election 
campaigns, the mayor often argued that creative industries including media, design, art and 
crafts were an important and crucial sector to regenerate the city’s economy and provide 
abundant employment (e.g., Park, 2014). In fact, in 2015 mayor Won-soon Park proposed a 
long-term vision of Seoul in the form of the "2030 Seoul Plan", which includes his version of 
"Seoul's Creative Economy" focusing on the development and investment of "digital and 
mobile convergence industry", "cultural content industry" and "silver industries" (SMG, 
2014). Under this plan, he stresses that human capital is the core of creative economy, and 
Seoul will be home to 100,000 creative workers in his second administration that goes until 
2017 (Park, 2014).  
																																								 																					




 In practice, it seems that the current mayor disagreed only with the methods of the 
past mayor’s “top-down” creative city policy as opposed to its underlying objectives. The 
new administration continued the emphasis on the “human capital”-driven policy projects 
promoted by the SDF and the SMG such as the various design-related educational programs, 
workshops for students and practitioners, mentoring programs for future employers and 
employees, and social enterprise incubation projects. In this sense, despite a more critical 
overall context of debate about the merits of the creative city policy, the question of the role 
of creative workers was never seriously touched upon, even under the “citizen-friendly” 
current mayor’s regime. Keeping this in mind, I approached creative workers in Seoul with 
the question as to what they think about this “rosy” discourse about the relationship between 
creative industry and economic development and employment. And more importantly, I 
asked them how they evaluated their everyday working and living conditions.   
7.4 Creative Industry as "Red Ocean Industry" and Deeply Fractured Labor Markets 
in Korea’s Creative Economy 
I begin my view of experiences of workers in Seoul’s creative economy by drawing 
from a compelling interview with Bora (CW1), a professional designer with 20 years of 
experience, which included working in the industry who now taught at a design school. In 
addressing a question about the current conditions, Bora (CW1) stated: 
 
Interviewee (Bora): “How about the working conditions and the labor market 
conditions for designers in Korea?” (A designer with 20 years experience and a 
current university professor in a design-related department) 
 
I : “Yes, could you tell me what you know about the current working conditions of 
designers and the labor market situation in general? I mean, you have worked as a 




think that you might have a great sense of the working conditions and the job market 
situation in the design industry.”  
 
Interviewee (Bora): “… I can say that it is absolutely tragic, and it will not be 
changed at all in the near future …The biggest reason is that we are graduating too 
many designers every single year. Do you know how many new design students 
graduate annually? 25,000 students per year now. The number is bigger than that of 
other developed countries like the U.S., Japan, etc. In this small country, we are just 
churning out too many designers, so the labor market is too competitive. Why does 
this thing happen? Because we have too many universities with design-related 
majors. So it is absolutely ill-structured….. Even though I am a university professor 
in a design department, the only solution that I can think for now is to reduce the 
number of these design-related educational institutions (such as universities and 
professional colleges), which is very difficult to do...”  
  
Bora (CW1)’s testimony is insightful because she has had a lengthy career path as 
both a designer and an educator in the design field. She graduated from one of the most 
prestigious design schools in Korea and worked in various companies from IT venture 
companies to big chaebol companies such as Samsung. Through her long career, she has 
found that the labor market situation has dramatically changed from around the 2000s 
onward. When she started her career at the beginning of the 1990s, the industry was still 
expanding; then she said that it was not so difficult to find a good job. Her major was IT-
related design, which was directly connected to the global IT booms from the 1990s onward; 
thus she said that many of her colleagues generally could “settle down” well within the 
industry. However, the more the universities launched design-related departments, the more 
the job market became glutted and competitive. For now, she said that the design industry is 
a typical example of a “red ocean industry” characterized by “excessive competition”; thus it 
is extremely difficult to find good jobs which provide stable employment, decent salaries and 




 According to the 2014 Korea Design Statistical Data44, only 50 percent of college 
graduates in design-related majors obtained a job in the industry. Also, within the total 
number of 220,000 employed designers, almost 93 percent of workers are hired in small and 
medium-sized enterprises whose average capital is below 300,000 U.S dollars; therefore the 
average number of workers per company is 4. At the same time, as Bora recounted, 
according to the government sources, from 1999 to 2014, the number of art and design-
related departments in universities and junior colleges shows a sharp increase over a span of 
fifteen years from 415 in 1999 to 804 in 2014 in universities and from 578 to 875 in junior 
colleges45. Parallel to this trend, the number of students in art/design-related departments, 
who comprise the future workers in the design industry, also has grown by nearly 60,000 in 
this period.46 In fact, the trend towards the establishment of art/design-related academic 
institutions, which began after the 1990s, has become one of the major structural factors for 
the oversupply of labor in the design industry.   
 In the design industry, working conditions are represented by “low income”, “long 
working hours” and “low welfare benefits”. Most of my interviewees agreed that the 
“conventional” starting annual salary among this 93 percent of the small and medium-sized 
companies is generally from 15,000 to 18,000 U.S. dollars, which results in their barely able 
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to manage their lives in Seoul47. However, even for the 7 percent of lucky people who start 
their jobs in large companies such as Samsung, LG or Naver (one of the largest IT companies 
in Korea), it is difficult to retain their jobs when they reach 40 years of age because of 
excessive competition. As Bora (CW1), said when she used to work in one of Samsung’s 
branch companies, there were about 35 designers in her department. However, she told me 
that only one person who started with her is still working there today. She explained that 
because not many designers can be promoted to the position of executive board member due 
to a “ceiling effect”, when they reach their 40s, they have very limited future options: 
becoming a freelancer designer, starting their own design business, or quitting their job. 
Some of the lucky few may be able to find a job in academia as she did. The promise of 
freelance work or starting one’s own design firm similarly risky ventures given the excessive 
competition in the industry.   
 Another female interviewee, Manok (CW12), who has worked as an industrial 
designer for 10 years, similarly blamed the conditions within the Korean design industry:  
Living as a designer in Seoul? Yes, it is very difficult. First of all, there are too many 
designers in this small country. Because there are too many designers and too many 
design firms, there is no way to increase the rewards of our work … I think that our 
educational system is completely wrong. It says only good things about design and art 
as a fancy creative employment opportunity … As you know, it is actually very 
expensive to become a designer. Tuition at design schools is generally much more 
expensive than at ordinary schools. And you know, for now, many young people go 
abroad such as to the U.S. and U.K. to study design. In this case, the money students 
have to pay is way well beyond the general population’s imagination. In spite of these 
expensive costs, when design graduates come back to Korea, what is waiting for them 
is excessive competition and low income/hard working conditions. I think that in 
																																								 																					
47 According to 2013 Seoul Welfare Survey (SMG, 2013c), the basic living cost per 
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poverty line estimation in Korea is 1,218,873(about 1200 US dollar) per household(3 




some sense this is an almost crazy situation … (Personal interview with Manok 
(CW12), a female designer with 10 years experiences) 
 
Manok (CW12) studied at one of the renowned design schools in the United States, 
but when she returned to Korea she found that working conditions and the job market 
situation were completely different from what she originally anticipated. She also agreed that 
the educational system and labor market are completely ill-structured, and the oversupply of 
labor will be a chronic problem for the working conditions of designers. Because of this 
harsh competition, she revealed that she was thinking of “leaving Korea” to find better 
working conditions abroad. More graphically, one designer, named Sunwoo, even expressed 
the living and working situation of designers in Korea as nearing “slave-like” conditions: 
I think that living and working as a designer in Korea is like a “slave in capitalist 
system”. When I used to work at a small design agency, I designed a lot of product 
packages such as for beverages. Do you know generally how many days they [the 
client company] give us to design their product packages?  Mostly only two or three 
days! You have to prepare generally five or six different tentative designs for them to 
choose from within only two or three days. So I think that you can imagine how hard 
we work generally. It is like a slave … If you can enter big companies such as 
Samsung or LG, you can get at least some economic rewards for your hard work, but 
the work intensity is even higher in those companies. Or, if you work in general small 
and medium sized design firms in Seoul, they do not even provide much economic 
rewards for your hard work. Only your own small self-satisfaction for your work, 
such as feeling like “yes, I did something creative” is all that you can get from your 
work … I don’t understand how our government keeps arguing that a designer is a 
promising job for the future … How does this small country create more designers 
than does the U.S. annually?  Because there are too many designers, capitals can buy 
us [designers’ labor] just too cheaply. (Personal interview with Sunwoo (CW16), a 
male designer with 10 years experience) 
 
  As shown in both statistical industry data and my in-depth interviews with designers, 
working and living conditions in the design industry are extremely unstable and harsh. 
Furthermore, one of the important findings which I uncovered through this series of 




painters is that these working and living conditions are not only the problem of designers: 
there are structural commonalities in working conditions and shared experiences of labor 
motivation between design workers and other creative workers such as those in media 
production that I researched in my previous project about the independent production 
workers in Korea’s broadcasting industry (Kim, 2013). In my previous work, I found that the 
increasingly flexible production system exacerbates labor precariousness within the Korean 
broadcasting industry. Similar to the design industry, this labor precariousness is ignited by 
the overflow of young labor due to the expansion of media and journalism departments in 
both universities and junior colleges. Also, under their harsh working and living conditions, 
only a small number of workers can retain their jobs as "passionate creators" and "liberal 
freelancers"; most of them leave the industry when they reached their 40s. Along these lines, 
governmental reports reveal that there is a chronic oversupply of labor in Korea's cultural 
industry (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2012). One report clearly shows that the 
majority of creative workers earn even less than 1,000 U.S. dollars per month including in 
literature (91.5% of sampled workers), fine arts (79% of sampled workers), photography (79% 
of sampled workers), theater production (74% of sampled workers), movies (71% of sampled 
workers), Korean folk music (67% of sampled workers), dance (64% of sampled workers), 
classical music (60% of sampled workers), popular arts (43.5% of sampled workers) and 
architecture (34% of sampled workers)48 (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2012). 
Therefore, it can be seen that precarious working and living conditions are a prevalent 
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phenomenon in Korea's creative economy, containing structural commonalities and shared 
experiences across a variety of occupations.  
 In spite of these structural constraints and industrial problems in Korea’s creative 
industries, there is continuous governmental promotion of creative economy as an evolving 
economic sector. Yet at the same time, it is difficult to identify governmental efforts to solve 
the chronic labor problems in these creative industries. In general, the national creative 
industry policy focuses primarily on the promotion of "industry," while efforts to capture the 
characteristics of creative industry from the viewpoint of "labor" are neglected. Within this 
broad societal atmosphere when I was conducting my fieldwork in Seoul, one of the 
distinctive policy projects under the new mayor was to hold numerous mentoring and 
educational programs for future workers and to promote social enterprise and venture 
enterprise for young workers. I have participated in several of these programs and have met 
some future workers and mentors. In the next section, I look more closely at the 
characteristics of these educational programs. 
7.5 Promoting a “Conformist Self-Development Creator” through the Creative City 
Policy 
The Seoul Design Foundation (SDF), one of the major administrative organizations in 
charge of Seoul’s creative city policy, has its three satellites offices called “Seoul Design 
Support Centers” in Guro, Mapo and Gangnam area near its main office located in the 
Dongdaemun area. The main task of these branch offices is to hold numerous educational and 
mentoring programs for the future design workforce and the current practitioners. In keeping 




university students as well as professional development programs for current designers 
jointly held by the SMG and other design companies. One of the mentoring programs, in 
which I participated during July 2012 called the “Design Job Searching Clinic”, was held in 
Mapo-gu City Hall and was jointly sponsored by the SMG, SDF and two online job-
searching companies (Designer Jobs and Media Jobs). The clinic lasted about two hours, and 
the venue was totally packed with hundreds of university and college students who were 
eager to gain any kind of information about the designers’ job market from “experts” in the 
field.  
The “Clinic” consisted of three presentations and a Q&A session from two current 
designers who were working in one of the Korean chaebol companies, “LG”, and from one 
student who is famous for his participation in several chaebol company- sponsored PR 
activities and internships. As I mentioned before, it is extremely difficult to enter a Korean 
chaebol company as a designer due to the excessive competition; therefore these two current 
designers’ presentations focused on: 1) how graduates could enter these prestigious 
companies in terms of what kinds of routes and strategies are necessary based on their career 
paths; 2) what kinds of “talent” and “capacities” are required to be successful; and most 
importantly 3) how graduates can “develop” these abilities.  
The first presenter, who had started her designer career twelve years earlier, began her 
presentation by talking about how she was the only one chosen among 400 candidates when 
she finally came to work with LG. She said that it took almost ten years to enter this 
“prestigious” company as a “capable” designer. She graduated from one of the most famous 
art schools in Korea and had worked at five different companies including several 




settling down at LG. Throughout her career path, she has worked on numerous extra projects 
as well, such as on book illustrations and animation character designs in order to make her 
portfolio more “dynamic” and “exceptional” than others.  
The first and most important suggestion that she gave to these future workers was to 
acquire and develop “extra” abilities beside good design skills. She said that there were 
already too many designers “who are good at design”; so nowadays designers should have 
other expert knowledge and skills, such as “mastering” graphics tools and software. In this 
sense, she was proud of her own knowledge about medicine, which she gathered herself 
through working at several pharmaceutical companies as a package designer. She said that 
this “extra” knowledge and experience in medicine was one of the reasons why she was 
chosen by LG. The reason why these extra abilities is needed is obviously because they are 
essential for appearing “better” or “distinctive” than other “ordinary” designers so as to 
survive in this excessive competitive market. Another important point that she addressed was 
“making your own self-identity as a designer” and “visualizing it in portfolios or resumes in a 
original way”, which also are related to “being distinctive and better” than others. Because 
many of the job candidates are already well-equipped with good “qualifications” such as a 
strong university GPA, abundant internship experience, high English language test scores, 
she said that the candidates all look the same. To beat out the hundreds or sometime 
thousands of other competitors, she suggested that it is crucial to make yourself appealing by 
“framing” your own story or self-identity and showing it in a “distinctive” way. As an 
example, she showed some “notable” model resumes, one of which included a smart phone 
application programmed by the candidate himself. In her final remarks, she stressed that her 




she stressed that everyone could become like her if they “keep challenging themselves and 
not giving up”.    
 The second presenter had a fairly similar career path to the first presenter. She also 
graduated from the same design school as the first presenter and had worked in numerous 
different types of design companies, such as animation production, IT design solution 
companies and web marketing companies before entering LG. She stressed in her 
presentation “having a mentality of self-development” rather than following only money and 
welfare benefits. She revealed that she actually had three job offers from several companies 
when she first “hit” the job market after her completion of graduate school. Among these 
three firms, she said that she chose the smallest IT solution company, which actually offered 
the lowest salary out of the three companies because she thought that she could “develop” 
herself in that company more than in the other two. In this company, she said that she was 
never lazy but rather kept “exploring” herself by continuously reflecting upon questions like 
“what are my dispositions?”, “what are my interests ?”, “what am I good at?” and “how can I 
develop myself more?” With this self-reflective practice, she stressed that it is essential to 
develop various potentialities and abilities “beyond” what companies generally expect for 
designers. Based on this self-reflection and self-development mentality, she said that she was 
able to learn more about various different types of work than other designers did and to 
experience a variety of types of job roles not only as a designer but also as a manager and 
project planner. She stressed that these differences made her successfully arrive at a company 
like LG. In her final remarks, she again addressed that “Please do not search for the 
companies which provide you with a high salary or good welfare benefits. Choose the 




and “self-reflection” made me think that these ideas might be based on such logic as "you 
have to protect yourself in order to survive in this excessively competitive situation because 
the companies no longer protect you".  
By looking at these design workers’ career paths, it seems clear that it is extremely 
difficult to enter good companies like Samsung and LG as a designer. Even though both of 
these speakers graduated from the best design schools in Korea, they had to keep changing 
companies and “never” wavering from the development of their skills and abilities beyond 
what was generally expected. A self-reflection and self-development mentality became a 
compulsory “required” subjectivity to survive as a designer in an excessively competitive 
situation, and personal histories and trajectories of how people develop their skills, 
knowledge and more importantly “themselves” become some of the most precious resources 
that contribute to making creative workers appear “distinctive” and “better” than their 
competitors.  
These two experts’ presentations were followed by one given by a current design 
student. The presenter, who introduced himself as an ordinary design major just like any 
other, had become famous by sharing his experiences and strategies as to how he was able to 
participate in numerous Korean big chaebol company-promoted public relations activities 
that were dubbed “external activities” (daehoehwaldong,대외활동).  From the 2000s onward, 
large Korean companies, such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai and SK, launched various types of 
so-called “campus PR activities”. In most cases, these companies annually recruited around 
one hundred volunteer university students as “campus reporters” or “blog journalists” to give 




business activities. To enable them to collect news data and produce news coverage and 
articles about their companies' businesses, companies invited these students to tour and 
participate in various PR activities, such as corporate social service activities. Companies 
usually economically supported these volunteer students, sometimes giving them the 
opportunity to travel internationally, manage their own websites, and publish their own 
newspapers or magazines based on their news coverage or articles. For example, Samsung 
manages the Young Samsung Campus Reporter program, while SK operates SK Students’ 
Blog Journalists. From the viewpoint of these companies, such activities – dubbed “chaebol 
company sponsored-external activities” for university students – have become one of the 
most effective and important of their tools to publicize their companies not only to the 
educational systems but also to the broader society. At the same time, to the university 
students, such internships become “noble” opportunities to closely experience their “dream” 
companies. For this reason, it is becoming very competitive to be chosen for participation in 
these “external activities,” as with other internship opportunities.  
The student presenter – chosen by all three companies of Samsung, SK and LG – was 
obviously some kind of “star” in the “external activities” field. He clearly argued that his 
participation in these “external activities” was very important because it gave him “precious” 
experience and information about these “dream” companies. One of the examples he pointed 
out was that he was able to actually meet and interview those in charge of the company’s 
recruitment department. Because of excessive competition, any information about 
recruitment is extremely important for the future workforce, and he revealed that he was able 
to gain an “insider’s viewpoint” as to what kinds of “human capitals” these companies 




ordinary students like himself – who even did not graduate from prestigious schools different 
from other two presenters working in LG– could get the opportunity to directly meet and 
interview those who were in charge of a large company’s recruitment. He seemed to firmly 
believe that these activities functioned as a way of increasing one’s possibility to enter “these 
dream companies”. Apart from gaining such an “insider’s viewpoint”, he introduced that he 
also could meet many “able” peer students via these “external activities”.  Since it was really 
competitive to be chosen by these companies' “external activities”, he argued that every 
chosen participant was thus an “able” one. He also revealed that he was even preparing to 
start his own IT design venture business with other peers whom he had met there. He added 
that through these activities he had developed a “strong attachment” to the companies with 
which he participated, even though he was not yet employed by them.    
After finishing all the presentations, in the Q&A session one student’s question 
surprised and made me strongly uncomfortable about these so-called "mentoring programs". 
This student said that he was now majoring in two more subjects – engineering and 
management in addition to design – in order to survive in this competitive job market. He 
cautiously asked the presenters whether his direction was suitable to what they framed as a 
“designer whose abilities go beyond what companies generally expected”. One presenter 
replied to him jokingly that he thought the best future designer is a person like a Hollywood 
movie character, “Iron Man”, who can design what he wants, engineer what he designed, and 
even manage his own companies. Even though many in the audience laughed at that moment, 
I felt a strong discomfort because I envisioned what the Korean society was imposing on 
these young students in order for them to become ideal future “creative workers”.  Such a 




their own fields, but also have to be omnipotent “superhero” workers who can do whatever 
the companies wants beyond their expectations. More importantly, so as to keep up with the 
industry’s “beyond expectations”, one of the most important things creative workers have to 
do is to constantly monitor and push their “self-development” and “self-reflection” in order 
to become “distinctive” and “better” than their fellow designers.     
Political scientist Isabell Lorey (2015) claims that precarization not only means 
“destabilization through employment” but also shows “destabilization of the conduct of life 
and thus on bodies and modes of subjectivation” (Lorey, 2015:13). Here she attempts to 
define “precarization” as a new mode of governmentality in the production of certain subjects 
whose main preoccupation is based on “insecurity” (Neilson and Cote, 2014). Therefore, she 
argues that global neoliberalism as governmentality can produce “conformist self-
development subjects” who eagerly and incessantly “develop” and “manage” themselves to 
cope with their feelings of “insecurity”. Similarly, McRobbie (2002) argues that reflexivity 
can function as a “de-politicizing and de-socializing mechanism” to call upon creative 
workers to continuously monitor and discipline themselves. She argues that in the absence of 
structures of social support, reflexivity can be toward a practice of “self-responsibility” and  
“self-blame” by keep asking oneself with questions like “where have I gone wrong?” 
(McRobbie, 2002: 522) In other words, these scholars importantly warn that under this 
precarization, self-reflexivity and self-development of the subject can be directly toward 
conforming to the current global neoliberalism.  
As shown in this participant observation, without any structural and industrial support 
creative workers in Korea are now under societal promotion of becoming “conformist self-




successfully survive in this excessively competitive job market. In doing so, they are 
cultivated to be model subjects who are "distinctive and better" than their peers to satisfy 
their future employer in the sense of “beyond industries’ expectations”. In this regard, “self-
development” and “self-reflection” function as tools to construct confirming self-
development subjects who excessively try to cope with their insecure and precarious working 
and living conditions by continuously “developing” and “monitoring” themselves.  
7.6 Artists Social Union Movement and Political Subjectivization 
As shown in my participant observation, the promotion of this subjectivity of a 
“confirming self-development subject” is continuously fostered by the widespread 
educational and mentoring programs for future workers in alliance between the state and 
capitals; this “self-development’-type solution is preferred in even the “citizen-friendly” 
current mayor’s administration. However, in Seoul, I also was able to find several people 
working in meaningfully different directions to improve the precarious working and living 
conditions of creative workers. These workers were not satisfied with “self-development”-
type solutions promoted by the state and capitals, but rather asked for structural changes and 
social supports. At the same time, in order to build up consolidation among various creative 
occupations, they strategically disavowed the given self-identity – such as that of 
“individualized creator” – yet recalled the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor” to resist 
and oppose the given precarious working and living conditions. This “resistance” subjectivity 
could be found in a variety of different forms from individual worker or a group of workers 
to “union”-type movements such as the Artists Social Union. Nonetheless, there were several 




labor market in Korea’s creative economy”49 and “against the given self-identity as 
individualized creator”.  
One of my interviewees, Sunwoo (CW16), who has been working in the design 
industry for ten years critically evaluated his ten month-long experience in Seoul Design 
Foundation (below SDF)’s social enterprise incubation program. He said that he originally 
had a personal desire to “talk about social issues” such as global warming through his design 
products since his undergraduate era. When he found the SDF-supported social enterprise 
incubation programs, he thought that it was time to start his own business; therefore he 
applied to the program and luckily was chosen by SDF. Through these projects, the SDF has 
provided several education and mentoring programs such as entrepreneurship and marketing. 
Still, he finally realized that the current city’s policy to support creative workers via 
education and mentoring typed projects was not changing their working and living conditions 
at all:  
My ultimate conclusion which I have found through participating in this whole 
project is that the state and the city’s discourse and policy of booming venture and 
social enterprise in creative industries are completely “wrong”. Think about it: if the 
state and the city still can make abundant employment by promoting the existing 
companies in creative industries, why do they need to support social enterprise or 
venture enterprise in creative industries? They already know that they can’t make any 
more jobs through promoting current companies because it is already overly 
competitive. At the same time, there is a continuous oversupply of labor … So I think 
																																								 																					
49 Here I refer to the term "penetration", developed by cultural sociologist Paul Willis. Willis 
(1977) defined "penetration" as "designate impulses within a cultural form towards the 
penetration of the conditions of existence of its members and their position within the social 
whole but in a way which is not centred, essentialist or individualist."(Willis, 1977:119). 
Based on his ethnographic research on the relationship between the counter-school culture 
and the reproduction of British working class, he showed that working class children actually 
see through "a common educational fallacy that opportunities can be made by education" 
(Wills, 1977:128) and know better than "the new vocational guidance what is the real state of 




that the state and the city now tell young workers to “start your own business by 
yourself” and they wrap it with a fancy discourse like “Yes, we are now investing in 
“creative and passionate young workers’ dreams”… Do you think that many people 
can really survive in this competitive market in social and venture enterprise? It is 
almost impossible … so I think that the current city’s policy to support venture and 
social enterprise in creative industries is just “deceiving” the citizens and young 
people. (Personal interview with Sunwoo (CW16), a male designer participated in the 
SDF's social enterprise incubation programs) 
 
Sunwoo's long-standing experience in the competitive design industry and his 
participation in an actual creative city policy project have allowed him to "see through" the 
mirage to come to realize that there are indeed structural constraints and limitations which 
individual workers cannot overcome. He has come to "know better" than the SMG's creative 
city policy as to what is the real industrial situation of creative industries. His penetration into 
the deeply fractured labor market in Korea's creative economy derives from his experiences 
and implicit knowledge through living and working in precarious conditions, and his 
firsthand participation has made him view the current existing policy and industrial situation 
critically. Therefore, it is important to note that creative workers are not simply dupes of the 
government-promoted fancy discourse of creative city policy just like my interviewee has 
actually penetrated it. However, only penetrating the given structure and existing system is 
not enough to resist and oppose the given working and living conditions as long as such 
resistance tends only to become one of individual blame or resentment. Rather, the worst 
situation might be that "people already know it but still are doing it". Therefore, it is 
necessary to create certain sites, media or organizations for workers to come together to share 
this blame, dissatisfaction and contempt toward the current existing system, and in this way 




creative workers who created a medium by which to investigate and share various creative 
workers' living and working conditions by publishing their own online magazine.  
The title of the online magazine, “Listening”, implies simply that these workers are 
open to listening to the diversity of creative workers’ voices in terms of issues and difficulties 
of their working and living conditions. This group of four young creative workers from such 
various backgrounds as design and IT programming publish an online magazine that includes 
a series of articles and interviews with different types of creative workers. When I visited 
their office, they told me that their “deep” dissatisfaction and strong contempt with the 
existing system led them to spontaneously research creative workers’ working and living 
conditions by themselves and share this information with other workers via the format of an 
online magazine. One member of the group, Heyri (CW7) explained to me how she came up 
with the idea to start this project:  
I majored in cultural studies and feminism in my undergraduate program and have 
been involved in various kinds of cultural activism on social issues. After graduating 
college, I have been working at one of the largest IT companies (in Korea) and at 
several cultural foundations as well. Also, I have many friends and relatives who are 
working in these fields such as arts, music, design, media, etc. … By passing through 
my careers, I have noticed that my viewpoint toward so-called “creative industries” 
has been changing. I found that there is a chronic and systematic problem mostly 
represented by the problem of “labor”. However, I felt that there was an odd 
perception gap between the older generations who started their careers when creative 
industries were still expanding and our generation who grew up under the discourse 
of prominent “creative industry” but found that working conditions were extremely 
poor and hard. I felt that these older generations seem not to take this labor problem 
seriously, so I thought that this is the task that our generation should take care of by 
ourselves. (Personal interview with Heyri (CW7), one member of the online magazine, 
Listening)  
 
Through the use of funding resources from the Korean Artists Welfare Foundation, 




articles about and interviews with creative workers, labor lawyers, politicians, and academics. 
In my interviews with them, they said that even though there are certain differences in each 
creative industry sector such as movies, design, media, literature, and music, they ultimately 
have found that there are strong commonalities such as the problem of widespread precarious 
working and living conditions and more importantly the problem of “being socially 
recognized creative work as labor”. Heyri explained this issue:   
Yes, we have researched various types of creative workers' living and working 
situations and found that there are some detailed differences within each industry. 
Broadly, the realm of “art” such as classical music, dance, and theater production, and 
the field of “cultural industry” such as popular music, movie, broadcasting and design 
have a different industrial situation. For example, in case of the artistic field, we 
found that state policy should be more toward the principle of patronage and 
enlightenment, but in more industrial fields, we found that there are certain industry-
specific problems such as copyright issues and subcontracting problems ... So we 
might need a different policy plan to handle each of them. However, in spite of these 
specific differences, we found the one critical commonality is that these various 
creative workers all want their works to being socially recognized and respected as 
“labor”. (Personal Interview with Heyri (CW7), one member of the online magazine, 
Listening) 
 
Thus one of these young workers explained that there might be a certain specific tool 
to solve each industry’s problem based on its own context. However, she argued that there is 
a common ground on which to solidify and consolidate these various creative workers in 
terms of socially recognizing and respecting creative work as “labor”. As I reported in my 
previous research, in the Korean creative industry there is a tendency for creative workers to 
try not to identify themselves as "laborers" or "workers"; rather they prefer to recognize 
themselves as "passionate creators" or "individualized freelancers" (Kim, 2008, 2014).  In 
order to cope with their precarious working and living conditions, creative workers in Korea 




office workers and blue-collar manual laborers. "Passion for creativity" and "liberal 
freelancer identity" give them a sense of pleasure and freedom, but this passionate creator 
and individualized freelancer subjectivity has become one of the strong barriers preventing 
them from solidifying themselves. In this regard, recognizing and respecting creative work as 
a "labor" go in an exactly opposite direction from what I observed before.  
In fact, this group of creative workers pointed out that there was a societal "turning 
point" that allowed creative workers to subvert their self-identity and turn their eyes toward 
the neglected subjectivity of “solidified labor”. The turning point was actually caused by a 
series of creative workers' deaths and suicides due to these precarious working and living 
conditions. In particular, in 2011, the death of the young screenwriter Chio Go-Eun, who 
died alone ill and in poverty at age 32, ignited societal dispute about the social welfare and 
support system for creative workers in Korea. Some of the news journalists reported that she 
was "socially murdered" and started investigating the poor living and working conditions of 
creative workers in various fields including literature, music, popular art, fine arts, designers, 
movies, and broadcasting (e.g, Ahn, 2011).  
Along these lines, it is necessary to note that an important social movement recently 
has emerged in which various types of creative workers are trying to consolidate and 
organize themselves into a "union". This movement is a meaningful example of how creative 
workers can empower themselves as “political subjects” who strategically disavow their 
given self-identity as “individualized creators” but recall the neglected subjectivity of 
“solidified labor” to resist and oppose given precarious working and living conditions. In 
December 2011, an open forum for creative workers was held in remembrance of Chio Go-




novelists, playwrights, movie directors, cartoonists, art directors and politicians from the 
Korean labor party discussed their living and labor conditions and the problems of the current 
social welfare system for creative workers. One of the reasons why these various creative 
occupations joined this open forum was that they found the current living and working 
conditions of so-called creative workers were more similar to one another than different. One 
movie director revealed that the reason for her participation in the forum was that she 
perceived the death of Chio Go-Eun not as a "symbolic incident of others" but rather as a part 
of "her own fear of making a living" because her living and working situation was exactly the 
same as that of creative workers such as Choi Go-Eun50. In other words, most participants 
strongly felt a consolidated "urgency" and "necessity" to change and oppose the current 
existing system.  
One of the critical issues during the forum focused on "how can we become socially 
recognized as ‘labor’". When a moderator of the forum asked a question about the 
relationship between "art and labor", "artists and laborers" and "the concept of artists labor", 
workers from diverse creative occupations interestingly showed several meaningful 
interpretations regarding their self-identity as artist/creator and worker/laborer. For example, 
one playwright reported her experiences and interpretations about the relationship between 
"artists and laborers":  
What I want to talk about regarding this relationship between artist and laborer is that 
speaking about myself as an artist seems to suppress speaking about myself as a 
laborer. I think that there is a certain societal view (in Korea) that creative activities 
																																								 																					
50 Even though I could not participate in the open forum because it took place before I started 
my fieldwork in Korea. However, I could find the full transcript of the forum in Artists 





should be evaluated by other special standards (not by its labor value), and this view 
itself conceals artists' labor value’. (Artists Social Union, 2011, translated by myself) 
 
Here, she points out that there has been a long-term societal viewpoint in Korea that 
divides  "art" and "labor", "artists” and “laborer", or "creator” and “worker," treating them as 
oppositional concepts. As I found in my previous research on broadcast workers, when they 
identify themselves as "creators", they tend to assume that their work is more "artistic", 
"creative", or "autonomous" than is other work such as white-collar office work or blue-
collar manual work in a hierarchical sense (Kim, 2008). In doing so, for them, self-identity 
as "laborer" seems to be perceived as "uncreative", "monotonous" or even "subservient".  
With this logic, identifying themselves as "creators" has a certain symbolic power to replace 
their "social rights as labor" with those of "individualized romantic artists". As Korea labor 
historian Hagen Koo (2001) has shown, Korean workers have suffered not only economically 
and politically, but also culturally and symbolically throughout Korea's industrialization 
period. Within this historical context, the name of "laborer" or "worker" had become 
stigmatized to mean "poor" and "uneducated". In this regard, the reason why the playwright 
sensed a suppressed feeling when she was "speaking about myself as laborer" is because the 
identity of laborer is perceived as "the identity of the other" for her.  
However, these groups of creators found that they can become "political subjects" 
when they "dis-identify" their given identity of "creators" in a hierarchical sense and re-
identify themselves as "laborer" in terms of the other in the sense of "equality". One creator 
said that the idea that artists/creators are also workers/laborers is a "strategic discourse" to 
break down the given order and the broad societal consensus of artists as "non-workers"; 




meaningful members of society just like others are in a equal sense. Similarly, Jun (CW8), 
who is an architect and a musician and strongly supports the Artist Social Union movement, 
told his view of the relationship between creator and worker: 
In our generation [he is in his 40s], I think that artists or so-called creators have been 
socially forced to enhance and intensify "selfness" in the sense of "better" and 
"distinctive" than have ordinary people through Korea's rapid industrialization period. 
People in creative occupations tend to keep think of themselves in a sense that like "I 
should be different, I have to be special, I have to think differently". This is delusion. 
I think this kind of self-centered identity of the creator should be subverted toward a 
more "other-centered identity". I always tell my creator friends and colleagues: "you 
are not special at all. You are equal to anyone else". ... In some sense, this selfness is 
embedded in our generation socially and culturally, so it might be a bit difficult to 
change it easily. However, I think that Korean society is changing now, and our next 
generation should find and develop how we can break this self-centered identity and 
develop an "other-centered" and "community-driven" identity. (Personal interview 
with Jun (CW8), a male musician and architect who supports Artists Social Union)  
 
As he argues, this group of creative workers has found that the self-centered identity 
of creator/artist should be changed into an other-centered identity of worker/laborer. In this 
sense, their idea of "artist laborer" or "creative worker" points out what Jacques Ranciere 
(1992) argues in terms of an "in-between" subjectivity in the sense of equality, in which the 
artist/creator identity is not perceived as "better" or "distinctive" than that of laborer/worker 
in the sense of confrontation between two identities but conceptualized rather as a "being 
together" to the extent that they are in-between names and identities.  
Jacque Ranciere (1992) distinguishes “identification” based on “the law of policy” 
from the concept of “subjectivization” that is based on “the law of equality”(Ranciere, 1992: 
58). He argues that identification is a process of “governing with the principle of the 
community under the heading of universality, the reign of the law, liberal democracy, and so 




workers are allocated certain “ways of doing, ways of being and ways of saying and seeing 
that those positions are assigned by name to a particular place and task” (Ranciere, 1999: 29); 
thus he calls this process of identification “police,” which is different from “politics.” Under 
this regime of identification, workers situate themselves according to their place. However, 
different from this process of identification, Ranciere conceptualizes a process of 
subjectivization that is “the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation of a self to 
other” (Ranciere, 1992: 60). Under the process of subjectivization, he goes on to argue that 
workers or proletariats begin to claim the fundamental assertion of equality.   
By applying Ranciere's concept of political subjectivization to the Artists Social 
Union movement, creators/artists claimed the neglected category of “worker/laborer” and 
opposed the given order, which divides and allocates them into a certain category or a certain 
order such as "individualized/passionate creator/artists". On the contrary, under the process 
of subjectivization, these creator/artists have the potential to become political subjects who 
can empower themselves by embracing and using the neglected names of "laborer" and 
"worker" as "poor" and "un-educated", which previously have been perceived as oppositional 
with a contrasting subjectivity for them. It is also important to note that the Artists Social 
Union is not yet legally recognized as a "union" by the state but still utilizes its name of 
"union". The group argues that the "Artists Social Union" is "against the limited, exclusive 
ways of traditional labor unions” but open to all who identify themselves as "creative 
workers" or who can agree with its purposes and goals. It shows that this union is based on 
the principle of equality, which proposes that "we all are able to be qualified regardless of 




subjectivization can be seen as what Ranciere calls the moment of “politics” which takes “the 
form of a part which has no part” (Read, 2007: 127).  
Since its first open forum, these groups of workers launched their preparatory 
committee in 2012.  In order to prepare the official establishment, they have held numerous 
open forums and collaborated not only with traditional labor unions such as the Korean rail 
workers who have been striking against privatization and the laid-off Ssangyong motor 
company workers but also with newly emerging social movement groups such as the Arbeit 
Workers Union (a trade union of part-time workers) and the Youth Community Union (a 
group of young people who fight for the right of young workers); through these 
collaborations, they are striving to consolidate their voices against increasingly precarious 
working and living conditions. Moreover, as a result of this variety of activities, they 
gradually have increased social recognition and officially established their organization on 
May Day, 2015. By looking at their activities – even though their action is still at a beginning 
stage – one may be able to predict that they not only will work on labor issues for artists and 
creators but also will engage with broad societal issues to build "social solidarity" against the 
current neoliberal-developmental symptoms of Korea.  
In conclusion, in comparison with Yokohama's "co-existing" model of post-
developmentalism that focuses on promoting ethical and moral volunteer subjects, it is 
possible to find that Korea’s “conflicting” model of post-developmentalism contains and 
fosters two different and contrasting sets of labor subjectivities: on the one hand the SMG 
and capitals have promoted “a conformist self-development creator” and on the other the 
creative workers have empowered “artists labor”.  While conformist self-development 




distinctive than the others, the in-between subjects of the artist laborers politically subjectify 
themselves by dis-identifying their given subjectivity as "passionate and individualized 
creators" in the sense of hierarchy and instead re-identifying themselves as the neglected 
identity of "laborers" and "workers" in the sense of equality. Through this political 
subjectivization, creative workers in Korea have begun to oppose not only the current 
creative city policy but also broader societal problems of precarious working and living 
conditions. In this regard, the framework of "politics" – which is lacking in Yokohama's co-
existing model of post-developmentalism – can be found in Korea's conflicting model; more 
importantly, this notion of "politics" is one of the crucial sources that contributes to making 















8.1 Ongoing Fast Circulation of Creative City Policy in East Asia and the Case of Seoul 
and Yokohama 
 On July 23rd, 2015, when I was in the middle of finalizing this dissertation research, 
Korean President Park Guen-hye announced that the Korean national government would 
establish 17 state-sponsored creative economy innovation centers across the nation in 
collaboration with Korean chaebol companies. The government asserts that these creative 
economy innovation centers will function as future hubs not only to boost national economic 
development but also to create more jobs for young people. Moreover, the main role of the 
centers will focus on supporting and developing venture enterprise incubation under the 
name of "creative economy". Two days later on July 25th, the government held a meeting 
with CEOs and chairmen of 17 Korean conglomerates including Samsung's Lee Jae-yong, 
Hyundai Motor groups' Chung Mong-koo, and LG's Koo Bon-moo. At that meeting, 
President Park Guen-hye emphasized that these chaebol companies should "share" their 
know-how and networks to support the successful startup of these innovation centers. This 
national policy plan reflects the ongoing governmental initiation and promotion of "creative 
economy" by its spending on new infrastructures, investment in agencies to spearhead new 
initiatives, the successful attraction of private capital investments, and promotion of the city 
and by extension of the national branding project. In spite of the outpouring of broad societal 
criticism of the creative city/creative economy that ranges from citizens to creative workers, 




policy never has lost its symbolic power at all. In fact, after Seoul's successful designation of 
the UNESCO Creative City Network in 2010, more Korean cities have joined the network 
including Busan (the City of Film) and Gwangju (the City of Media Arts); furthermore, many 
other cities currently are preparing their applications for their designation as part of the 
UNESCO Creative City Network.  
 This fast circulation trend can be observed in Japan as well. One of the explicit 
examples of this tendency can be observed with the emergence of the "inter-local and 
transnational policy network” represented by the Creative City Network of Japan (below 
CCNJ). The CCNJ was established in 2013 as a platform to promote cooperation and 
exchange among creative cities within this country as well as globally and is composed of 
various municipalities, NPOs, professionals and academic experts. Recently, over 49 
municipalities and 16 NPOs in Japan have joined the CCNJ that is supported by the Agency 
for Cultural Affairs in order to prepare explicit policy practices and strategic plans for 
Japan’s creative city policy. This fast circulation trend of the creative city policy via this kind 
of inter-local policy network not only provides evidence that scrutinization of the growing 
role of inter-local policy networks may be the key to understanding the current global 
circulation of the creative city policy, but also shows that a case study research approach 
based on a particular city's policy adoption and implementation may have some 
methodological limitations in terms of fully capturing a representative portrait of the creative 
city phenomenon because there just may be too many cases to catch up with.  
 Given this fast-growing "creative city phenomenon", what might be the practical 




possibility that this research suffers from the pitfall of anecdotalism? Or, as Actor-Network 
Theory assumes in theory – because certain urban realities are based on highly contingent 
and uncertain localized achievements – is it necessary instead to scrutinize more cases to 
draw a more accurate picture and fill in empirical gaps within our understanding of 
ambiguous East Asian variants of the global "creative city phenomenon"? To answer these 
questions, I propose to use my case studies of Seoul and Yokohama – not in the sense of 
binary oppositional concepts of "universal" versus "particular" – but rather in the sense of the 
in-between concept of "conjuncture". In his famous concept of articulation, Stuart Hall 
famously proposed the consideration of certain social realities within the viewpoint of 
"articulation" in terms of the notion of contingent but concrete historical conjuncture; more 
importantly, he argues that once certain articulation is constructed, it moves not in “infinite 
difference” but in “unity in difference.” 
 Through the application of Hall’s conceptualization of articulation, it is thus possible 
to reframe the debate between the East Asian variant on the one hand and the global creative 
city phenomenon on the other. As we can see in the concept of articulation, certain policy 
regimes are not automatically given as transparent or abstract. Rather, they always seem to 
consist of concrete connections and linkages of policy practices among various policy actors, 
and these connections and linkages can be sustained mainly by specific processes, which are 
not “eternal” but rather have to be constantly renewed. By following Hall's position, I suggest 
that the larger characters of Neoliberalism and Developmentalism might not be useful to 
effectively capture the global rapid circulation of creative city policy. Rather, as I have 




developmentalisms, neoliberalisms or post-developmentalisms via conjunctural analysis of 
the creative city phenomenon in East Asia. In this sense, I hope that the cases of Seoul and 
Yokohama will contribute to the prediction that certain patterns of assemblages may re-
emerge through the active translation of inter-local and transnational policy networks. 
Therefore, I suggest that it is crucial for future research to deliberately trace how inter-local 
and transnational policy networks – such as Japan’s CCNJ – "translate" the creative city 
policy and in what ways this translation influences a local municipality' adoption and 
implementation of policies. In fact, the cases of Seoul and Yokohama are particularly 
important because they are perceived as internationally successful and among the leading 
cities at both the local and global levels. For this reason, it can be predicted that Seoul and 
Yokohama will take relatively important roles in the transmission of their knowledge and 
strategies to other cities, corporate actors, and NGOs midst this rapid circulation of creative 
city policy.  
 In what ways does the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama generate new 
forms of urban politics in relation to various policy actors, including city government, local 
and global business capitals, and citizen and creative labor? To answer this research question, 
this research viewed creative city policy of Seoul and Yokohama as “new urban 
governmental techniques”, and it traced connections among various institutional actors 
including Seoul and Yokohama city governmental officials, policy experts from 
governmental think tanks, activist organizations, citizen groups, artists, and creative workers. 
The main body of this dissertation consists of three main substantive parts which include a 




construction projects, (2) urban mega events, and (3) new forms of subjectivities such as 
“creative citizen” and “creative labor”.   
 In the first main part (chapter 2 and 3), I focused on how creative city policies in 
Seoul and Yokohama are located in procedures and objects within the urban construction 
project by comparing Seoul’s Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park construction to 
Yokohama’s Creative Core Area construction. I examine how these urban sites become 
carefully rearranged settings through certain procedural, institutional, and technical 
mechanisms implemented by various discursive and material practices of policy actors.  
 In case of Yokohama, by starting from Yokohama’s brief urban history, I proposed to 
view the relationship between the Minato Mira 21(below MM21) and the Kannai Area to 
better understand the emergence of the creative city policy in Yokohama. Based on the 
consideration of the relationship between MM21 and Creative Core Area, I found that two 
different policy networks-the Kannai’s post-developmental and MM21’s neoliberal-
developmental networks-coexist in different spaces, one in the Creative Core Area and the 
other in MM21, though having different time spans (MM21 From 1980 and Creative Core 
Area from 2004). On the other hand, different from Yokohama’s coexistence model, in case 
of Seoul, I reported that two different policy networks-the former mayor’s neoliberal-
developmental network consisting of the state and capital and the current mayor’s post-
developmental network consisting of the state and citizens- conflicted with each other over 
one site, the Dongdaemun Design Plaza and Park, in a compressed time span from 2007 to 
2013. Based on these findings, I suggest a clearer conceptualization of the East Asian variant 




Developmentalism” or “Neoliberal-Developmentalism” but within the framework of multiple 
“post-developmentalisms” or “neoliberal-developmentalisms”.  
 In the second main part (chapter 4 and 5), I examined in what ways urban mega 
events are practiced by routinized techniques or standardized procedures by focusing on 
Seoul’s Design Seoul Olympiads and Yokohama’s Yokohama Triennales. Rather than 
understand the development of new urban mega events as merely the reflex of the expansion 
of neoliberal capitalism, these chapters suggested view mega events as discursive and 
material fields of struggle where a variety of policy conflict and oppose each other by 
translating and counter-translating urban spaces and events in a different direction. 
 In the case of Yokohama, by focusing on four different Yokohama Triennales from 
2001 to 2011, I found that coexisting model of creative city Yokohama consisting of the 
state-NPOs-citizens only provided with a limited mode of civic participation by fostering 
“volunteer subjectivity”, which is apolitical and supports only the state. In this regard, in 
spite of citizens’ strong desire to become a “mediator” of urban mega events, there is no 
route by which citizens can more "radically" participate from the actual planning and 
management process of the exhibition. Different from Yokohama’s coexisting model and its 
relation to “volunteer subjectivity” as an ideal model of citizen participation, in case of Seoul, 
I show how different policy networks such as "neoliberal-developmental" and "post-
developmental" networks differently organized urban mega events represented by “Seoul 
Design Olympiads” and the “Dongdaemun Design Jam 7.7.7”.  By focusing on three Seoul 
Design Olympiads, I found that these urban mega events were organized and managed by an 




Through these urban mega events, civic participation was only limited to what I refer to as 
“participation via competition”, thereby completely neglecting citizens’ involvement in the 
planning and the management processes of the events. Different from Seoul Design 
Olympiads, Korea’s post-developmental policy networks in which state actors interacted 
directly with ordinary citizens and NPOs, newly organized and managed Dongdaemun 
Design Jam 7.7.7 by providing more direct and in-depth citizen participation. In this regard, 
the two different types of events demonstrate that Seoul’s each policy network has opposing 
and conflictual ideas and meanings in relation to urban spaces and events.  
 The last main part (chapter 6 and 7) aims to “reassemble” the creative city policy 
actors and objects together in an active process to foster certain types of subjectivities such as 
“creative citizen” and “creative labor” in Seoul and Yokohama. The participant observation 
research in Seoul Design Support Center in Seoul as well as in Creative City School in 
Yokohama comprises my main case studies for these final main chapters. By focusing on the 
lived experiences of working and living conditions, I tried to show how creative workers in 
Seoul and Yokohama actually experience, evaluate, participate, negotiate or even resists the 
given creative city policies as well as their precarious working and living conditions.  
 In case of Yokohama, by following the recent researches on creative labor, I focused 
on how the ethical and moral dimensions of labor subjectivity are prominently important to 
explain workers’ everyday living and working experiences as creative labor in Yokohama. 
Furthermore, I address how these ethical and moral values in creative work are actually 
preferred within the given creative city policy and have certain limitations to overcome a 




in Seoul demonstrate the potential to resist and oppose not only the given creative city policy 
but also their precarious working and living conditions. In order to rightly capture these 
creative workers’ resistance and opposition, I located creative workers’ subjectivities of 
Seoul within the growing research trends on “precariat” studies. In contrast with Yokohama’s 
“co-existing” model of post-developmentalism that focuses on the promotion of “moral and 
ethical volunteer subjects”, I show how Korea’s “conflicting” model of post-
developmentalism actually contains and fosters two different and contrasting sets of labor 
subjectivities: the SMG and capitals that promote “a conformist self-development creator” on 
the one hand and the creative workers who are empowered “artists labor” on the other. 
8.2 Epilogue: From the circulation of Creative City “policy” to the transmission of 
Creative City “politics”?  
 After completing my lengthy field research in Japan and Korea, I had the opportunity 
to present one of my dissertation chapters at the annual convention of International 
Association for Media and Communication Research in July, 2014. At that conference, one 
of the commentators of my research said that even though he understood the problems of 
creative city policy in East Asia well by reviewing my paper, he asked me that what might be 
my opinion as to the future policy direction or any potential “alternative” for creative city 
policy. I do not quite remember how I responded to that question; as far as I remember, none 
of us in that conference room clearly answered that question about an "alternative". After the 
conference, however, I had to keep struggling with this question when I worked on my 
dissertation manuscript. Sometimes I thought that thinking about an "alternative" was outside 




role to suggest an “alternative,” given I am a  "mere researcher”. Nonetheless, when I 
collected the data about Artists Social Union movement and re-analyzed my interviews with 
creative workers and activists in Korea, I finally reached the result that what these creative 
workers and citizens really desire is not a well-planned “policy” but rather radical “politics”.  
 French philosopher Jacques Ranciere defines "policy" as a governing process relying 
on "the distribution of shares and the hierarchy of places and functions" in which people are 
allocated to only within a certain way of being (Ranciere, 1992). Different from the logic of 
policy, Ranciere defines "politics" as an emancipating process that depends on the logic of 
equality in which people demolish every order, qualification and hierarchy in an anarchic 
sense (Ranciere, 1992). To apply Ranciere's conception of "policy" and "politics" to the 
creative city policy, it is clear that the creative city policy in Seoul and Yokohama exactly 
follows what Ranciere called the logic of "policy" as a governing process in which the order 
and the role of policy actors are distributed, allocated and located through certain procedural, 
institutional, and technical mechanisms implemented by various discursive and material 
practices. Under this policy regime, the role of creative workers and citizens is located solely 
in a "moral and ethical volunteer subject" in Yokohama or a "conformist self-development 
subject" in Seoul. Therefore, what is necessary is not to consent or agree with this policy 
regime, but to dissent and disagree with the current creative city policies; most importantly, it 
is possible to find an important clue about "politics" in the Korea's Artists Social Union 
movement.  
 East Asian developmental states have been well known for their high level of state 




successfully “catch up” to their western counterparts has been based heavily on the crucial 
role of its technocracy and well-organized state policies. In other words, well-planned state 
policies from “experts” have been a major tool for national economic development in East 
Asia. However, it is important to note that this strategy of development via a well-organized 
policy became one of the reasons why East Asian society prefers to be the society of consent, 
agreement and apolitical. The rapid circulation of the creative city policy shows that inter-
local and transnational policy networks, connections and linkages are rapidly emerging now; 
therefore my answer about possible “alternatives” might be that it is urgently necessary to 
develop counter-networks, counter-connections and counter-linkages to transmit "politics". If 
this is accurate, what is necessary for East Asian society is not a question of "How can we 
develop effective and optimal creative city policy?" but rather that of "How can we invent 













DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN KOREA  
















NGO/NPO NG 1 Early 30s Female 5 years 











CW 1(Designer/Professor) Mid 40s Female 20 years 
CW 2(Designer) Early 30s Female 10 years 
CW 3(Writer) Late 30s Female 10 years 
CW 4(Architect) Early 40s Female 15 years 
CW 5(Designer/Professor)  Mid 40s Female 15 years 
CW 6(Painter/Activist) Mid 30s Male 3 years 
CW 7(Designer) Mid 30s Female 8 years 
CW 8(Architect/Musician) Late 40s Male 15 years 
CW 9(Painter/Activist) Mid 30s Female 8 years 
CW10(Designer) Early 30s Male 3 years 
CW11(Architect) Mid 40s Male 14 years 
CW12(Designer) Mid 40s Female 5 years 
CW13(Designer/Professor) Late 40s Male 18 years 
CW14(Design field) Mid 20s Male College Student 





























DEMOGRAPHY OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES IN JAPAN  
Occupation No. Age Gender Length of Career 
State Official  SO 1 Late 40s Male 20 years 
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